THE CRIMINAL DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE*

AuthorJ. Ll. J. Edwards
Date01 July 1954
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1954.tb02157.x
Published date01 July 1954
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
Volume
17
July
1954
No.
4
Now
that
The
M,odern
Law
Review
appears six times
a
year, the
Editorial Committee have felt free to test a proposal they have long
had under consideration-the publication of an issue devoted to
a
single branch of law.
This, the first such special number, concentrates attention on
the criminal law and its attendant problems.
If,
as is hoped, this
experiment meets with the approval
of
readers, the Committee will
adopt the regular practice of publishing, not more than once a year,
further special issues in which particular topics are examined
at
greater length than can ordinarily be possible. The Editorial
Committee will welcome the views
of
readers upon this experiment.
293
Vor-.
17
I
!)
THE CRIMINAL DEGREES
OF
KNOWLEDGE
*
To
establish criminal guilt it is often necessary to consider what
degree of knowledge is sufficient to incur liability. In two branches
of criminal law, namely, statutory offences involving knowledge
and aiding and abetting, this question is of such practical import-
ance that
it
is surprising to find little
or
no treatment
of
the subject
in any
of
the standard w0rks.l How very different this is com-
pared with the attention given,
for
example, to the doctrines
of
constructive notice and connivance in books on equity and divorce
respectively. Indeed, the kinship which exists on this topic between
the field
of
equity and criminal law is one
of
the interesting
features made apparent by a closer study
of
the problem. In the
recent case
of
Roper
v.
Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter)
Ltd.,2
an attempt was made by Devlin
J.
to
categorise the various degrees
of knowledge which are relevant in statutory crimes, but it is
respectfully suggested that his conclusions must be treated with
reserve, since, with one exception, they were put forward without
any apparent citation
or
examination
of
the relevant cases.
So
far as the requisite grades of knowledge in aiding and abetting are
concerned there have also been several recent cases in which the
courts have sought to re-enunciate the correct principles. In both
spheres of liability the principal doubt concerns negligence as
a
state
of
mind. Whereas on a charge of aiding and abetting
it
is
reasonably clear that nothing less than actual knowledge
or
con-
nivance is req~ired,~ the examination which follows discloses
*
This article constitutes
a
chapter
of
a book which is shortly
to
be published in
the series
English Studies
in
Criminal Science,
edited by the Department
of
Criminal Science, Cambridge Universiti.
1
A
notable exception is Glanville Williams’s recently published
Criminal Law-
The General Part.
2
[1951] 2 T.L.R. 284,
at
pp.
287-8.
3
See
Johnson
v.
Youden
[1950]
1
All E.R. 300;
Ferguson
v.
Weaving
[1951]
1
K.B.
814, and
Gardner
v.
Akeroyd
[1952] 2 All E.R. 306.
4
In
Thomas
v.
Lindop
[1950]
1.411
E.R. 966, Lord Goddard C.J. drew attention
to the close relat,ionship which exists between aiding and abetting and the type
of
offence which is based on guilty knowledge in the form of permitting or
suffering certain conduct. Just
as
act,ual knowledge or connivance is necessary
in cases of suffering,
so,
too, the Chief Justice added, it is one of the essential
ingredients
of
aiding and abetting
(see
p.
968). Some
of
the
cases
on aiding
and abetting in which the doctrine of connivance
was
applied are
R.
v.
Antonelli
and Ba.rberi
(1905)
70
J.P.
4 and
Johnson
v.
Youden (supra).
The decision in
the last case should be compared with that in
Carter
v.
Mace
[1949] 2 All E.R.
714, in which the Divisional Court appear
to
lay down
a
principle wherein
liability
as
an aider and abet,tor arises independently of knowledge or con-
nivance. The suggestion made by a learned writer in 66 L.Q.R. at p. 228,
that
Carter
v.
Mace
is explicable
as
deciding that a person may be liable for
aiding and abetting
if
he fails to carry out such inquiries
as
a
reasonable man
See pp. 59-60, 85-8, 125-7.
294

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