The King (on the application of CHK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
JudgeLord Justice Zacaroli,Lord Justice Lewis,Lord Justice Peter Jackson
Judgment Date03 March 2026
Neutral Citation[2026] EWCA Civ 207
Year2026
Docket NumberCase No: CA-2025-002568
Between:
The King (on the application of CHK)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Before:

Lord Justice Peter Jackson

Lord Justice Lewis

and

Lord Justice Zacaroli

Case No: CA-2025-002568

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge

AC-2025-LON-002962

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

CHK, the Appellant, appeared in person

Michael Armitage and Emma Christie (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 26 February 2026

JUDGMENT Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 3 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Lord Justice Zacaroli
1

The right to claim habeas corpus, one of the oldest of the prerogative writs, is an extremely important protection of the most fundamental of freedoms – the liberty of the citizen under the law. A writ issues where a person is detained without any authority or where the purported authority is beyond the powers of the person authorising it. It requires the person responsible for the detention to produce the detained person in court and make a return stating the grounds of detention. Its importance is recognised in the fact that an application for a writ of habeas corpus was traditionally given priority over all other court business: see, for example, Lord Donaldson MR in R (Cheblak) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 WLR 890 at p.894A-B.

2

It is also important, however, that this ancient right is not misused, taking up valuable court time on a priority basis, at the expense of other litigants, where there is in reality no deprivation of liberty on which the right is based.

3

The appellant in this case (referred to as “ CHK”, following an order for anonymity made by Lang J on 12 September 2025 and continued in this court) is not detained at all, but is (and has at all times since 2018) been on immigration bail subject only to limited bail conditions. His application for habeas corpus was rightly rejected by the deputy judge below, on the basis that such minimal curtailment of his liberty as existed by virtue of the conditions attaching to his bail was not sufficient to justify the issue of a writ. That was plainly correct, and CHK's appeal against that decision is hopeless for that simple reason.

Background

4

CHK is a Brazilian national who was convicted of serious criminal offences and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 2012. He is therefore a “foreign criminal” within the meaning of s.32(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007.

5

On 12 May 2017 the respondent (the “ SSHD”) refused a claim for asylum and an associated human rights claim made by CHK, and certified the claims under s.94 and s.95B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “ May 2017 Decision”). The consequence of certification was that he could only exercise a right of appeal against the SSHD's decision after having been deported from the UK.

6

On the same date, the SSHD made a deportation order (the “ Deportation Order”). This recorded that, pursuant to s.5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, once any right of appeal that may be exercised from within the UK under s.82(1) of 2002 Act was exhausted or, if CHK did not have a right of appeal that may be exercised from within the UK, the SSHD – by the Deportation Order – required CHK to leave and prohibited him from entering the UK for so long as the order was in force.

7

Shortly afterwards, following the decision of the Supreme Court in R (Kiarie & Byndloss) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 42; [2017] 1 WLR 2380, the SSHD withdrew the May 2017 Decision, but remade it in substantially the same terms on 17 July 2017, save that it was not this time certified (the “ July 2017 Decision”).

8

Having completed the custodial part of his sentence, CHK was initially placed in immigration detention but was released on bail in about May 2018 and remains on bail, subject to conditions. The conditions have varied over time.

9

From 3 July 2023 (and applicable at the time of the hearing before the deputy judge) the bail conditions were as follows:

(1) CHK was allowed to work;

(2) CHK was required to reside at a new address (the previous conditions having referred to another address); and

(3) CHK was required to report to a police officer/immigration officer on a monthly basis.

10

On 26 January 2026 the bail conditions were varied and are now as follows:

(1) CHK is not allowed to work;

(2) CHK must report to a police officer at a police station in the town where he lives every fortnight; and

(3) CHK must report digitally by complying with Immigration Bail Digital Reporting.

11

CHK appealed against the July 2017 Decision. On 2 March 2018 that appeal was dismissed by the first-tier tribunal (“ FTT”). On 15 May 2019 the Upper Tribunal (“ UT”) set aside the FTT's order and remitted the appeal to the FTT. On 10 May 2021 the FTT again dismissed CHK's appeal against the July 2017 Decision. That order of the FTT was set aside by the UT on 18 January 2023, and the matter was remitted again to the FTT.

