The European Parliament's Legislative Powers Reconsidered – Assessing the Current State of the Procedural Models Literature
| Author | Torsten Selck |
| Published date | 01 May 2004 |
| Date | 01 May 2004 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2004.00208.x |
| Published By | Sage Publications, Inc. |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The European Parliament’s Legislative
Powers Reconsidered – Assessing the
Current State of the Procedural Models
Literature
Torsten Selck
University of Groningen
This article maps out the state of affairs of the academic literature which uses procedural spatial
voting models to explain legislative decision-making in the European Union. Employing Tsebelis’s
(1994) article in which the author models the Union’s co-operation procedure and using it as a
reference point, I show that there is no clarity yet as to which of the several existing procedural
model specifications yields the most convincing results. I conclude by suggesting how the current
situation could be improved, and that procedural modelling might be integrated with other ratio-
nal choice theory for a better understanding of the ongoing evolution of the policymaking instru-
ments in the European Union.
1. Procedural models of European Union legislative
decision-making
How can the outcome of European Union (EU) legislative decision-making best be
explained? Rational choice institutionalism departs from the assumption that, in
order to analyse how EU secondary legislation is created, decision-making power
as laid down in the Treaty Establishing the European Community and the Treaty
on European Union has to be taken into consideration.1 The political debates in
the French city of Nice, which surrounded the recent intergovernmental negotia-
tions that were supposed to prepare the Union for further treaty revision and to
redesign important aspects of the Union’s institutional setting, might be considered
as preliminary evidence for the importance of formal rules in the European Union’s
decision-making process. In December 2000, the intergovernmental conference
was terminated, culminating in a new European treaty. Its main objectives are to
redefine the existing treaties to provide for greater efficiency in the light of EU
Eastern enlargement. The debates resulted in a more frequent use of the codecision
procedure, in a reweighing of the Member States’ formal voting shares, and in reor-
ganising the structure of the European Commission (Cottrell, 1999; The Economist,
2000). The most prominent of the European Union’s current primary legislative
instruments are the so-called consultation procedure, the assent procedure, the co-
operation procedure, and the codecision procedure. In fact, there exist several more
of these rules, but social scientists by and large chose to focus their attention on
the ones mentioned above. The reason for this is supposedly the fact that the vast
majority of secondary legislation in the EU is generated via the use of the proce-
dures mentioned above.2
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
80
T O R S T E N S E L C K
In order to understand exactly how these institutional arrangements might affect
the EU legislative process, procedural spatial voting models have been put forward
which focus on a stylised representation of the policy process in the European
Union. These models try to conceptualise the different legislative arrangements
by integrating rational choice theory with an interpretation of the structure of
decision-making as influenced by the treaties of the EU. The treaties represent the
Union’s primary legislation. They in detail attribute certain roles to institutional
actors in the process which generates European secondary legislation, such as EU
regulations, directives and decisions. One of the first papers to employ procedural
modelling in trying to explain EU legislative decision-making was put forward by
George Tsebelis (1994). The aim of the paper was to assess the European Parlia-
ment’s legislative powers under the co-operation procedure. In his article, Tsebelis
attributes substantial powers to Parliament which – under certain conditions – he
considers to be able to submit a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the Council of the
European Union and thus to exercise substantial influence in the area of law-
making. Concluding, the author regards Parliament to be a conditional agenda setter
in the European Union legislative process.
Tsebelis’s article presents a model which essentially focuses on the last stage of
the co-operation procedure. The procedure, which was established by the Single
European Act of 1987, was intended to strengthen the role of Parliament in its
interaction with the Union’s other institutional actors, the Commission and the
Council, to produce new legislation. An important characteristic of the model is
that the author does not present a formal account of the preceding stages of co-
operation. For the last stage, he assumes that Parliament offers to the Council a
legislative proposal which this body can either accept or reject with a qualified
majority (62 out of 87 votes), or amend it with unanimity. Over the last few years,
all of the major decision-making procedures of the EU were subject to being mod-
elled with the help of the procedural model approach. Figure 1 presents an
overview of the different models.
The consultation procedure was analysed by Bernard Steunenberg (1994) and
Christophe Crombez (1996). The difference between the two models is that, while
Crombez assumes that the Commission has to submit a proposal if the Council asks
it to do so (agenda setting power), Steunenberg assumes additionally that the Com-
mission has the power to withhold bills (gate keeping power). Annick Laruelle (2002)
presents a unique theoretical account of this procedure by integrating both leg-
islative versions, qualified majority and unanimity, into one model. She assumes
that the Council acts as a unitary actor, thus regarding decision-making in the
European Union as an inter-institutional rather than an intra-institutional process.
Only one model exists for the assent procedure. It was put forward by Crombez
(1996) and focuses solely on the unanimity version. Assent’s qualified majority
version so far has not received any attention from procedural modellers. Apart
from Tsebelis (1994), several other models were designed which focus on the co-
operation procedure...
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