The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Ten Years On

Published date01 August 2018
Date01 August 2018
AuthorSimon Parsons
DOI10.1177/0022018318779835
Subject MatterComment
Comment
The Corporate Manslaughter
and Corporate Homicide
Act 2007 Ten Years On:
Fit for Purpose?
It has been just over 10 years since the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (the
Act) was brought into force on 6 April 2008. The Act abolished killing by gross negligence manslaughter
in respect of corporations and abandoned the identification doctrine, so that a corporation cannot be
attributed with liability for that crime .
1
In its place, the Act creates in English law the offence of
corporate manslaughter. The purpose of the change was to enable the courts to get away from the
identification doctrine with its emphasis on the directing mind of the corporation being grossly negligent
to an offence that would impose direct personal liability on a corporation where there has been a gross
management failure which was the cause of a person’s death. The offence enables the conduct of all the
management within a corporation to be taken into account when ascertaining whether there were
systemic failures in respect of safety that caused a death. Thus, both small and large corporations could
face liability for the offence of corporate manslaughter. However, a substantial contribution by senior
management to the gross breach of duty is required. Has this requirement made the offence ineffective
against large corporations? The case law does appear to give an answer to that question.
What was Wrong with the Identification Doctrine?
It was recognised at the end of the 19th century that corporations are legal persons separate from their
shareholders and managers.
2
Despite this, the criminal law developed a criminal liability for corpora-
tions acting through their controlling officers. In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd vNattrass,
3
it was held that the
act of the supreme governing authority of a corporation (namely, the board of directors or the managing
director or controlling officer) constituted an act of the corporation itself. This is known as the identi-
fication doctrine. In respect of corporate liability for manslaughter, it would be necessary to prove that a
controlling officer who was the directing mind and will of the corporation was grossly negligent in
respect of a death, so that negligence could be applied to the corporation with the result both would be
guilty of killing by gross negligence manslaughter. The problem with applying the identification doc-
trine in respect of corporate li ability for manslaughter w as that successful prosecut ions were only
possible where a company was small. For example, in RvOLL Ltd and Kite,
4
the managing director
of OLL Ltd Peter Kite and OLL Ltd were bot h convicted of killing by gross neglige nce after the
company, owned and run by Peter Kite, organised a canoe expedition in Lyme Bay where four sixth-
formers drowned. The novice canoeists were sent out in poor weather with inadequate training and
supervision. A reasonable managing director, having the same information as Peter Kite, would have
realised that these circumstances were very dangerous and grossly negligent because of the risk of death.
1. The identification doctrine remains a method of attribution to corporations for other crimes.
2. Salomon vSalomon [1897] AC 22.
4. The Times, 9 December 1994.
The Journal of Criminal Law
2018, Vol. 82(4) 305–310
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0022018318779835
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