The logic of delegation and institutional contexts: Ministerial selection under mixed-member systems in Japan
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891118811686 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| Author | Hiroki Kubo |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
The logic of delegation and
institutional contexts: Ministerial
selection under mixed-member
systems in Japan
Hiroki Kubo
Meijigakuin University, Japan
Abstract
How do electoral systems and legislative institutions modify the logic of delegation in ministerial
selection processes? This study argues that candidate-centered electoral systems and bicameralism
increase the risk of agency loss. I reveal how these two institutional contexts mediate party
leaders’ strategies on the allocation of ministerial posts by analyzing Japan’s ministerial-selection
data and survey-based ideal point estimates from 2003 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that,
under the party-centered electoral systems of the lower house, individuals’ ideological proximity
to the party leadership increases the probability of their joining a cabinet. However, party leaders
allocate cabinet posts to ideological outliers in the upper house and also select MPs who are
ideologically distant from the party leadership under the candidate-centered electoral systems in
order to maintain party unity.
Keywords
bicameralism, cabinet portfolio allocation, candidate-centered electoral systems, intra-party
politics, minister selection
Introduction
How do electoral systems and legislative institutions modify the logic of the delegation of cabinet
portfolio allocations? Moreover, how does party leadership allocate cabinet posts in the interests of
achieving the party members’ collective goals, and why are such particular methods chosen? The
essence of parliamentary democracy is a single chain of delegation and executive accountability to
the legislature (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, 1996). In parliamentary democracies, the ministerial
Corresponding author:
Hiroki Kubo, Meijigakuin University, 1-2-37 Shirokanedai, Minato, Tokyo, 1088636, Japan.
Email: hkubo@law.meijigakuin.ac.jp
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2019, Vol. 4(4) 303–329
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891118811686
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selection process is one of the most im portant aspects of the entire deleg ation-accountability
relationship. This is because it has a decisive influence on subsequent delegation processes,
including cabinet governance, bureaucratic control, and policy implementation (Strøm et al.,
2003, 2008). Moreover, the post-allocation process is theoretically considered to be an effective
tool of parliamentary control over cabinets (Dowding, 2014; Dowding and Dumont, 2008; Strøm
et al., 2010). Specifically, recent research has analyzed the issue of intraparty politics and minis-
terial selection and has revealed institutional mechanisms that are used to reduce agency loss in
parliamentary democracies (In dridason and Kam, 2008; Kam et al. , 2010). However, little is
known about the logic of delegation for the ministerial selection process outside of the context
of the Westminster-parliamentary system. This study clarifies the institutional contexts that pre-
vent agency loss and affect success and failure in successful delegations.
The central claim of this article is that the logic of delegation, mediated by electoral systems and
legislative institutions, affects the ministerial selection process. In parliamentary democracies,
individual MPs delegate their power to the prime minister (PM) and the PM selects cabinet
members in the interests of achieving the party’s collective goals. The prime minister is more
likely to select MPs who share similar ideologies to himself/herself in order to attempt to achieve
collective policy goals and prevent agency loss. However, the existence of a second chamber and
personal-vote-seeking electoral systems complicates the single chain of delegation and ministerial
selection process. Bicameralism multiplies the number of chains of delegation and a candidate-
centered system weakens the influence of the party leadership on post allocation as it involves an
ex ante control mechanism. This results in a failure to prevent adverse selection and minimize the
ideological gap between ministers and their principal. As a consequence, the party leader tends to
select MPs who have a weak ideological affinity with the PM, which in turn creates ideologically
heterogeneous cabinets.
In order to elucidate the logic of the minister selection process when multiple chains of delega-
tion and weak ex ante control mechanisms are in question, I focus on contemporary Japanese
politics between 2003 and 2014. Contemporary Japanese politics is an ideal area to test the effect
of intraparty politics and institutional contexts on cabinets, because Japan has two intere sting
institutional features: an a symmetric bicameral system and a mixed-member system (para llel
voting system) in both chambers. In the first case, while the cabinet is accountable to the lower
chamber, it is not accountable to the upper chamber, which has a strong influence on the legislative
process. More importantly, in the second case, while the lower house members are elected under a
single member district (SMD) system or proportional representation (PR) under a mixed-member
majoritarian (MMM) system, the upper house members are either elected by SMDs, by single non-
transferable vote (SNTV), or by nationwide open list PR (OLPR). Utilizing this unique institu-
tional characteristic in contemporary Japan, I examine how these different electoral systems and
the existence of the second chamber modif y the logic of delegation in the minister selection
process.
This study clarifies how and why mixed electoral systems (the combination of party-centered
and candidate-centered systems) and asymmetric bicameralism (two different chains of delega-
tion) change the logic of delegation in a parliamentary democracy. In the second section, summar-
izing the literature on the logic of delegation and intraparty politics in ministerial selection
processes, I highlight the necessity of understanding the problem in broader institutional contexts.
In the third section, I present my main argument about institutional contexts and ministerial
selection. My goal is to reconcile different points of view on the problems associated with the
delegation process for ministerial selection, focusing on institutional contexts. I argue how
304 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4(4)
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