The King (on the application of Bhupinder Iffat Rizvi) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London

Hearing date: 4 November 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

In the early hours of 20 March 2003, Sabina Rizvi was shot dead as she drove away from Bexleyheath Police Station. Her boyfriend, and a passenger in her car, Mark Williams was also shot. He survived, but sustained a significant brain injury. Paul Asbury has subsequently been convicted of the murder of Sabina Rizvi and the attempted murder of Mark Williams. The assailants who carried out the murder and attempted murder at Paul Asbury's direction have never been identified, and have yet to face justice.

An inquest into Sabina Rizvi's death (“the Inquest”) was opened on 25 March 2003, but adjourned pending Paul Asbury's trial. After Paul Asbury's conviction, the decision was initially taken not to resume the Inquest, but this was reversed thanks to the concerted efforts of the Rizvi family.

On 12 February 2019, the Senior Coroner for South London concluded that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) was arguably engaged and that the Inquest should be resumed. Senior Coroner for South London's appointed HHJ Angela Rafferty KC (“the Coroner”) to hear the case, with the Inquest taking place between 4 and 26 March 2024 before a coroner's jury (“the Jury”). The Coroner is a highly experienced criminal judge who is a Senior Circuit Judge at the Central Criminal Court.

The period between the Senior Coroner for South London's decision in February 2019 and the commencement of the Inquest was the result of a number of evidential, procedural and administrative complexities, with the result that the Inquest did not begin until 2024.

One issue which was raised at the Inquest was whether the First Interested Party (hereafter “the Police”) had breached the duty owed to Sabina Rizvi under Article 2 of the ECHR, namely the right to life. The issue was whether the Police (and in particular, the Second and Third Interested Parties, Roberto Florio and Thomas Horner), either did appreciate or should have appreciated that Paul Asbury posed a real and immediate threat to Sabina Rizvi's life once she left the police station, and should have taken steps to mitigate that risk.

At the conclusion of the evidence on 24 March 2024, the Coroner gave a ruling (“the Ruling”) that there was sufficient evidence to establish that there was such a real and immediate threat, but insufficient evidence to leave to the Jury the issue of whether such a risk was or ought to have been known to the Police. The Coroner also found that there was insufficient evidence that there were steps which the Police could reasonably have been expected to take to prevent any risk to Sabina Rizvi materialising. As a result of that ruling, no issue as to the acts or omissions on the part of the Police was left to the Jury.

By this application, Sabina Rizvi's mother, Bhupinder Iffat Rizvi (“Mrs Rizvi”) seeks permission to challenge the lawfulness of the Coroner's ruling as a matter of public law, by way of proceedings for judicial review. Mrs Rizvi contends that the Ruling involved two errors of public law:

i) “The Coroner erred in law by determining the matters to be left to the jury based upon whether there was sufficient evidence that the substantive Article 2 ECHR duty had been breached rather than whether such a breach was arguable, and added an unnecessary and impermissible gloss to the threshold for assessing whether such a breach had occurred (or was arguable).”

ii) “The Coroner erred in law by eliding the question of whether there had been a breach of the substantive Article 2 duty with that of whether there was sufficient evidence that there were any acts or omissions by the police that were potentially causative of Sabina's death which could safely be left to the jury”.

In order to bring such a claim, Mrs Rizvi must not only establish an arguable case of public law illegality, but she must also obtain an extension of time for bringing the claim. This is because, absent such an extension, applications for permission to bring proceedings by way of judicial review must be brought “promptly; and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose” (CPR r 54.5(1)). In this case, Mrs Rizvi asks the court to extend time from 30 June 2024 to 24 September 2024.

While the claim is brought against the Coroner as defendant, the Police, Roberto Florio and Thomas Horner have been joined to the claim (“the Interested Parties”). The Coroner and the Interested Parties oppose Mrs Rizvi's application for an extension of time and for permission to seek judicial review.

The judgment addresses the issues which arise under the following headings:

i) The legal context to the Inquest.

ii) The course of the Inquest.

iii) The Ruling.

iv) The extension of time application.

v) Ground 1.

vi) Ground 2.

The legal context to the Inquest The role of the inquest

Under s.1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”), a senior coroner who is made aware that the body of a deceased person is within their area must conduct an investigation into their death in certain circumstances, including where the coroner “has reason to suspect that the deceased died a violent or unknown death”.

Section 5 of the 2009 Act provides:

“(1) The purpose of an investigation under this Part into a person's death is to ascertain—

(a) who the deceased was;

(b) how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death;

(c) the particulars (if any) required by the 1953 Act to be registered concerning the death.

(2) Where necessary in order to avoid a breach of any Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)), the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b) is to be read as including the purpose of ascertaining in what circumstances the deceased came by his or her death.

(3) Neither the senior coroner conducting an investigation under this Part into a person's death nor the jury (if there is one) may express any opinion on any matter other than—

(a) the questions mentioned in subsection (1)(a) and (b) (read with subsection (2) where applicable);

(b) the particulars mentioned in subsection (1)(c).”

In determining whether s.5(2) (and the wider investigatory function of a coroner's inquest it involves) is engaged, it is sufficient that there is arguably a breach of an Article 2 right. In R (Skelton) v HM Senior Coroner for West Sussex [2020] EWC 2813 (Admin), [16], a Divisional Court (Popplewell LJ and Jay J) stated:

“The threshold for the procedural obligation to arise is that there has been an arguable breach of an article 2 substantive obligation. This threshold is a low one because to impose a more onerous burden would run the risk of the coroner determining, in advance of the full evidential picture, what the outcome of any inquest might be. “Arguable” in this context means anything more than fanciful (see R (Palmer) v HM Coroner for Worcestershire [2011] Inquest LR 50, per Hickinbottom J, at para 60). The threshold was expressed in slightly different language by Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ in R (Maguire) v Blackpool and Fylde Senior Coroner [2021] QB 409, para 75 where he said: “the procedural obligation imposed by article 2 … with which we are concerned [is] the parasitic procedural obligation to investigate when a credible suggestion is made that the state has breached its substantive article 2 obligations.””

Finally, s.10 of the 2009 Act provides:

“(1) After considering the evidence given to an inquest into a death, the senior coroner (if there is no jury) or the jury (if there is one) must—

(a) make a determination as to the questions mentioned in section 5(1)(a) and (b) (read with section 5(2) where applicable), and

(b) if particulars are required by the 1953 Act to be registered concerning the death, make a finding as to those particulars.

(2) A determination under subsection (1)(a) may not be framed in such a way as to appear to determine any question of—

(a) criminal liability on the part of a named person, or

(b) civil liability.

(3) In subsection (2) “ criminal liability” includes liability in respect of a service offence.”

Article 2 inquests

The ECHR right which arises in this context is Article 2:

“Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which the penalty is provided by law”.

Inquests in which Article 2 issues arise are understandably referred to as “Article 2 inquests”. Inquests which do not engage the wider enquiry contemplated by s.5(2) of the 2009 Act are frequently referred to as Jamieson inquests (after R (HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe) ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1).

Article 2 has a number of elements, which are discussed in R (Skelton) v...