The Humanitarian Turn at the UNSC: Explaining the development of international norms through machine learning algorithms
Author | Richard Hanania |
Published date | 01 July 2021 |
Date | 01 July 2021 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320929728 |
The Humanitarian Turn at the UNSC:
Explaining the development of
international norms through machine
learning algorithms
Richard Hanania
Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Abstract
The UN Security Council (UNSC) has transformed from a body almost exclusively focused on conflict to one that
addresses a wide variety of issues. Despite a series of powerful works in recent years showing how international norms
have developed over time, we still lack clear understanding of why and when international institutions change their
missions. This article argues that while international politics is usually characterized by inertia, shocks to the system,
or focal point events, can compel rational actors to adopt new logics of appropriateness. Since 1945, the end of the
Cold War and the signing of the Helsinki Accords stand out as such events. Through latent Dirichlet allocation, a
machine learning algorithm used to classify text, UNSC resolutions between 1946 and 2017 can be divided into the
subjects of War,Punitive, and Humanitarian. The topic Humanitarian exploded in frequency after the Cold War,
and more refined models show that words related to human rights and elections similarly increased after Helsinki.
These changes are rapid and occur in almost the immediate aftermath of focal point events, showing their importance
for norm diffusion. The analysis also reveals another shift towards humanitarian topics in the mid-2000s, demon-
strating the ability of topic modeling to uncover changes that have been missed by earlier kinds of analysis.
Keywords
constructivism, norms, text analysis, United Nations
As he was negotiating the creation of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), President Roosevelt (FDR)
was of two minds. Despite telling British Foreign Min-
ister Anthony Eden in 1943 that he saw the institution as
a means to disarm less powerful countries, FDR occa-
sionally talked of a new world order in which the more
developed nations would take on the responsibility of
protecting human rights. Stalin and Churchill, Roose-
velt’s negotiating partners, were less ambivalent about
what they wanted out of the postwar system. They
sought to secure the territories and borders of their
respective empires and believed that the job of the
UNSC should simply be to keep peace between states
(Bosco, 2009: 14–23).
For its first several decades, the UNSC acted in accor-
dance with the vision of Churchill and Stalin. Over time,
however, something changed. Resolution 2041 (2012),
for example, was on its surface about the ongoing occu-
pation of Afghanistan. Yet the document also stressed
the importance of and put forth concrete steps towards
achieving goals such as including women in state deci-
sionmaking processes and reforming the prison sector.
Although the threat of terrorism had originally brought
the international community into Afghanistan, the reso-
lutions addressing the ongoing conflict have given the
forces in that country a role more in line with the idea-
listic vision of Roosevelt.
How and when did this change happen? This article,
while accepting the role of historical contingency, pre-
sents a general theory of institutional development.
Corresponding author:
rh2947@columbia.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(4) 655–670
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320929728
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Borrowing from game theory, it argues that major
changes in international practice may be compelled by
focal point events, or exogenous shocks that can funda-
mentally change the focus and purposes of an interna-
tional organization. The UNSC is chosen as the focus of
analysis because of its central role in the creation of
international law. Gaining insights into the circum-
stances surrounding major changes in the focus of the
organization, along with their timing, is important both
for testing theories about the development of interna-
tional norms and directing scholars towards new research
agendas. Using a machine learning algorithm called
latent Dirichlet allocation, this article confirms the
importance of the end of the Cold War, while also
revealing interesting patterns showing change around the
time of the Helsinki Accords, contradicting those who
have argued that those agreements were ineffective or
counterproductive (Pipes, 1985). Moreover, an explora-
tory analysis reveals a further shift towards humanitarian
issues in the middle of the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury, demonstrating the ability of text analysis to provide
new insights that can stimulate future research.
Changing values in international society
Few questions in international relations are as funda-
mental as those that ask about the extent to which ideas
about appropriate behavior influence conduct and, in
contrast, how much relations between states are driven
by narrowly defined interests. Scholars in recent years
have produced a series of powerful works showing how
the values of international society have changed over
time (Pinker, 2011; Hathaway & Shapiro, 2017; Gold-
stein, 2012; Gat, 2006; Mueller, 2009). Yet, while the
question of where norms come from has proved more
difficult to answer than the question of whether they are
influential, certain ideas have gained currency. Historical
study reveals the prominent role played by norm entre-
preneurs, who are unsurprisingly most likely to succeed
when they have the backing of a powerful state (Iken-
berry, 2009; Kaufmann & Pape, 1999). In addition to
processes based on power disparities, scholars also
emphasize the importance of persuasion and social influ-
ence in international politics (Johnstone, 2011; John-
ston, 2001).
There are two main ways that international organiza-
tions in particular can spread norms to the rest of the
international community. First, in areas where they exer-
cise power, they can take direct action, or make policy
that incorporates certain norms. International organiza-
tions often have their own budgets and mandates from
states, and control over resources and their distribution
can directly shape behavior (Hurd, 2008). Once a state
accepts a new practice in order to comply with a regula-
tion from abroad, that norm can become embedded in
domestic politics through the activities of bureaucracies
and institutions created in order to ensure compliance
(Park, 2005). International organizations can also
directly sanction behavior that violates widely accepted
norms through refusing to provide resources, placing
certain conditions on their distribution, or even by sim-
ply deciding who gets to take advantage of mechanisms
designed to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation
(Hathaway & Shapiro, 2017).
In addition to taking direct action, international insti-
tutions can spread norms through statements and
declarations that are aspirational in nature, or normative
declaration. This can contribute to the creation of new
logics of appropriateness that can change the behavior of
domestic and international actors (Finnemore, 1993).
For this reason, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and governments fight to control the agenda and influ-
ence the pronouncements of international institutions,
expending tangible resources in order to do so, even
when there is no direct payoff or lawmaking power at
stake such as in the case of the UN General Assembly
(Hurd, 2008:112–118; Hanania, 2019).
The Security Council as a diffusor of norms
The UNSC is a singular institution, as its ‘ability to
mobilize massive coercive resources is unprecedented
among international organizations, and almost all states
in the system have consented to it in a highly public way’
(Hurd, 2008: 30). The UNSC spreads norms through
both methods described above. With regards to direct
action, recent decades have seen a rise in UN-created
peacekeeping initiatives, and they appear to reduce the
likelihood of developing nations reverting to civil war
(Fortna, 2008). In authorizing missions in countries
such as Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, the Security
Council promotes values such as good government,
including women in decisionmaking processes, and a
free and open press. Similarly, it sanctions the outcasts
of international society such as terrorists and those who
produce prohibited weapons, and such punishments
tend to be enforced by states and other international
institutions (Reinisch, 2001).
The Security Council also spreads norms through
normative declaration, a practice that has increased over
the last few decades. While the effect of direct action can
be traced quite easily, how can we likewise be confident
656 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(4)
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