The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking
| Author | James D. Morrow,Kevin L. Cope |
| DOI | 10.1177/09516298211044092 |
| Published date | 01 October 2021 |
| Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Original Research Articles |
The limits of information
revelation in multilateral
negotiations: A theory of
treatymaking
James D. Morrow
Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Kevin L. Cope
School of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
Abstract
States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine
states’willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it other-
wise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-govern-
mental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to
secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal
those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism
design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states
are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not
the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types
that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the
treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations
can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new lineof empirical research on
how multilateral treaties are negotiated.
Keywords
International institutions, bargaining, international law, treaties
Corresponding author:
James D. Morrow, Institute for Social Research (ISR), University of Michigan, Room 4456, 426 Thompson
Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48104–2321, USA.
Email: jdmorrow@umich.edu
Original Research Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2021, Vol. 33(4) 399–429
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/09516298211044092
journals.sagepub.com/home/jtp
Introduction
Multilateral treaty negotiations are now central to international cooperation, with some
recent negotiations producing successful institutions that shape state behavior,
1
and
others falling apart before reaching an agreement. For instance, at the Copenhagen confer-
ence of 2009, a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol floundered and was withdrawn. Other
treaties such as the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court were concluded without
the support of key states, hampering their effectiveness.
2
These negotiations’success or
failure turns in large part on the ability of sponsoring inter-governmental organizations
(IGOs) to reconcile states’competing preferences for cooperation. Because treaty-
negotiating states have the power to opt out of the regime if it would not benefitthem,
the success of negotiations depends on conciliators’ability to distinguish between state
demands that are sincere deal-breakers and those which are idle threats.
One common dilemma facing multilateral negotiations over new international law is
that would-be parties disagree about the exact form of the treaty. One of the fundamental
features of treaties—one not present in other forms of democratic rule-making—is that
they bind only those that opt-in through ratification. States that are dissatisfied with a pro-
posed agreement can simply walk away from the regime. Given that most treaties’
success depends in large part on how many and which states ultimately ratify it, drafters
can and do modify a treaty’s terms over the course of negotiations in an effort to secure
the support of dissatisfied or wavering states. Some other potential parties may oppose the
concessions because they think they would reduce the treaty’s clout or undermine its
purpose. Granting too significant concessions might even lead some current supporters
to abandon it.
3
The negotiations to conclude the1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
exemplify these issues. Many hoped that participating countries would bridge their differ-
ences and reach a consensus on the terms of the treaty, but these hopes were soon dashed.
The United States in particular wanted limits on the court that other states feared would
cripple it even though they recognized the importance of the US to the success of the
court. As William Schabas put it, “[h]ad the Rome Statute been more accommodating to
the Security Council, and had it more closely resembled the 1994 draft of the [ICC], the
United States might be a State Party. But this would have dampened the enthusiasm of
other States …there might well have been considerably fewer States Parties than there
are today”(Schabas, 2011, 27). Reluctant states were unwilling to divulge the minimum
adjustments necessary for their support. A member of the Canadian delegation, John
T. Holmes, described the problem well: “Privately, …many delegations called for
serious negotiations to begin; yet publicly these same delegations repeated their oft-stated
positions without signaling areas of possible compromise”(Holmes, 2001, 29). Faced wi th
a reluctant state, how far should the drafters o fa treaty go to secure its support? How should
they weigh the competing demands of different states? These judgments are difficult
enough whenparties freely share theirpositions, but the reluctance of the partiesdemanding
change in a treaty cloud these judgments further.
We apply mechanism design to a spatial theory of multilateral treaty negotiations to
show the limits on what parties are willing to reveal in these negotiations. There are
two elements of private information—ideal points and reservation levels—that states
400 Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(4)
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