The ‘genetic’ effect: Can parties’ past organizational choices condition the development of their internal distribution of power in the cartel party era? Evidence from Finland, 1983–2017
| Author | Vesa Koskimaa |
| Published date | 01 August 2020 |
| Date | 01 August 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720901422 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720901422
Politics
2020, Vol. 40(3) 313 –331
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395720901422
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The ‘genetic’ effect: Can
parties’ past organizational
choices condition the
development of their internal
distribution of power in the
cartel party era? Evidence from
Finland, 1983–2017
Vesa Koskimaa
Åbo Akademi University, Finland and University of Helsinki, Finland
Abstract
This study critically assesses the claim of the cartel party theory that the party in central office
(PCO) has lost its powers to the party in public office (PPO) as parties have adapted to various
changes in their operating ‘environment’. The study argues that a party’s tendency to adapt is
conditioned by the party’s ‘genetic’ heritage: if the PCO assumed a prominent position during
the party’s institutionalization, it can more likely stand against external pressures compared to
a PCO that has been traditionally weak. The study compares the development (1983–2017) of
two Finnish parties, which hail from polar ‘genetic’ traditions: a social democratic mass party
and a conservative cadre party. The change of the party ‘environment’ has strongly supported
PCO’s decay. Unlike earlier longitudinal studies on intra-party power balance, the study assesses
all significant power dimensions and finds a contradictory development: while the distribution
of leadership positions and resources increasingly favour the PPO in both parties, significant
‘genetic’ differences in the distribution of formal decision-making power have not diminished at
all. If statutory regulations matter, the results suggest that the PPO cannot ‘insulate’ like the cartel
model expects in parties where the PCO’s strong role has been strictly codified.
Keywords
intra-party power, party change, party organization, party types
Received: 25th June 2019; Revised version received: 13th December 2019; Accepted: 20th December 2019
Introduction
This study critically assesses the claim of Katz and Mair’s (1995, 2002, 2009, 2018) car-
tel party theory that during the last quarter of the 20th century extra-parliamentary parties’
Corresponding author:
Vesa Koskimaa, Samforsk, Åbo Akademi, ASA A4, 20500 ÅBO, Finland.
Email: vesa.koskimaa@abo.fi
901422POL0010.1177/0263395720901422PoliticsKoskimaa
research-article2020
Article
314 Politics 40(3)
national-level decision-making and administrative organs, that is, the party in central
office (PCO), weakened considerably vis-à-vis the party in public office (PPO, that is,
MPs and cabinet ministers), as parties adapted to citizens’ declining societal engagement,
the emergence of public party subsidies, and the birth of fast-paced, ‘governmentalized’,
internationalized, and media-driven style of politics. In contemporary parties, the PCO
should merely operate as the PPO’s service organization, while the PPO drives parties’
policy work.
As a theory, the cartel model has enjoyed popularity (not universal, though, see
Kitschelt, 2000; Koole, 1996), but existing evidence leaves doubts over its accuracy.
Following Katz and Mair (1993), quantitative longitudinal studies have attempted to
establish the PPO’s growing dominance by examining relative changes in PPO’s and
PCO’s control of resources, leadership positions, and statutory prerogatives. The early
studies on resources found that in many democracies parliamentary parties’ finances and
staff increased fast between the 1960s and early 1990s. The same studies, however,
detected a coincidental, albeit slower, strengthening of central party offices that often
continued to be larger (Heidar and Koole, 2000; Krouwel, 2012; Mair, 1994). A recent
comparative study showed that PPO’s resources grew even faster between 1990 and
2010, although central party offices’ resources did not decline dramatically (Bardi et al.,
2017). Overall, however, parliamentary parties’ resources have increased significantly
during the past five decades, strengthening the PPO.
Another measure has focused on the control of parties’ leadership positions. Early
studies suggested that MPs’ presence in parties’ national executive committees increased
slightly between the 1960s and early 1990s, reflecting the strengthening of the PPO
(Katz and Mair, 1993, 2002). A more recent study – which also covers the 1990s, on a
smaller sample of cases – showed instead that party activists, not public officials, had
become more prominent in several European countries’ national party executives
(Detterbeck, 2005).
Finally, changes in party offices’ relative strengths have been assessed through par-
ties’ statutory regulations. An early comparative study found that in 1990 extra-parlia-
mentary party organizations were still dominant in leftist parties and intra-party power
balances had not changed much since the 1950s (Gibson and Harmel, 1998). Later, an
aggregated country-level comparison suggested that mid-elites’ grip on candidate and
leadership selection is weakening (Scarrow et al., 2000). However, a recent comprehen-
sive study showed convincingly that in regard to PCO/PPO power balance, Danish
parties’ statutes did not change almost at all between the 1950s and the first decade of
the 2000s, and instead they continued to reflect the parties’ origins and ideologies
(Pedersen, 2010). Recent qualitative research, too, has suggested that intra-party power
balance might still vary across parties (Enroth and Hagevi, 2018; Passarelli, 2015). In
the Swedish social democratic party, the PCO even appears to have strengthened since
the 1960s (Loxbo, 2013).
The evidence is mixed. The uncertainty over ‘the ascendancy of the party in public
office’ stems, in part, from eclectic methodological choices. Individual studies have
tended to focus only on certain power attributes. Thus, we do not know, for example,
whether changes in party resources are always accompanied with parallel changes in
leadership positions and statutory regulations – or whether the latter in fact remain stable.
In light of the evidence, it seems possible that only one power attribute, party resources,
has changed towards the cartel model. If so, the model demands a re-interpretation, as it
suggests a more comprehensive change in intra-party power balance.
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