The Criminal Sanctions against the Illicit Proceeds of Criminal Organisations
| Author | Anna Maria Maugeri |
| Published date | 01 September 2012 |
| Date | 01 September 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1177/203228441200300304 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
New Journal of Eu ropean Crimina l Law, Vol.3, Issue 3-4, 2012 257
THE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST
THE ILLICIT PROCEEDS
OF CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS
A M M*
ABSTRACT
e most recent tendency to place con scation at the forefront of the ght against
organised crime emerges from several important supranational legal instruments (for
example, the 1990 Strasbourg Convention, Council Framework Decisions 2005/212/
JHA and 2006/783/JHA, and the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council in 2012). rough a comparative survey of current legal system s it is
possible to identify four models of con scation: the criminal penalty; con scation based
on the presumption of the illegal destin ation of the assets; con scation of the suspected
illicit proceeds, based on the assumption of the source of the proceeds, and the actio in
rem. ese legislative forms of con scation are criticised at the national level,
particularly as regards their compat ibility with the presumption of innocence, with the
principle of proportionality and with the protection of property rights. In some
judgments, in fact, the ECtHR has evaluated whether some forms of extended
con scation based on rebuttable presumptions are compatible with the guarantee of
article6 (presumption of innocence and fair trial) or article 7(nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege and the prohibition of retroactive c riminalisation) of the Convention, or
with article1 of its First Protocol (right to proper ty). In conclusion, the author presents
some proposals to interpret the new types of extended con scation in order to nd a
good balance between the exigencies of e ciency in the ght against criminal
organisations and the protection of citize ns’ safeguards.
Keywords: con scation; e ciency; presumption of innocence; proceeds;
proportionality
e con scation of illega l proceeds is very importa nt in the ght against orga nised crime
in ord er to av oid the reinve stment of such procee ds in econom ic act iviti es and to prev ent
the in ltration of il legal organisations in the economy and in the p olitical system.
* Full Professor of Cr iminal law – Universit y of Catania (Italy).
Anna Maria Maugeri
258 Intersentia
e ght against the economic power of criminal associations responds to the
need to more widely protect the rules of the ma rket economy; the entry into business
of individuals who use illicit capital seriously alters the basic conditions for free
competition and blocks the development of competitive dy namics.
Such an aggressive and wide ranging phenomenon, subject to frequent
transformations linked to processes of nance and globalisation that characterise
today’s world economy, has pushed the modern criminal legi slator in Italy and in other
countries to develop a complex system of laws in order to ght the economic power of
organised crime.1 Moreover, as an essential tool to ght organised crime, con scation
has been given strategic priorit y at EU level, although at present the number of freezing
and con scation procedures in the EU and the amounts recovered from organised
crime seem modest if compared to t he estimated revenues of organised cr iminal groups.
In the comparative survey of current law systems it is possible to identify four
models of con scation intended to ght organised crime: the criminal penalty;
con scation based on the presumption of the illegal destination of the assets;
con scation of the suspected il licit proceeds, based on the assumption of the source of
the proceeds, and t he actio in rem.
1. THE CONFISCATION PENALTIES AND THE
PATRIMONIAL SANCTIONS BASED ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF ILLICIT DESTINATION
In some legal systems legislators have introduced c riminal penalties again st property
such as the Vermögenstrafe (property sanction) in Germany, §43a StGB,2 or the
con scation généra le in France, which a ects also lega l persons.3
1 For a wide overview about sanc tions against illegal proceeds in Italy, in Germany, in French, in
England, in Ireland, in Switzerland, in Austria, in the United States and in Australia, see Maugeri,
Le moderne sa nzioni patrimoniali t ra funzionalità e garantis mo, Milano 2001.
2 is sanction was introduced by the Law to combat drug tra cking and ot her forms of organised
crime on 15 July 1992; iele, Vermögenstrafe und Gewinnabschöpfung. Ein spagat zwischen
Ver fass ungs rech t und e ektiver Kriminalpolitik, Göttingen 1999, 31; Bringewa rt, ‘Die Bildung der
Gesamtver mögensstrafe – ein kriminal politisches Kuckucks ei’, in NStZ 1993, 316; Dessecker,
Gewinnabsch öpfung im Strafrecht und in de r Strafrechtspraxis , Freiburg 1992, 350; Lackner, ‘§43a’,
in StGB, München 1993, 293; Nibelling, ‘Vermögensstra fe – eine neue Sank tion auch des
Jugendstrafrec hts?’, in NStZ 1997, 65; Stree, ‘§43a’, in Strafgesetzbuch – Kommentar Schönke/
Schröder, 25th ed., 1997, 625, §3; Horn, ‘§43a Vermögenstra fe’, in Systematischer Kommentar,
Rudolphi, Horn, Sams on, 22. Lfg., 1993, 27.
