The Implications of the Value Chain and Financial Institutions for Work and Employment: Insights from the Video Game Industry in Poland, Sweden and Germany
| Author | Christina Teipen |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12144 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12144
54:2 June 2016 0007–1080 pp. 311–333
The Implications of the Value Chain and
Financial Institutions for Work and
Employment: Insights from the Video
Game Industry in Poland, Sweden and
Germany
Christina Teipen
Abstract
What are the reasons for national dierences of international market access in
high-risk software development and what is the role of employment regulation?
This analysis elucidates this question based on national sector studies of the video
games industry with particularfocus on financial systems, skill formation as well
as work and employment systems in Sweden, Germany and Poland. National
financial architectures and education are a decisive factor. However, the results
also suggest that the ‘varieties-of-capitalism’ (VoC) approach underestimates
industry divergencewithin and across supposedly homogeneous national models,
especially in the field of labour regulation. The author proposes to link VoC
theory to a transnational perspective, which complementarily takes into account
firm embeddedness in industry-specific value chains.
1. Introduction
Over the past five decades, interactive entertainment software has emerged as
a global growth market. At an early stage in the process, first the USA and
subsequently Japan attained and expanded their positions as world leaders
of digital games development (PWC 2010). With the exception of France,
European nations have remained relatively minor players in the industry.
Nonetheless, some would appear to have met with more success than others.
The purpose of this article is to examine the conditions that account for
these dierences and in so doing establish their implications for work and
employment. To do so, I draw on varieties of capitalism (VoC) and global
Christina Teipen is atBerlin School of Economics and Law.
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312 British Journal of Industrial Relations
value chain (GVC) frameworks, establishing how well these frameworks
enable us to account for dierences in the video game industry in three
European countries: Sweden, Poland and Germany. I pose the following
questions: What contributes to the common underperformance of these
nations and to their comparative dierences?If these contributory factors are
national institutions, which institutions are they and which supplementary
explanatory factors exist? How do power asymmetries in value chains and
national institutions interact? In addressing these questions, I put particular
(but not sole) emphasis on the role of national dierences in the institutions
of work and employment.
2. National institutions, industry specifics and transnational value chains
Two main approaches can inform analysis of national dierences in industry
development: the VoC approach and the GVC approach. The former,
especially as developed byHall and Soskice (2001), seeks explanations for how
companies strategically utilize dierent sets of institutions. Hall and Soskice
assume that liberal market economies (LMEs) oer competitive advantages
because institutional conditions in Anglo-American countries favour more
flexible human resource management, mobile general skills, and ‘easy access
to stock market capital’ (Hanck´
e 2009: 4). The comparative strength of
their analysis is that they identify a complementary series of nation-
specific institutions establishing incentives and constraints for companies’
competiveness and fabric. As for other business system approaches (e.g.
Whitley 2007: 244), their analysis suggests that industrial relations, education
and training, and financial institutions in coordinated market economies
(CMEs) are suboptimal for the development of radicallyinnovative industries
such as the video games industry (Hall and Soskice 2001). They also suggest
LMEs are more successful in considerable measure because they have both
‘fluid, dynamic external labour markets’ and ‘liquid, transparent capital
markets’ (Whitley 2007: 244). In contrast, CMEs encourage incremental
innovation and less ‘risky technologies (Casper et al. 1999: 22).1
A problem with these analyses is that stock market-based types of business
financing, considered by VoC and business system approaches to play an
important role in shaping the pace and nature of innovation, are no longer
limited to the original LMEs.2Thus, the barriers to radical innovation in
traditional CMEs or ‘non-LMEs’ may not be as great as these approaches
suggest. For example, Larue et al.’s (2003) study on the video game industry
demonstrates the positive eects of significantly restructuring financial
institutions in France (see O’Sullivan2007). Video game publishers were more
successful in positioning themselves in that country than in the UK, which is
a key LME. Sweden has likewiseincreasingly established financial institutions
for start-ups and growing businesses (Bitard et al. 2008: 254–5). These
analyses are evidence of the considerabletransformation of national financial
institutions, with Sweden being among the more dynamic countries in this
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2015 John Wiley& Sons Ltd/London School of Economics.
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