The likelihood of local allies free-riding: Testing economic theories of alliances in US counterinsurgency interventions

Published date01 September 2017
DOI10.1177/0010836717701966
Date01 September 2017
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717701966
Cooperation and Conflict
2017, Vol. 52(3) 309 –331
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836717701966
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The likelihood of local
allies free-riding: Testing
economic theories of alliances
in US counterinsurgency
interventions
Barbara Elias
Abstract
In counterinsurgency interventions, free-riding by small, local allies is persistent. Yet, the literature
on free-riding by small allies is largely limited to conventional multilateral partnerships, such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, neglecting other types of asymmetric alliances. Using new
data containing 144 US requests to local allies in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article tests the
logic of economic theories of alliances in counterinsurgency interventions. I find even when small
allies are explicitly asked to contribute to alliance-wide security goods, they are likely to free-ride
almost half the time (45%), and the likelihood of free-riding is dependent on whether local allies can
be excluded by larger allies. This conclusion upholds the logic of economic models, since shared
defense goods that exclude local allies fail to meet the criteria of public goods.
Keywords
Afghanistan, alliances, burden-sharing, counterinsurgency, free-riding, Iraq, military intervention,
Vietnam
It is largely assumed that small allies will fail to carry their share of collective burdens,
instead opting to free-ride off efforts of larger security partners (Oneal, 1990b; Russett
and Sullivan, 1971; Sandler et al., 1980; Sandler and Hartley, 2001). Olson and Zeckhauser
instigated a prolific debate by modeling how large states, specifically the USA, would
‘bear a disproportionately large share of the common burden,’ while smaller members
free-ride (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966: 269; Sandler, 1993; Sandler and Hartley, 2001).
Although economic theories of alliances traditionally model asymmetric, multilateral
security alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), commentary on
Corresponding author:
Barbara Elias, Bowdoin College, 9800 College Station, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA.
Email: belias@bowdoin.edu
701966CAC0010.1177/0010836717701966Cooperation and ConflictElias
research-article2017
310 Cooperation and Conflict 52(3)
security alliances in counterinsurgency interventions often describe similar free-riding
behaviors in their asymmetric alliances between foreign intervening forces and local part-
ners. Despite potential similarities, there has not yet been a systematic analysis comparing
the logic of economic theories of alliances and burden-sharing in counterinsurgency
coalitions. This article fills this gap, examining the US counterinsurgency wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Vietnam, specifying the applicability of economic models and analyzing
factors that make local free-riding more, or less, likely.
Analyzing free-riding is imperative to understanding long-term outcomes in counter-
insurgency interventions. The failure of local partners to carry their share of the burden
is a strategic liability. Free-riding hinders local military and governance institutions,
potentially affecting the duration, cost or even outcome of the war (Biddle, 2008; Cohen
et al., 2006; Cooper, 2009; Elias, 2013; Gompert and Gordon IV, 2008: xlv–lvii, 344;
Jaffe and Morris, 2015; Riedel, 2012: 92; Watts et al., 2014). Drawing on existing theo-
ries of asymmetric burden-sharing not only enhances understandings of free-riding in
these wars, but further expands larger understandings regarding collective goods. As
Oppenheimer (1979: 390) argued, testing the range of application for Olson’s model is
important for identifying assumptions within the theory.
To test the applicability of economic theories of alliances in counterinsurgencies, I
rely on new data from the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, I
examine 144 policy requests from Washington to local allies documenting attempts by
the USA to create alliance-wide cooperation against the insurgency. This set of requests
does not capture the universe of opportunities afforded to in-country allies to free-ride.
However, limiting analysis to US requests for cooperation (a) eliminates instances of
independent US action apart from collective joint security efforts and (b) adopts a
tough-test case selection where allies were specifically asked to participate, and not to
free-ride. This approach identifies the likelihood of free-riding even when a larger ally
requested local assistance. As discussed in the methods section, not all instances of non-
compliance by small allies with US requests are cases of free-riding, since non-compli-
ance could be motivated by multiple factors, including disagreement with the policy
being proposed. Free-riding, on the other hand, is defined as small allies benefiting
from the provision of an alliance-wide good aiming to harm the insurgent enemy, or
bolster collective counterinsurgency capabilities, without contributing to the production
of that security good.
Supporting the logic of economic theories, I hypothesize that free-riding by smaller
counterinsurgency allies is more likely the more closely requests from larger allies resem-
ble alliance-wide public goods. Conversely, proposed policies that do not resemble public
goods are less likely to result in free-riding. A public good is defined as a commodity or
service that is both non-rival (one actor’s consumption does not reduce availability) and
non-excludable (no actor can exclude others). This study tests non-excludability, as a first
step in examining burden-sharing in counterinsurgency contexts.
These hypotheses build on Sandler’s (1993) ‘joint-products model,’ specifying that
Olson’s theory will be likely confirmed, so long as the alliance-wide product in question
meets the criteria for being a public good (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984; Oneal and Diehl,
1994; Sandler and Hartley, 2001). Yet, importantly, not all inter-alliance defense prod-
ucts produced in alliances will qualify as alliance-wide public goods and, in those cases,

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