The different faces of power in European Union–Russia relations
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836717729179 |
| Published date | 01 March 2018 |
| Author | Tom Casier |
| Date | 01 March 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717729179
Cooperation and Conflict
2018, Vol. 53(1) 101 –117
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836717729179
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The different faces of power
in European Union–Russia
relations
Tom Casier
Abstract
This article applies Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to European Union (EU)–Russia
relations aiming to understand power in its complexity and without a priori theoretical assumptions.
Four different types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – feature
simultaneously. It is argued that non-compulsory forms of power are key to understanding the
logic of competition in EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the 2014 Ukraine crisis, despite
receiving limited scholarly attention. First, a struggle over institutional power, the capacity to
control the conditions of the other actor indirectly, appeared from rivalling integration projects and
competing norm diffusion. Secondly, power relations were strongly characterised by constitutive
forms of power – structural and productive – in particular the capacity to produce and recognise
identities, such as Europeanness. In both fields, the EU held a hegemonic position, which Russia
increasingly challenged. The geopolitical reading of the change in regime in Ukraine in 2014 prompted
Moscow to a radical change of strategy, by shifting the emphasis in the confrontation to compulsory
power. Attempts at direct control, from annexation to sanctions, now dominate relations. Where
Russia seeks to prevent the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine
through destabilisation, this can be labelled ‘negative’ compulsory power.
Keywords
European Union foreign policy, power, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis
‘Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure.’
Nye (1990: 170)
Introduction
While one of the core issues in politics and international affairs, power is among the most
difficult concepts to grasp. Different schools of thought have defined power in diverging
Corresponding author:
Tom Casier, Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS), University of Kent, Boulevard Louis Schmidt 2a,
1040 Brussels, Belgium.
Email: t.casier@kent.ac.uk
729179CAC0010.1177/0010836717729179Cooperation and ConflictCasier
research-article2017
Article
102 Cooperation and Conflict 53(1)
ways and increasingly it has been acknowledged that power is not a one-dimensional
concept, but one that works at different levels, in various ways. It is surprising that power
in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) (or by extension ‘the West’) has
often been the subject of analysis, but has rarely been studied systematically.1 The lack of
critical reflection over conceptual issues of power has frequently led to reductionist views,
narrowing power to a very limited context (e.g. energy dependence) and using one-sided
concepts of power (e.g. coercive capacity or ‘normative power’). Tuomas Forsberg has
indicated the need to look at power in EU–Russia relations differently and to approach the
concept in a more nuanced and differentiated way (Forsberg, 2013). This article seeks to
rethink power relations between Moscow and Brussels in terms of Barnett’s and Duvall’s
taxonomy of power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Their categorisation of power is by no
means the only possible or ultimate one, but it has the advantage of integrating different
theoretical approaches to power and therefore encompassing a wide spectrum of interpre-
tations, looking at power in its various disguises of ‘compulsion, institutional bias, privi-
lege and unequal constraints on action’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 62). Barnett and Duvall
present a taxonomy of power distinguishing between compulsory, institutional, structural
and productive power (see the next section). This article uses their framework to obtain a
better understanding of EU–Russia relations. In other words, the purpose is to bring the
complexity of power back into the scholarly debate. First Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxon-
omy is applied to EU–Russia interaction in the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis that
started in 2014. In the last section, their multi-dimensional framework is used to under-
stand the dramatic change in power dynamics that took place with the crisis over Ukraine.2
In doing so, the article seeks to understand how the annexation of Crimea and consecutive
developments implied a profound shift in the nature of the power struggle between Russia
and the EU.
The article seeks to make a contribution to our understanding of power in EU–Russia
relations in the following ways. First, by applying Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy of
power, it looks at power from different angles, without a priori singling out any particu-
lar interpretation. In doing so the complexity of power, where multiple dimensions oper-
ate simultaneously, is acknowledged. This will lead to an analysis of issues such as
identity production and institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood. The point is not
that those have not been studied, but these issues have not often been approached in
terms of a systematic power analysis. Secondly, the analysis seeks to understand power
in EU–Russia relations by looking beyond their bilateral relations. The multi-dimension-
ality of power implies that power is not constrained to these bilateral relations. As will be
explained in the theoretical section, power is not only exerted directly (in the bilateral
relations between the EU and Russia) but also affects these relations indirectly (for
example, through arrangements with third countries). In other words, to fully understand
power, we need to look at both direct and indirect forms of power. In this article, indirect
or diffuse power will mainly be explored through the role Russia and the EU play in their
overlapping neighbourhood. The power they have over/or in the countries in between
determines their power position and therefore their internal, EU–Russia, power relations.
These two aspects of power are ultimately interrelated: increasing mutual concerns about
the projection of power in the post-Soviet space moved from a marginal position on the
bilateral agenda to a core issue of competition. Thirdly, as explained below, power is not
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