The Employer's Liability (Defective Equipment) Act—Lion or Mouse?

Date01 January 1984
Published date01 January 1984
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1984.tb01636.x
AuthorBeverley Lang
THE
EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY (DEFECTIVE
EQUIPMENT) ACT-LION OR MOUSE?
INTRODUCTION
EACH
year some
10,000
people are injured by defective products at
work.’ An accident at work caused wholly or partly by a defective
product raises complex questions on liability in an action for damages
by the injured plaintiff. It will often entail an investigation into the
standard of care displayed by several parties: the employer, the
manufacturer, the supplier and .possibly an independent contractor
such as an installer or repairer. Since
1969
the Employer’s Liability
(Defective Equipment) Act has given an employee a right of action
against his employer in circumstances where he is injured by a defect
in equipment provided by his employer and the defect is caused by
the fault of
a
third party. When the Act was first introduced one
commentator considered that it would “wreak havoc with the law of
tort”3 while another dismissed it as a “very limited ~eform.”~ Since
then, it has attracted little attention. The purpose of this article is to
examine the effect of the Act upon employees’ rights and employers’
liabilities, particularly in the light of proposed changes in the law of
product liability.
THE
POSITION
AT
COMMON
LAW
At common law, an employer has a personal duty to take reasonable
care for the safety of his employees. He must take reasonable care
both to provide his workmen with the necessary plant and equipment
and to maintain it in proper ~ondition.~
If
an employee is injured by
defective equipment an employer will be liable if he has continued
to allow use of the equipment when he knew it to be dangerous or
defective.6 An employer will not be liable for a latent defect which
could not have been detected on reasonable e~amination.~
I
Pearson Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation
for
Personal Injury. Cmnd.
7054 (1978) Chap. 22, para. 1201. The term “product” includes any manufactured object.
For the narrower meaning
of
the term “equipment” see note 14,
infra.
The
Act came into force on October
25,
1969.
(119) N.L.J. 1139.
Hepple [1970] C.L.J.
27.
WiLFons and Clyde Coal
Co.
v.
Englkh
I19381 A.C. 57;
Smith
v.
Baker
[1891] A.C.
325;
Williams
v.
Birmingham Battery and Mefal
Co.
[1899] 2
Q.B.
338;
Ross
v.
Associafed
Portland Cement Manufacfurers Lfd.
[1964] 1 W.L.R.
768
(H.L.).
Nairsmith
v.
London Film Productions Lrd.
(19391
1
All
E.R. 794;
Bksefr
v.
L.
&
G.
Fire Appliance
Co.
Lid.
[1965] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 93;
Taylor
v.
Rover
Co.
Lrd.
[1966]
1
W.L.R.
1491;
Marsron
v.
Brifkh Railways Board
[1976] I.C.R. 353 (C.A.).
Toronto Power
Co.
v.
Paskwar
[1915] A.C. 734;
Turner
v.
N.C.B.
(1949) 65 T.L.R.
580.
48

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