The Curious Absence of Inter-municipal Cooperation in England
| Author | Josephine Kelly |
| Published date | 01 July 2007 |
| Date | 01 July 2007 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0952076707078763 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
© Public Policy and Administration
SAGE Publications Ltd
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
0952-0767
200707 22(3) 319–334
The Curious Absence of
Inter-municipal Cooperation
in England
Josephine Kelly
Aston University, UK
Abstract
In Europe local authorities often work with their neighbouring municipalities,
whether to address a specific task or goal or through the course of regular
policy making and implementation. In England, however, inter-municipal
co-operation (IMC) is less common. Councils may work with service
providers from the private and non-profit sectors but less often with
neighbouring local authorities. Why this is the case may be explained by a
number of historical and policy factors that often encourage councils to
compete, rather than to work collaboratively with each other. The present
government has encouraged councils to work in partnership with other
organizations but there are few examples of increased horizontal cooperation
between local authorities. Instead the prevailing model remains fixed on
vertical co-working predicated on a principal-agent relationship between
higher and lower tiers of government.
Keywords
competition, cooperation, local government partnerships
Introduction
In Europe councils have considerable opportunities to work with neighbouring
municipalities; whether to address a specific task or goal or through the course of
regular policy making and implementation, these forms of inter-municipal co-
operation (IMC) are practiced widely and are well established, particularly in
France, the Netherlands and Spain. In England, however, although local govern-
ment in recent years has worked extensively with service providers from the
private and non-profit sectors, at the institutional level local authorities have fewer
opportunities and incentives to work jointly with neighbouring councils. Indeed,
DOI: 10.1177/0952076707078763
Josephine Kelly, PSSM Group, Aston Business School, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK.
[j.t.kelly@aston.ac.uk]
319
Public Policy and Administration 22(3)
on those occasions when neighbouring councils do collaborate, it is likely to be
predicated on a principal-agent relationship between higher and lower tiers of
councils, or in response to directions from central government departments and
less frequently by local initiatives.
Why this is the case can be explained by the persistence of hierarchy in the UK,
illustrated by local government’s subordinate position in relation to central
government. This is compounded by the lack of constitutional safeguards that
leaves the institutions of local government exposed to the exigencies of
Westminster and Whitehall policy goals. Hence councils operate principally with-
in a framework constructed by central government’s policy objectives, legislation
and the day-to-day expediencies of the governing political party. In practical
terms, securing institutional cooperation between councils remains problematic
because of impediments that are embedded in institutional structures and policies
that prevent, rather than support collaboration.
On the surface, the publication of the local government White Paper ‘Strong
and Prosperous Communities’ (Department of Communities and Local Govern-
ment [DCLG], 2006) marks a beginning of an end to these tensions, as the
government is proposing new forms of collaboration between higher and lower
tiers of councils, including new powers for councils to take responsibility for
shaping their localities though the well-being powers. Nevertheless, the vision for
local authorities described by the White Paper indicates that the policy objectives
of central government departments will continue to shape the form and purpose of
democratic local government.
These tensions are explored in the first part of the article by examining several
of the impediments that hinder IMC at the institutional level. The second part of
the article discusses examples of central steering of local authorities and how
the corollary of New Labour policy initiatives has resulted in strong trends of
managerialism and centralism, while fostering a form of localism that is shaped by
top down pressures. The analysis indicates that ‘bottom–up’ horizontal IMC is
impeded by embedded historical/cultural factors within local government, which
are coupled with the persistence of central policy drivers that promote manageri-
alism and centralism. Consequently the imperative of the primacy of central
government’s own policy objectives have contributed to the diminution of the
institutions of local government.
Constraints, Competition and Partnerships – but Rarely
Cooperation
Explanations why English local authorities infrequently cooperate with their
neighbours, unlike their European counterparts, lie in a number of factors that
have manufactured cautiousness in the political and managerial culture of coun-
cils. Such wariness is embedded in local authorities’ structures and practices;
specifically, that practitioners are obliged to ensure that councils, as legal entities,
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Kelly: Inter-municipal Cooperation in England
fulfil their managerial, political, democratic and constitutional responsibilities,
which leave few opportunities for collaboration outside these boundaries. Indeed,
central government has created barriers to IMC by encouraging competition
between councils, either directly through the rate of local taxation or indirectly, by
performance indicators and league table rankings. Only recently has government
encouraged councils to cooperate, driven by the fragmentation of the delivery of
local government services and New Labour’s belief in the benefits of collaborative
partnerships. Such arrangements are justified by Government, as the most
appropriate vehicle to ensure local authorities, working with central government
departments, may provide strategic leadership and the coordination of service
providers in their localities. In the context of the constraints on councils, along
with competition, it is questionable whether such arrangements result in genuine
cooperation or are a reconfiguration of a principal-agent connection.
Constraints
Compared to most European systems of local government, English councils have
fewer powers and do not enjoy a secure constitutional position. Moreover, its
structures, institutions, responsibilities and obligations are determined by
Government and Parliament and historically enjoyed limited scope for local dis-
cretion. On the one hand, this provides central government with a great deal of
flexibility to reconfigure councils and the whole system of local government to
adapt to changing circumstances and challenges. On the other hand, however,
such flexibility and adaptability has rendered local authorities highly susceptible
to changing fads and the short-term expediency of Westminster and Whitehall
policy makers. The adaptability of local government is illustrated by the changes
to the role of councils over the last 25 years and is currently mostly concerned with
the delivery of services in their area in a context defined by central government
departments.
Constraints on local authorities are broad and lack specificity, which is
symptomatic of local government’s lack of any constitutional safeguards. On the
other hand, constraints, for example, by legal duties, policy advice and guidance
and financial incentives provide considerable scope for Government to deal with
new challenges as they arise. Probably the most significant and enduring of all
constraints is the doctrine of ultra vires, the principle that those councils that act
beyond their powers would be deemed to have acted unlawfully. Councils are
further restricted by their responsibilities to spend money wisely, also known as
their fiduciary duty (Loughlin, 1996). What constitutes acts as being ultra vires or
what items of expenditure are deemed to breach council’s fiduciary duty to its
stakeholders is open to interpretation in law and has because of changing circum-
stances been modified over time (Loughlin, 1996).
These constraints, however, are mostly reactive measures. During the 1980s
they were found to be of diminishing effectiveness against recalcitrant councils
(Kelly, 2003). Accordingly, the Government has modified the role of the Audit
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Public Policy and Administration 22(3)
Commission (AC), which was first established in the mid-1980s to assess whether
councils acted lawfully and whether the services provided were value for money.
Although these constraints remain, New Labour has expanded the role of the AC
from being mostly concerned with verifying the actions of councils, usually by
legality and probity audits, to performance and programme accountability, plus
policy audits. This has been accompanied by the AC shifting its emphasis from
post hoc verification on to proactive and preventative activities, known as ‘up-
streaming’; in other words advising and guiding councils how best they can ensure
that it fulfils policy prescriptions and the performance criteria set by the
Government (Kelly, 2003). One of the by-products of the Government’s apparent
obsession with performance management and the AC’s interest in performance
measurement is the proliferation of league tables and other ranking systems,
which effectively place local authorities in quasi competition with each other.
Accordingly, councils may cooperate but collaboration is predicated on minimiz-
ing any risk to performance rankings (Kelly, 2003; Local Government Chronicle
[LGC]18 June 2006).
Further constraints on IMC...
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