The Law Society of England and Wales v Anal Sheikh

Approved Judgment

By a claim form issued pursuant to CPR 8, the Law Society of England & Wales (“the Applicant”) applies against Ms Anal Sheikh (“the Defendant”) for various declaratory and injunctive relief. First of all, a declaration is sought that the Defendant's current claims against the Claimant proceeding before the Employment Tribunal are totally without merit. Secondly, a mandatory injunction is sought that the Defendant apply forthwith to the Employment Tribunal for an order that her current claims be dismissed upon withdrawal. Thirdly, that, subject to the above, the Defendant be restrained from issuing any claim or making any applications in any court, Employment Tribunal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal, or in any other tribunal against their defendants, employees, servants or agents without first obtaining the permission of this court.

The matter is before me today pursuant to an application notice issued under Part 23 and mirrors the relief sought in the Part 8 claim form. The relief sought is in the nature of injunctive relief and is in effect for a further Civil Restraint Order governed by the provisions of CPR 3.11 and the relevant practice direction, PD3C.

This case has a lengthy, complex and in many ways tragic background. I am not going to cover all of the relevant background, but will alight on that which is necessary for this judgment to be understood.

Many years ago, the Defendant was a practising solicitor. She specialised in conveyancing and related property matters. There was litigation involving one of her clients, Mr Dogan and his company Red River UK Limited. That was resolved before Henderson J in April 2010. The Defendant lost that litigation. Meanwhile, the Defendant was struck off the Roll of Solicitors for dishonesty in May 2009. The first GCRO was made against her in July 2009 by Burnett J (as he then was). That order was extended by various judges over time, the last extension being made by Turner J on 13 July 2017.

For the purposes of today's proceedings, I have paid particular attention to the judgment of Patterson J made in 2015 and the judgment of Turner J made on the occasion I have mentioned. The effect of Turner J's GCRO is that the Defendant is restrained from litigating in the High Court and the county court, but the order does not extend to inferior courts, including Employment Tribunals. What has happened in the light of the GCROs is that it is clear to me that the Defendant has sought to circumvent them by bringing proceedings in the Employment Tribunal. It is necessary for these purposes to identify those proceedings and for me to say something about them.

The first set of proceedings was issued in Central London on 11 April 2017 and bears case number ET-2200748/2017. The claim is against a number of entities including the Law Society, Bar Council and Ministry of Justice, and is for race and religious discrimination. An examination of the substance of the claim reveals that it is a thinly veiled attempt to re-litigate some of the matters which gave rise to the Defendant's current difficulty. It is said, for example, that between certain dates in October 2007 various senior judges, barristers and solicitors entered into a conspiracy to commit an identity theft in the context of a certain conveyancing transaction, described as the Red River Conveyancing and Mortgage Fraud. It is immediately clear that the focus of the claim is the underlying dispute which was determined by Henderson J (as he then was) back in April 2009. The conspirators – they include Briggs J (as he then was), Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (formerly Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and President of the Supreme Court) and Henderson J – are all said to be guilty of fraud, in particular Briggs J, in relation to an order he made on 2 October 2007. It is said in this claim that Briggs J impersonated a judge and stayed enactments of trials. He put on his judicial robes and wig and used the empty courtroom and bribed the court to stand around and pretend that a hearing was taking place.

The claim is in discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics contrary to relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 and, as the Defendant informs me, the basis of the claim is sections 111 and 112, because the Employment Tribunal is a public body for these purposes and is, in effect, conniving in the discrimination carried out by others. That is the first claim.

The second claim (although the pleadings are not available) was brought before a separate tribunal in Watford. It is to be inferred that the allegations were the same, or, if not quite the same, very similar, because there is in the paperwork a letter from the Employment Appeal Tribunal dated 14 December 2017, which was an attempt by the Defendant to appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal given by letter dated 16 August 2017 rejecting her claim because the ET had no jurisdiction. Paragraph 4 of the reasons of Elizabeth Laing J demonstrate that the subject matter of the claim is likely to have been, as I have said, the same if not very similar. Laing J said that, in her opinion, the notice of appeal disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and had no reasonable prospects of success, although does not say in terms that the claim or the application to appeal the ET's refusal of jurisdiction was totally without merit.

There is a yet further claim based, it seems to me, on identical facts, brought this time again in the Tribunal in Central London. The case number on this occasion is 3306713/2017, and it was received by the Tribunal in July 2017. The Employment Tribunal decided of its own motion that the claim should be rejected against the majority of the respondents named, but could be pursued against the Ministry of Justice. It is not clear why that view was taken. The Ministry of Justice sought to defend the claim, as was its right, and the Defendant's riposte was, on my understanding, to apply either for summary judgment or for the Defence to be struck, it matters not precisely, but the matter came before Her Honour Judge Eady QC, sitting in chambers, on 28 March 2018.

What happened is that the Employment Tribunal had on 13 October 2017 accepted the Ministry of Justice's response, in other words its Defence, and the EAT decided that, in effect, there was no judicial decision which could be appealed and that the proposed appeal was wholly without merit, which I take to mean totally without merit. The EAT was so concerned that the Defendant would be seeking to pursue claims in the EAT as a means of avoiding the GCRO that consideration should be given to referring the matter to the Attorney General.

In relation to the first set of proceedings, it is right to point out, in the Defendant's favour I suppose, that those have been stayed pending the determination of the Law Society's application. The Defendant, dissatisfied with that, sought to appeal the original stay and the order extending the stay, and those appeals were determined, again by Her Honour Judge Eady QC, at the end of May of this...