The Limits of Partnership: An Exit-Action Strategy for Local Democratic Inclusion
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00677.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2007 |
| Author | Jonathan S. Davies |
| Date | 01 December 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00677.x
The Limits of Partnership: An Exit-Action
Strategy for Local Democratic Inclusion
Jonathan S. Davies
University of Warwick
The challenge of enhancing the ‘democratic anchorage’ of partnerships has become a central concern in
policy studies. Radical reform proposals designed to level the deliberative playing field include commu-
nity veto powers and the appointment of neutral arbiters. Welcome as they would be, however, it is
questionable whether such reforms would overcome power asymmetries in the partnership arena. A study
of the local politics of social inclusion in two UK cities, Dundee and Hull, suggests that managerialism,
driven by national governments, is eroding the prospects for partnership democratisation. But more
significantly for the reformist agenda, public managers and community activists think in incompatible
frames about the role of partnerships and in ways that are not understood by the other party. Non-
communication undermines the prospects for an equitable democratic consensus. Insights from Bourdieu
suggest that even in environments more favourable to equitable democratic discourse than those in
Dundee and Hull, subtle manifestations of power in culture, discourse and bearing would undermine the
potential for a Habermasian consensus between radically unequal actors. In a radical departure from the
network governance paradigm, it is therefore argued that empowerment may depend less on enhanced
network democracy than on strong independent community organisation capable of acting separately and
coercively against governing institutions and elites – an exit-action strategy. These preliminary conclu-
sions point to a substantial research agenda on the politics of the state–civil society nexus.
In response to widespread concern about the democratic deficit in partnerships,
or governing networks (Rhodes, 1997), critics have begun considering how
better ‘democratic anchorage’ might be achieved in local collaborative institu-
tions.1 Scholars including John Diamond (2004), Chris Skelcher (2005), Skelcher
et al. (2005) and Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing (2005) argue for radical reforms
aiming toward inclusive and accountable networks. They believe that despite the
difficulties inherent in democratising a polycentric governing system, communi-
ties can be empowered within democratised networks. This article challenges
these claims, arguing that reformist scholars underestimate the challenge of
democratic inclusion. Instead, it proposes a radical break from the network
‘orthodoxy’ in UK policy studies (Marinetto, 2003), advancing a case for ‘exit’ by
groups unable to secure full democratic inclusion in the partnership arena.
The argument derives from Bourdieusian and Habermasian social critique; the
former in an account of how class domination is secured in the ‘habituation’ of
social practice (Noble and Watkins, 2003), the latter of the corrosive effects of
capitalist modernity on democracy. Their insights help explain deliberative failure
between public managers and community activists, revealed in an ESRC-funded
study of partnerships in Dundee and Hull. The study illustrates that
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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J O N AT H A N S. DAV I E S
managerialism has eroded the prospects for democratic partnerships. But more
significantly, it reveals that public managers and community activists have con-
trasting common-sense understandings of partnership which, being unspoken,
cannot be articulated or deliberated. This finding lends provisional support to the
Bourdieusian idea that even if measures to enhance deliberative democracy were
implemented, they would still reproduce inequalities rooted in the cultural and
material resources of powerful actors; in this instance, local public service man-
agers ( Bourdieu, 1984; 1990). If power relations are embrocated in language and
other forms of communication, then the possibility of rationally motivated
consensus among unequal protagonists is radically restricted (Crossley, 2004). This
conclusion is a challenge to the partnership principle and points toward the need
for effective ‘restraining barriers’ to protect civil society from state domination
(Habermas, 1987a, p. 364). It suggests that community activists would be well
advised to consider exiting partnerships, even in better deliberative conditions
than those pertaining in Dundee and Hull. This strategy finds support from
theorists (Kohn, 2000; Medearis, 2005) who argue that disempowered actors who
carve out autonomous spaces and act coercively against dominant interests can
influence governing outcomes better than those collaborating with governing
elites. This case for ‘exit-action’ strategies opens up a challenging research agenda
on the study of power at the state–civil society nexus (Mettler and Soss, 2004).
The Challenge of Network Democratisation
Since the 1960s, UK governments have sought to promote collaborative local
governance, successively involving local government and other public agencies,
the business and voluntary sectors and community activists (Davies, 2002). Gov-
erning networks, or partnerships, are hybrid organisations typically comprising
state, market and civil society actors. The most recent examples, like English Local
Strategic Partnerships ( Johnson and Osborne, 2003), are complex bureaucracies
run by dedicated public managers. It is widely accepted that there is a democratic
deficit in these governing networks, despite community involvement. For
Skelcher et al. (2005, p. 586) managerialism has become a dominant trend:
‘technical expertise is privileged and decisions proceed through a rational process
little impacted by the political world’. Dianne Perrons and Sophia Skyer’s study
of the Shoreditch New Deal for Communities regeneration partnership found
that government-imposed performance management regimes render ‘the task of
adequately representing the community difficult – “virtually impossible” ’
(Perrons and Skyer, 2003, p. 278).2 Such observations are common (Amin, 2005;
Taylor, 2000).
Managerialism can be justified on efficiency grounds and by appeal to the
democratic legitimacy of elected governments. Skelcher et al. (2005) describe an
‘agency’ model of partnership where the tasks of joined-up governance, public
responsiveness and effective performance management require strong public
managers. In this scenario, if community representatives impede effective
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POLITICAL STUDIES: 2007, 55(4)
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programme delivery, managers and politicians may feel justified in circumventing
local democratic procedures to secure public value from the public pound
(Stoker, 2004, pp. 190–1). However, this argument fails where responsiveness to
citizens is a pre-condition of efficiency. Creating ‘public value’ (Moore, 1995)
demands participatory governance. Managers ‘can only know the meaning of
public value ... through dialogue with citizens’ (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 552). For
Amartya Sen (1999, p. 154), democracy is a crucial means by which public goods
are defined and secured. In this light, partnership democratisation is a key
governance challenge.
What, then, are the strengths and weaknesses of proposals to democratise net-
works? The argument proceeds in three steps. First setting out key ideas for
network reform, the discussion then turns to a critical evaluation of these ideas in
light of Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of how class power is secured through cultural
capital. The case is then advanced for alternative exit-action strategies to be
pursued by disadvantaged groups in the event that democratic inclusion in
partnership is unfeasible. Key issues in this three-part discussion are then framed
as questions examined in the study of Dundee and Hull.
Enhancing the Democratic Anchorage of Partnerships
What would democratic partnerships look like? John Dryzek’s definition of
deliberative democracy holds that ‘the essence of democratic legitimacy should be
sought ... in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in
authentic deliberation about that decision’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. v, cited in Medearis,
2005, p. 54, emphasis added by Medearis). Deliberative democracy demands not
only participation, but also equal access to decisions by all citizens with a stake in
them. In partnership, however, this is impractical.At best, equal access to decisions
for democratically selected, accountable and recallable community representatives
would be informed by prior deliberative exercises with constituents.
Generating an equitable democratic consensus in a radically unequal society
requires a ‘counterfactual’ space where real-world ‘status distinctions are bracketed
and neutralized’ (Fraser, 1990, p. 60). Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative
Action (Habermas, 1984; 1987b) suggests that this space exists in the rules internal
to discourse. He argues:‘Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention
of universal and unconstrained consensus’ (Habermas, 1971, p. 314). Consensual
aspirations are internal to the practices of communication, beyond the influence
of values or socio-economic structures. They are the ‘telos’, the raison d’être, of any
communicative encounter (Habermas, 1984, p. 247). From this abstract principle,
Habermas derives...
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