The deepest foundation of our democratic crisis

Published date01 January 2025
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231203719
AuthorJane Mansbridge
Date01 January 2025
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121231203719
International Political Science Review
2025, Vol. 46(1) 3 –17
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/01925121231203719
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The deepest foundation of our
democratic crisis
Jane Mansbridge
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, USA
Abstract
The deepest foundation of our democratic crisis is our increasing human interdependence. That
interdependence creates increasing needs for `free-use goods’: goods that, once produced, anyone can use
without paying (other names: “public goods,” “non-excludable goods”). Such goods produce the classic
“free-rider” problems to which the most efficient solution in societies of strangers is usually government
provision through taxes or regulation, both of which depend on a combination of voluntarism (based on
duty and solidarity) and legitimate coercion. More interdependence creates more free-rider problems,
which require more government intervention/coercion. Our eighteenth-century democratic mechanisms
were not designed to legitimate the amount of state coercion we now need. To bolster legitimacy, we need
to embrace the logic of free-use goods and replace one-way with recursive representation, the principle of
distinction with more descriptive representation, corruption with clean institutions, and legislative-centric
democracy with a full representative system approach, all drawing on our collective intelligence.
Keywords
Democratic crisis, legitimacy, free-rider, recursive representation, descriptive representation, corruption,
representative system, legitimate coercion.
Introduction
The deepest foundation of our democratic crisis is our increasing human interdependence, both
globally and within nations. That interdependence creates increasing needs for ‘free-use goods’ –
goods that, once produced, anyone can use without paying. When a good can be used free, people
usually do not pay for it voluntarily, hoping they can ‘free-ride’ on others’ production of the good.
The good therefore often does not get produced, or not enough to meet the needs. This is the classic
‘free-rider problem’, to which the most efficient solution, particularly in societies of strangers, is
usually government provision through taxes or regulation. Both taxes and regulation depend ulti-
mately on government coercion. In brief, more interdependence creates more free-rider problems,
which in turn require more government intervention (or coercion).
Corresponding author:
Jane Mansbridge, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Email: jane_mansbridge@hks.harvard.edu
1203719IPS0010.1177/01925121231203719International Political Science ReviewMansbridge
research-article2023
Original Research Article

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