The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: a Reassessment

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhaa035
Date25 February 2021
Pages642-685
Year2021
Published ByOxford University Press
I. INTRODUCTION

[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor … and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.1

The Clayton Act, excerpted above, provides for private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws.2 The Act’s right of action allows private parties to sue, and its treble-damage remedy creates private incentives to bring suit. According to the Supreme Court, the statute demonstrates Congress’s “belief that private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.”3 Although private antitrust litigation was rare in the first half of the twentieth century, it boomed in the post-war era.4 The evolution of private antitrust filings can be seen in Figure 1. Today, private lawsuits account for 94 percent of antitrust cases filed in federal courts.5

The language of the Clayton Act—“any person … injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue”—is broad. But in 1977, the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois6 construed that language to bar damages actions by indirect purchasers, such as consumers two or more steps removed from an antitrust law violator in a distribution chain.7 The Court instead assigned direct purchasers exclusive rights to sue for antitrust damages. This rule applies even if direct purchasers, such as wholesalers or retailers, “pass on” cartel or monopoly overcharges to consumers.8

The Court cited three concerns with private antitrust suits by indirect purchasers. First, apportioning damages among direct and indirect purchasers was too complicated.9 Second, awarding damages to both direct and indirect purchasers risked multiple liability for defendants.10 Third, dividing damages between direct and indirect purchasers diluted incentives to sue, thereby weakening private enforcement of the antitrust laws.11 A rule barring suits by indirect purchasers avoided these concerns.

Private Antitrust Filings in Federal Courts

Source: Crane, supra note 4.

The rationale for the Court’s rule has eroded. First, apportioning damages among direct and indirect purchasers is not too complicated.12 Lower courts routinely determine indirect purchaser damages in state law cases that permit them.13 Second, the concern over multiple liability for antitrust defendants begs the question.14 (And it is ironic, given antitrust law’s preference for treble damages.) In any event, the rule, which allows direct purchasers to recover damages sustained by indirect purchasers, exacerbates the concern because some state antitrust laws allow recovery by indirect purchasers themselves.15

What remains is the claim that dividing damages between direct and indirect purchasers dilutes incentives to sue, thereby weakening private antitrust enforcement. That claim got a boost from scholars who used economic theory16 and empirical evidence17 to support it. In particular, Professor William Landes and then-Professor Richard Posner wrote an influential article defending the Supreme Court’s rule. According to Landes and Posner, direct purchasers are more efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws than indirect purchasers because of their closer proximity to violators.18 Therefore, concentrating the recovery in direct purchasers is better than dividing it between direct and indirect purchasers.19

The economic logic of that claim is questionable. Of course it is true that allowing more plaintiffs and dividing damages between them lowers individual incentives to sue. And it may be true that direct purchasers are better positioned to detect antitrust violations. But that does not imply that the overall probability of suit is greater under a rule that assigns direct purchasers exclusive rights to sue. After all, different parties will have different incentives to sue conditional on damage awards. For example, a direct purchaser may not want to sue an important supplier. The overall probability of suit will depend on the set of parties allowed to sue and their profit incentives—including, but not limited to, damage awards—at the margin.

Empirical evidence for the claim is wanting. Several early studies showed that the Supreme Court’s rule had either a positive effect or no effect on the frequency of private antitrust litigation.20 However, those studies used time-series and pooled cross-section methods that boil down to before-and-after comparisons. The studies did not estimate a counterfactual outcome, which the panel structure of the data used in the studies allows. This is not a criticism of choices made by the studies’ authors. Rather, the relevant methods were not available or not widely used at the time.

This article presents new evidence that the rule against indirect purchaser plaintiffs reduced private antitrust litigation by twenty percent. To make that finding, it uses the fact that a handful of federal judicial districts adopted the rule ahead of the Supreme Court. Neither a comparison of these districts with others, nor one of a district before and after it adopted the rule, is appropriate, given the possibility of unobserved district or time effects. However, a comparison of the before-and-after difference in districts affected by the Supreme Court’s decision with the same difference in districts not affected (a difference in differences) is appropriate, if the two groups exhibit common trends before the decision. Making that comparison, this article finds that the indirect purchaser rule reduced private antitrust litigation by about twenty percent.

Of course, the frequency of suit is only a proxy for private antitrust enforcement. In equilibrium, a high probability of suit lowers the number of violations and therefore the number of suits. However, there are strong reasons to doubt that the estimated reduction in private antitrust litigation is due to fewer violations. For one, that story is not consistent with the trend in price markups, which started to increase around the time private antitrust litigation started to decrease.21 But more important is that a feature of the rule allows us to sort cause from effect. As explained later on, the indirect purchaser rule has two parts. The first part, the result of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,22 allows direct purchasers to recover the full amount of any overcharge (no “defensive” passing-on).23 The second part, the result of Illinois Brick, disallows recovery by indirect purchasers (no “offensive” passing-on).24 The two cases were decided almost ten years apart. Because Hanover Shoe was already in place at the time of Illinois Brick, the Illinois Brick decision itself could not have increased incentives to sue. And so, by considering the two decisions separately, we can separate partial equilibrium effects from general equilibrium effects. In any event, the rule rests in part on earlier findings that it had a positive effect on the frequency of suit. Because this study finds the opposite, it further erodes the rule’s rationale.

The Supreme Court chose to bar private antitrust suits by indirect purchasers, in part because it believed that “the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery in … direct purchasers.”25 Since then, market power has grown according to some measures.26 For example, Figure 2 shows average markups over marginal cost, which increased threefold over the past 40 years.27 In response, there have been calls to revise antitrust standards and to “break up” large businesses.28 Others have advocated for stronger enforcement of existing antitrust standards.29 Yet, a recent enforcement action against Apple was nearly thrown out of court, after Apple claimed that the consumers suing them were not direct purchasers under Illinois Brick.30 A divided Supreme Court let the case proceed.31 Although five Justices agreed that the consumers suing Apple were direct purchasers, it was a “near miss” that renewed debate over the rule. Thirty states and the District of Columbia as amici curiae asked the Supreme Court to overturn Illinois Brick,32 and at oral argument, one Justice asked why not.33 But the Court kept the rule—for now.

Average Markups over Marginal Cost

Source: De Loecker, Eeckhout & Unger, supra note 26.

The rule should be abandoned. It is plainly inconsistent with the text of the Clayton Act. It ignores the Act’s legislative history. And it is bad antitrust policy. Rather than encourage private antitrust enforcement, the rule closes the courthouse door to plaintiffs who would otherwise be entitled to sue. The Supreme Court should reconsider the rule in an appropriate case, or Congress should amend the Clayton Act to make clear that indirect purchasers may sue for damages.34

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section I provides background information about the indirect purchaser rule in antitrust law. Section II examines the theoretical effect of the rule, concluding that it is ambiguous. Section III proposes an empirical approach to estimate the effect of the rule. And Section IV presents the results of that approach.

II. BACKGROUND A. The Clayton Act

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for private enforcement of the antitrust laws.35 The text reads:

[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor … and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.36

This statutory language is broad. It authorizes private actions by “any person” injured as a result of “anything forbidden” by the antitrust laws.37 And the statute provides a strong remedy—“a powerful financial incentive” to bring suit, and a large penalty for wrongdoing38—in the form of threefold, or...

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