3 For the ‘crimes against t he humanity’ Article 213–1, 4° Code pénal; for the most serious ca ses of
drug tra cking Article 222–49, §2 Code pénal (version en vig ueur au 31janvier 2012, depuis le
11juillet 2010) and the launderi ng of the proceeds of t hese crimes; for ter rorism Article422 –6 Code
pénal; for crim inal assoc iation ‘association de malfaiteurs’ – L . No. 2001–420, 15 May 2001 –
Article450 –5; for Tra cking i n human beings, ‘ la traite des êt res humains’, and for the e xploitation
of the prostitution , ‘proxénétisme et des infrac tions qui en résultent’, Article 225–25; see Maugeri,
Le moderne sa nzioni, op.cit., 194.
e Crim inal Sanction s against the Ill icit Proceeds of Crim inal Organisa tions
New Journal of Eu ropean Crimina l Law, Vol.3, Issue 3-4, 2012 259
ese penalties allow con scation of all or part of the property of a convicted
person, irrespective of whet her the assets are procured illega lly or legally.
In France the Law No. 2010–7684 has reformed the legislation on con scation in
order to improve the e ciency of this instrument (in particular the power to freeze
and the tools to increase i nternational cooperation) as well as to ensure respect for the
presumption of innocence and of propert y rights.5
e German Constitutional Court has declared the unconstitutionality of
Vermögenstrafe because this s anction violated the principle of legalit y (Article103, §2
GG) and culpability principle (BverfGE 105, 135).6 In fact, in addition to a prison
sentence (of over two years) the court was empowered to order payment of a nancial
sum which – at varia nce with a system of daily penalties – wa s limited by the value of
the o ender’s assets alone: dependi ng on the individual guilt the a mount in question
had to be equivalent to (at the most) two years of imprisonment in ca se of default and
there were no guidelines on the linkage between the quantum of sanction and the
degree of guilt (in addition, the property sanction and imprisonment had, when
accumulated, to conform to ind ividual guilt).
Since the issue of punishment was involved, its imposition had to respect the
principle of proportionality ; this is the problem of this model of con scat ion: it can be
very e cient to seize all the assets of the convicted person, without having to prove
the illicit origin of the proceeds, but this risks violating the fundamenta l safeguards
of the crimina l law, and in par ticular the culpability a nd proportionality principles.
As regards the latter it is instructive to consider US law. In the USA criminal
forfeiture is a crim inal penalty, which can become a form of general con scation when
it a ects all t he interests in an enterprise of the defendant.7 Crim inal forfeitures are in
4 9 juill 2010 visant à facil iter la saisie et la con scation en matière pénale: JO 10 ju ill. 2010, p.12753.
5 Principles recognised by t he Cons. const. 29Augus t 2002, No. 2002– 461 DC, Loi d’orientation et de
programmation pour la justice. – Cons. const., 16 Januar y 1982, No. 81–132 DC, Loi de
nationalisat ion. See Cutajar, ‘Compte rendu du colloque: ‘Identi cation, saisie et con s cation des
avoirs crimi nels’, Strasbourg 15septembre 20 09’, Cahiers de la sécur ité, n.11, 2010, 211.
6 Cf. BGH, 15November 2002, 2 StR 302102 (LC Frankfurt a.M .), in NStZ 2003, 198; Dessecker,
Gewinnabschöpfung im Strafrecht und in der Strafrechtspraxis, Freiburg 1992, 350–351; Krey-
Dierlamm, ‘Gew innabschöpfu ng und Geldwäsche’, JR 1992, 357; Dreher-Tröndle, §43a,
Strafgesetzbu ch und Nebengesetze, München 1995, 49 2; Körner, Betäubungsmittelgesetz, München
1985, 235; Park, Vermögenstrafe und ‘modernes’ Strafrecht. Eine verfassungsrechtliche,
strafrechtsdogmatische und Kriminalpolitische Untersuchung zur §43 a StGB, 64. Cf. Maugeri, Le
moderne sanz ioni, op.cit., 170 et seq., 664–725; Fonda roli, Le ipotesi speciali di con sca nel siste ma
penale – Ablazione patrimoniale, criminalità economica, re sponsabilità delle persone g iuridiche,
Bologna 2007, 465 et seq.
7 It was introduced by the Compressive Dr ug Abuse prevention and C ontrol Act 1970 (21 U.S.C. §848)
and by the Racketeering In uenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act (18 U.S.C. §1963)), 18 U.S.C. §1961; in the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 200 0 (CAFRA) Congress enac ted 28 U.S.C. §2461(c), which provides that a forfeit ure
judgment may be obtai ned in any crimina l prosecution on the basis of a viol ation for which a civil
forfeiture provision exists.
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