12

In June 2021 CHK applied under the EU Settlement Scheme. That application was refused by the SSHD on 17 October 2025. CHK has appealed that decision to the FTT. The EUSS appeal and the appeal against the July 2017 Decision remain pending. Directions were given in relation to both on 24 October 2025 by FTT Judge Chinweze.

13

On 1 September 2025, CHK applied to the Administrative Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, refused that application on the papers on 17 October 2025.

14

In his reasons for refusing permission, the deputy judge first noted the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Kaitey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 1875; [2022] QB 695, at §122, in which it was recognised that a writ of habeas corpus might be available, in appropriate circumstances, notwithstanding that a person was not in fact in detention but on bail. He concluded, however (at §14), in the following terms:

“A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy intended to secure a person's release from physical detention. The Applicant in this case is not detained. He was released on bail and lives in the community. The SSHD properly concedes that bail conditions might in an appropriate case constitute a “significant curtailment” of liberty that would justify the use of habeas corpus. In this case the curtailment of liberty through bail conditions is not sufficient in my judgment to justify the use of habeas corpus.”

15

The deputy judge went on to hold, even if that was wrong, that the Deportation Order was itself never withdrawn, revoked or quashed by a court. It constituted, therefore, an active and lawful instrument, which provided a clear legal basis for the imposition of bail conditions. Such conditions are mandatory pursuant to §2(1) of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. The restrictions on CHK's liberty are therefore direct, necessary and legally required consequences of a valid deportation order.

16

CHK asserts 12 grounds of appeal, as enumerated in his skeleton argument, running to 17 pages, and detailed further written submissions, running to 56 pages. He has also at various times filed a number of other lengthy documents addressing particular matters said to be relevant to the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal, CHK handed up a 32-page “written case” which constituted the submissions he wished to make orally. The Court took time to read that written case and CHK then made short submissions on certain key aspects of it. We announced our decision to dismiss the appeal at the hearing. These are my reasons for joining in that decision.

17

In addition to what CHK said orally at the hearing, I have taken account of all the written submissions he has filed in support of his appeal.

18

A number of ancillary applications were made. CHK applied for summary judgment on his appeal. As the substance of the appeal was addressed at the hearing, we dismissed that application as serving no purpose. The SSHD made an application for an extension of time to file a respondent's notice (without prejudice to the contention that none was needed). This related to points arising in relation to the second ground of appeal, which it is unnecessary to deal with, so we need not address it. CHK also made an application to admit fresh evidence. I would admit that evidence insofar as it has described events since the hearing before the deputy judge. Otherwise, it is not relevant to the determination of the appeal on the basis explained in this judgment, and I would not admit it. CHK made an application to be permitted to rely on a bundle of authorities, but there was no objection to that from the SSHD and he was permitted to rely on it.

The first ground of appeal

19

The first ground of appeal is that the deputy judge applied the wrong test for habeas corpus, in that he said it requires “physical detention”. CHK contends that the degree to which he is deprived of liberty by the existence of the Deportation Order and the conditions attaching to his bail is sufficient to entitle him to claim habeas corpus.

20

As foreshadowed at the start of this judgment, the first ground of appeal is hopeless. In short, CHK is neither detained nor deprived of his liberty in any sense that comes close to entitling him to a writ of habeas corpus.

21

CHK contends that the “physical detention” test is outdated, and the judge should have applied a test of “ de facto control”. CHK argues that he is under the de facto control of the SSHD by virtue of the following severe restraints on his liberty: (1) compulsory residence restrictions (he must reside...

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1 firm's commentaries
  • Habeas corpus writ not to be used to challenge bail conditions
    • United Kingdom
    • LexBlog United Kingdom
    • 3 March 2026
    ...very firm judgment in a case called R (On the Application Of CHK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 207, the Court of Appeal dismisses an appeal against refusal of a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was issued by a Brazilian man on immigration bail who appears...