The King (on the application of Peacekeepers Foundation) v Liverpool and Knowsley Magistrates Court

Hearing date: 21 May 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 June 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review, permission having been refused on the papers by Mr Mark Ockelton, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, by an order sealed on 3 March 2025. This judgment is structured as follows:

The factual background: paragraphs [2]–[7];

The procedural history: paragraphs [8]–[11];

The legal framework: paragraphs [12]–[15];

Sufficient interest: paragraphs [16]–[25];

Alleged delay: paragraphs [26]–[36];

Alternative remedy: paragraphs [37]–[52];

The merits (grounds 2 and 3): paragraphs [53]–[97];

The merits (grounds 4 and 5): paragraphs [98]–[115];

The merits (grounds 6 and 7): paragraphs [116]–[130];

The merits (grounds 8 and 9): paragraphs [131]–[154];

Conclusion on the application for permission: paragraphs [155]–[158]; and

Costs: paragraphs [159]–[173].

The factual background

The Claimant, PeaceKeepers Foundation, is a corporate entity registered at Companies House. It was incorporated on 3 July 2024. Marc Horn is a director and trustee of the organisation.

The application arises out of council tax liability proceedings brought by Liverpool City Council (“LCC”) against Mr Horn under regulation 34 of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (“the 1992 Regulations”).

On 12 August 2024 District Judge Healey sitting in the Liverpool and Knowsley Magistrates' Court heard LCC's application. Mr Horn advanced a series of arguments before the District Judge and judgment was reserved.

On 23 September 2024 the District Judge granted the application, making a council tax liability order against Mr Horn for £1,025.66, comprising the £75.66 payable in council tax and £950 for LCC's legal costs. The District Judge's reasons were set out in a detailed written judgment.

On 14 October 2024 Mr Horn applied to the District Judge under section 111(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (“the MCA”), asking him to state a case for the opinion of the High Court in respect of 17 questions which it was contended arose from the judgment.

On 24 October 2024 the District Judge refused to state a case under section 111(5) of the MCA, on the grounds that the application was frivolous (meaning “futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic”: R v North West Suffolk (Mildenhall) Magistrates Court, ex p Forest Heath District Council (1997) EWCA Civ 1575. Again, the District Judge gave detailed written reasons for the decision.

The procedural history

On 20 December 2024 the Claimant filed this application for permission to apply for judicial review. It was issued by the Administrative Court Office in London on 24 January 2025. The claim was duly transferred to Manchester. Seven grounds were initially advanced, but Ground 1 was withdrawn before the hearing.

The renewed application for permission proceeded as a “hybrid” hearing in that a very large number of individual members or supporters of the Claimant organisation attended the hearing both in person and online. I am grateful to the court staff for making those arrangements.

It was agreed that Mr Horn could make submissions on behalf of the Claimant. I do not understand him to be a legal professional, but he has plainly conducted extensive legal research. The Defendant, as a court, had made brief submissions in its Acknowledgement of Service, but did not participate in the hearing. I was also assisted by written and oral submissions from Simon Whitfield, counsel for LCC, who had appeared in the Magistrates Court proceedings.

The renewal hearing had been listed for 3 hours given the number of issues and grounds involved. The oral submissions took all of that time, such that it was necessary to reserve judgment.

The legal framework

It is necessary for me to decide, afresh, whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review.

Permission should only be granted if the judge is satisfied that there is an arguable ground for judicial review which has a realistic prospect of success: see the cases cited in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2024 (“the Guide”) at paragraph 9.1.3.

Even if a claim is arguable, the judge must refuse permission (i) unless they consider that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates; and (ii) if it appears to be highly likely that the outcome for the claimant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred: the Guide at paragraph 9.1.4. The latter requirement derives from section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which provides in material part that:

“(3C) When considering whether to grant leave to make an application for judicial review, the High Court—

(a) may of its own motion consider whether the outcome for the applicant would have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, and

(b) must consider that question if the defendant asks it to do so.

(3D) If, on considering that question, it appears to the High Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, the court must refuse to grant leave.

(3E) The court may disregard the requirement in subsection (3D) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest”.

The court may also refuse permission (i) if the court considers that there has been undue delay in bringing the claim; and (ii) if there exists an adequate alternative remedy: the Guide at paragraphs 9.15–6.

Sufficient interest

The relevant law

Section 31(3)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that the court shall not grant permission to bring judicial review proceedings unless it considers that the claimant has a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the [claim] relates”.

The applicable principles are set out in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p World Development Movement [1994] EWHC Admin 1, [1995] 1 WLR 386 at 392–396, R (Good Law Project Ltd) v Prime Minister [2022] EWHC 298 (Admin) at [53]–[59] and the other cases referred to in the Guide at paragraph 6.3.2.

The parties' positions

LCC contended in its Summary Grounds of Defence that the Claimant organisation did not have sufficient interest in the matter to which the claim relates, namely the tax liability of Mr Horn as a private individual; and thus did not have standing to bring the claim. LCC referred to the organisation's website, stating that it indicated that it was involved, generally, in “[e]mpowering individuals to understand and defend their rights under the Rule of Law”, rather than having any particular interest or expertise in council tax enforcement. LCC argued that at most the organisation might seek to assist individuals such as Mr Horn to challenge their liability to council tax. In particular, the Claimant could not be regarded as the “victim” of the District Judge's decision to make a liability order for council tax against Mr Horn and thus could not assert that the Judge had acted in a way which is rendered unlawful by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”).

In his various written submissions, Mr Horn described the Claimant as “a not-for-profit incorporated entity advocating for due process, transparency, and constitutional compliance in local authority enforcement proceedings” and indicated that it brings this claim “in the public interest” as it addresses “systemic legal failures in council tax liability proceedings”. He submitted that the organisation's constitution and activities focus on the rule of law and due process of law, in particular what it considers to be “systemic and procedural unlawfulness affecting council tax payers generally”. He stated that it represents over 9,000 interested persons and conducts public education forums on statutory enforcement procedures.

Mr Horn's application to be joined as a Claimant

Judge Ockelton refused permission, in part, on the basis that the Claimant did not have standing.

On 13 May 2025 Mr Horn submitted a document to the court by which he “consented” to being added as a Claimant to the proceedings should the court consider it in the interests of justice to make such an order. He was advised by court staff before the hearing that he was required to file an application notice in order to apply to be added as a party to the proceedings under CPR 19.2(2)(a) and to pay the necessary court fee. He declined to do so; but said at the hearing that he would complete the application notice and pay the fee if ordered to do so.

During the hearing Mr Whitfield accepted that Mr Horn was a proper Claimant (indeed, on LCC's case, the only proper Claimant). He conceded that LCC would suffer no prejudice by Mr Horn being substituted or added as a Claimant and would not object to such a course.

Conclusion on the sufficient interest issue

In light of the above chain of events, it was agreed that if permission was granted Mr Horn could be added to the claim as a...