The King (on the Application of Shaun Thompson and Silkie Carlo) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Administrative Court |
| Judge | Lord Justice Holgate,Mrs Justice Farbey |
| Judgment Date | 21 April 2026 |
| Neutral Citation | [2026] EWHC 915 (Admin) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Docket Number | Case No: AC-2024-LON-001764 |
Lord Justice Holgate
Mrs Justice Farbey
Case No: AC-2024-LON-001764
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Dan Squires KC, Aidan Wills and Rosalind Comyn (instructed by Bindmans LLP) for the Claimants
Anya Proops KC, Robert Talalay and Raphael Hogarth (instructed by Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services) for the Defendant
Dee Masters and Joshua Jackson made written submissions for the Intervener
Hearing dates: 27–28 January 2026
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 21 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Lord Justice Holgate and
Introduction
This claim challenges the legality of the policy of the defendant, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, adopted on 11 September 2024 in relation to the deployment in London of live facial recognition technology (“LFR”). The policy is entitled “MPS Overt LFR Policy Document” (“the Policy”).
LFR is seen by the defendant and other police forces as a powerful tool for the prevention and detection of crime, finding missing persons and the protection of the public. It involves the use of cameras, which are generally moveable rather than fixed, to capture the images of members of the public in a public location. The facial features of individuals are expressed as unique biometric or numerical values. The software then compares those values with the biometric details of a number of persons sought by the police to see whether they achieve a pre-set score indicating the required likelihood of a positive match.
If there is no match, the biometric data of the member of the public is automatically and immediately deleted. Any facial images detected by the system which have not been matched are blurred in the images visible to officers. But if the biometrics do match, an alert is created and the two images to which the data relates are examined by officers to decide what if any action to take. The technology is capable of scanning a substantial number of faces per second and a very large number over the course of a deployment.
The claimants do not contend that the use of LFR is unlawful as a matter of principle, or in all circumstances. However, they submit that the use of LFR gives rise to “significant civil liberty concerns” which have become greater with the increased deployment of LFR over the last few years. They rely upon a number of matters. LFR involves the extraction of a person's biometric data, a key attribute of an individual given its unique characteristics. LFR can be deployed without the consent or knowledge of the persons involved, on a large scale or in crowded locations. The overwhelming majority of persons whose facial biometrics are captured and processed are not suspected of any wrongdoing and are not otherwise persons for whom the police are looking. There is a risk of false identification which may result in intrusive questioning to establish identity.
However, it is important to emphasise that neither this case, nor this court, is concerned with the merits and demerits of the use by the Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”), or other police forces, of LFR. Judicial review is simply the means of ensuring that public bodies act within the limits of their legal powers, and in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, as well as any relevant procedures and legal principles governing the exercise of their decision-making functions. The role of the court is concerned with resolving questions of law. It is not responsible for making political, social or economic choices, or in this case policy decisions, on how the police carry out their functions. Such decisions are ones that Parliament, or the common law, has entrusted to the relevant public authorities, not the court. The court is only concerned with the legal issues which the claimant is entitled to raise in these proceedings.
The claimants contend firstly, that the Policy violates Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”), in that, contrary to Article 8(2), it allows
“interference” with the “right to respect for private and family life” by the use of LFR which is not “in accordance with the law” (“IAWL”). This was the first ground of challenge argued at the hearing before us (“ground 1”).
Secondly, the claimants contend that the Policy violates Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR in that, contrary to Article 10(2) and Article 11(2), it allows “restrictions” upon the “freedom of expression” and the “freedom of assembly and association” by the use of LFR which is not “prescribed by law” (“PBL”). This was the second ground argued at the hearing before us (“ground 2”).
It is common ground between the parties that in the present case whether the Policy is IAWL raises the same issues as whether it is also PBL. The court's conclusion on the IAWL issue, either way, will also hold good for the PBL issue.
Mr Dan Squires KC who, together with Mr Aidan Wills and Ms Rosalind Comyn, appeared for the claimants, stated that grounds 1 and 2 advance essentially the same contentions in relation to Articles 8, 10 and 11, namely whether the Policy leaves too much discretion to individual officers within the MPS to have the quality of “law.” In that regard, the claimants accept that the defendant has the legal power to use LFR and to adopt a policy for its deployment.
We should at this stage note that some of the authorities cited to us use the expression “the legality principle” to refer to “the quality of law” requirement. Irrespective of nomenclature, we are concerned with the principle derived from the caselaw of the ECHR, and applied in the domestic cases, that a measure, such as the Policy, must have the “quality of law” in the sense that it must be accessible to the persons concerned, foreseeable as to its consequences and compatible with the rule of law ( Huvig v France (1990) 12 EHRR 528 and Kruslin v France (1990) 12 EHRR 547, applied by the Supreme Court in In Re Gallagher [2019] UKSC 3; [2020] AC 185 at [14]). 1
There is no issue in the present case about the accessibility of the Policy. It has been published and it is comprehensible. The contrary has not been suggested.
The central issue in this case relates to foreseeability. Mr Squires frequently submitted that the Policy (or rather certain parts of the Policy) confers too broad a discretion on individual police officers when deciding on whether and where to deploy LFR. But this turned out to be a form of shorthand. He accepted that the appropriate test is that stated by Lord Sumption JSC in Gallagher at [17]:
“The measure must not confer a discretion so broad that its scope is in practice dependent on the will of those who apply it, rather than on the law itself”.
In other words, a measure must have sufficient clarity and foreseeability for the purposes of IAWL and PBL so as not to allow arbitrariness, that is decision-making by a public authority on the basis of whim, caprice, malice or predilection (Lord Bingham in R (Gillan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ([2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307
at [34]). This court is being asked to determine whether particular parts of the Policy identified by the claimants are contrary to ArArticles 8, 10 and 11ecause they allow officers to make individual decisions on the deployment of LFR which are arbitrary. The Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal have previously considered these issues in relation to LFR: R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Information Commissioner and others intervening) [[2019] EWHC 2341(Admin) [2020] 1 WLR 672; [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, [2020] 1 WLR 5037), which we discuss below.It is important to be clear at the outset that a challenge to the foreseeability of a measure, or its alleged arbitrariness, does not involve a challenge to the proportionality of that measure or its application in a particular case. That distinction was emphasised by Lord Sumption in Gallagher at [14] and [17]. Lord Reed JSC had previously drawn the same distinction in R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35; [2015] AC 49 in his analysis at [114]–[115] (endorsed by Lord Sumption in Gallagher at [36]–[41]).
Whether a measure satisfies the requirement of foreseeability is an anterior legal question. If it does not, then the measure violates whichever Convention right is engaged. If it does, then issues as to justification and proportionality may fall to be determined. However, Mr Squires made the claimants' position clear. They do not raise any issue regarding justification or proportionality in this case.
The claimants
The first claimant is a 39-year-old Black man who was born and lives in London. He volunteers as a community worker with Street Fathers to provide a proactive and positive male presence for children and young people in areas of London affected by youth violence to prevent them coming into contact with the criminal justice system (Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds para.20).
On 23 February 2024 near London Bridge station Mr Thompson was stopped, detained and questioned by police officers after having been matched by LFR with a different person on a police “watchlist” (a list of “Sought Persons”). That person was his brother who was on bail for a suspected offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm on him. Although officers doubted whether the first claimant was the person on the watchlist, they nevertheless scrutinised him, asked questions and made him prove his...
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