The House of Lords and the Licensing Acts
| Date | 01 March 1965 |
| Author | R. W. L. Howells |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1965.tb01063.x |
| Published date | 01 March 1965 |
MARCH
1966
NOTES
OF
CASES
227
This conclusion based on a strictly logical application of the
principle in
Gotcrley’s
case was regarded as contrary to common
sense by the judge. The result seems unrealistic because of the
uneasy co-existence in our law of two entirely different systems of
compensation-on the one hand, statutory insurance (supplemented
by national assistance) against some of the vicissitudes of life and,
on the other hand, common law damages awarded on the basis of
fault. When these overlap the courts aTe tempted by their sym-
pathy for the plaintiff to give him the best of both worlds. This
may be justice but is it good law
?
G. GANZ.
THE
HOUSE
OF
LORDS
AND
THE
LICENSING ACTS
IN
Vane
v.
Yiannopoullos
the House
of
Lords were given an
opportunity
*
to consider the principles of interpretation of the
Licensing ActsY3 which have long been remarkable for the extent
to which they have been made
a
forcing-house for vicarious criminal
liability by the courts. Their lordships’ approval of these principles
was given with reluctance, thus raising doubts whether these Acts
will in future be a vehicle for the advancement of vicarious criminal
liability to the same extent as they used to be.
The case turned on the construction of section
22
(1)
(a)
of
the Licensing Act,
1961:
“
If
the holder of a
. .
.
licence knowingly sells
or
supplies
. .
(liquor contrary to the terms of his licence)
.
.
.
he shall be
guilty of an offence.”
The defendant held
a
licence empowering him to sell liquor in his
restaurant to persons dining on the premises. While he was in
the kitchen a waitress supplied liquor to two persons who had not
ordered
a
meal. The defendant was unaware of this contravention
of the section by his servant: indeed there was evidence that he
had previously instructed her to observe the law strictly. On these
facts he was prosecuted for
“
knowingly selling
”
liquor, but was
acquitted by the Metropolitan Magistrate.
Prima facie
it
would appear difficult to contend that the defen-
dant had
‘‘
knowingly sold,” but the prosecutor’s case was based on
authority. The obligations under the Licensing Acts, which are
primarily imposed upon a responsible person as licence-holder,
fall into the following broad classifications
:
(a) strict offences,4 where
mens
Tea
is excluded clearly
or
by
necessary irnplicati~n,~
1
jl’3641
3
W.L.R.
1218;
[1964] 3
All
E.R.
831.
2
Cnder the Administration
of
Justice Act,
1960,
c.
65,
8.5.
1
(1)
(a),
(2)
snd 2 (1).
3
Licensing Act,
1953,
c.
46,
and
the Liceming Act,
1961,
c.
61.
5
Commissioners
of
Police
v.
Cartman
[1896] 1
Q.B.
655.
e.g.,
the Licensing Act,
1953,
8s.
100
(1)
(a),
130, 131, 132, 136 (3).
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