The Monarch and the Selection of a Prime Minister: A Re-Examination of the Crisis of 1931

AuthorGraeme C. Moodie
Date01 February 1957
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.1957.tb00856.x
Published date01 February 1957
Subject MatterArticle
THE MONARCH
AND
THE
SELECTION
OF
A PRIME MINISTER:
A
RE-EXAMINATION
OF
THE
CRISIS
OF
19311
GRAEME
C.
MOODIE
University
of
Glasgow
IN Labour Party circles before the war, disquiet was frequently expressed
about the part played by King George
V
in the formation of the National
Government in August 1931, More recently it has become unfashionable
to query the public actions of the Monarch, as opposed, that is, to the
making of indiscreet and personal ‘revelations’ about what should be the
private lives of Royalty. It is of note, therefore, that this pre-war disquiet
should be expressed once more in Mr. Herbert Morrison’s recent book on
the constitution.* It is the more significant because Mr. Morrison, unlike
the earlier critics, writes after much fuller information about the King’s
action has been published? and after experiencing the apparently excellent
relations between Monarch and Cabinet during the lifetime of the 1945
Labour G~vernment.~ In itself this suggests, as it is the purpose of this
article to argue, that what might be called ‘the case against the King’s
action’ cannot be dismissed, as it has tended to be, simply as the product
of
pique, ignorance, or a misunderstanding of the British Constitution. At
any
rate, after the lapse of a quarter-century, it is perhaps worth while re-
examining the constitutional aspects of the crisis of 1931 in
so
far as they
concern the power
of
the Monarch
to
select a Prime Minister.
I.
A
It is necessary to begin by stating, as briefly as possible, what seem to be
the facts in the case. The relevant information about the 1931 crisis
is
now
readily accessible.’ By the end of the third week in August the Labour
*
This article was set up for this issue before 1957.-E~.
Government and Parliament
(1954), pp. 77-80.
In Harold Nicolson,
King George
the
Fifrk
(1952), pp. 453-69.
In addition
to
the remainder of Mr. Morrison’s discussion
of
the Monarchy, see, for
example, M. Stewart, ‘Labour and the Monarchy’,
Fabian Journal,
viii, 1952, 17-22.
The account which follows is based mainly upon that given in Nicolson, op. cit. Light
of
varying intensity
is
also
cast
on
the whole crisis by, among others: Viscount Samuel,
Memoirs
(1945), pp. 204 and 221-2; Philip Snowden,
An Atrtobiography
(1934),
ii.
pp. 929-
B
Political
Studles,
VoI.
V.
No.
1
(1957,
1-20).
5540.5.1
2
THE
MONARCH AND
THE
SELECTlON
OF
A
PRIME MINISTER
Government was faced with the necessity
to
resign,
ask
for a dissolution
of Parliament,
or
accept certain economic and financial policies to cope
with the current crisis. The necessity arose, most directly,
from
two factors:
the
loans
demanded by the Bank
of
England were obtainable
only
from the
United States of America, and on the condition that ‘suitable’ measures
were taken by the Government; and, secondly, the leader
of
the Liberal
Party,
on
whose support
in
Parliament the Government depended, had
informed Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, that unless these
policies were adopted the Liberals would withdraw their support and vote
with the Conservatives. However, the majority of the Cabinet was not
prepared to follow MacDonald in accepting the economies, including cuts
in
unemployment benefit, that were thus needed. Accordingly, on the 23rd
of
August, the King was warned that the Government would probably have
to resign and, on MacDonald’s advice, he consulted the Liberal and Con-
servative leaders, Sir Herbert Samuel and Stanley Baldwin. Samuel was the
first
to arrive, and advised that it was most desirable that the economies be
put through by a Labour Administration,
or,
failing that, by a temporary
National Government under MacDonald.
In
this way, he thought, the
working classes might be more willing to accept the unpalatable economies.
This analysis seems to have impressed the King very favourably. Baldwin,
when the point was put to him by the King, said that he was prepared to
serve under MacDonald
or,
if
the latter insisted on resigning, to
form
an
administration of his own should the Liberals give him the necessary
support. Later that same evening, after the divided Cabinet had been unable
to agree over the final
offer
from the New
York
bankers, MacDonald
returned to Buckingham Palace to offer his resignation. Thereupon, accor-
ding to
a
report by Sir Clive Wigram, the King’s Private Secretary,’ ‘The
King impressed on the Prime Minister that he was the only man to lead the
country through the crisis and hoped that he would reconsider the situation’,
and then accepted MacDonald’s request
for
a
conference on the following
morning with Baldwin, Samuel, and himself. At this conference, once more
to quote from Sir Clive Wigram’s account:
. . .
the Prime Minister said that he had the resignation
of
the Cabinet
in
his
pocket, but the
King
replied that he trusted there was
no
question
of
the Prime
Minister’s resignation: the leaders
of
the three parties
must
get together and come
to
some arrangement. His Majesty hoped that the Prime Minister,
with the
62;
R.
Postgate,
The Life of George Lansbrrry
(1951), pp. 261-72;
M.
A.
Hamilton,
Arthur
Henderson
(1938), pp. 347-403; H. Dalton,
Call
Back Yesterday
(1953), pp. 259-303;
G.
M.
Young,
Stanley Baldwin
(1952), pp. 164-8; Keith Feiling,
Life of Neville Chamberlain
(1946), pp. 189-97; Lord Parmoor,
A
Retrospecr
(1936), pp. 319-20; John Strachey,
The
Coming
Struggle for Power
(1933), pp. 273-92; and Sidney Webb, ‘What Happened in 1931’,
Political
Quarterly,
iii,
1932, 1-17.
Quoted
in
Nicolson, op. cit., p. 464.
Ibid..
pp.
465-6.
Emphasis not
in
the
original.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT