The more concentrated, the better represented? The geographical concentration of immigrants and their descriptive representation in the German mixed-member system
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512118796263 |
| Published date | 01 November 2019 |
| Date | 01 November 2019 |
| Author | Lucas Geese,Diana Schacht |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118796263
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(5) 643 –658
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512118796263
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The more concentrated, the better
represented? The geographical
concentration of immigrants and
their descriptive representation in
the German mixed-member system
Lucas Geese
University of Bamberg, Germany
Diana Schacht
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Germany
Abstract
Does the geographical concentration of ethnic minorities influence their descriptive representation in
closed-list systems? Counterintuitive to the idea that single-member district electoral rules are necessary
for minorities’ geographical representation, we argue that, in closed-list systems, parties are incentivised
to allocate promising list positions to those minority candidates who are based in geographical areas
where minorities concentrate. Empirically, we provide a case study of the list positions of dual candidates
of immigrant origin running in the German mixed-member system in 2013. Results show a relationship
between the list positions of candidates of immigrant origin and geographical concentrations of immigrant-
origin residents.
Keywords
Descriptive representation, mixed-member systems, immigrant-origin candidates, geographical
concentrations, ethnic minorities, closed-list systems
Introduction
Investigating the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is a fundamental topic in political
science. The representation of ethnic minorities’ interests, their political participation, and trust in
democratic institutions, hinges on minorities’ adequate numerical (or descriptive) representation in
Corresponding author:
Lucas Geese, Faculty for Social Sciences, Economics, and Business Administration, University of Bamberg,
Feldkirchenstr. 21, Bamberg, 96052, Germany.
Email: lucas.geese@uni-bamberg.de
796263IPS0010.1177/0192512118796263International Political Science ReviewGeese and Schacht
research-article2018
Article
644 International Political Science Review 40(5)
decision-making assemblies (Mansbridge, 1999). Since proportional representation (PR) systems
perform better than single-member district (SMD) systems in producing proportionality between
parties’ vote and seat shares, they are often said to be more conducive to minority representation
(Ruedin, 2009). However, scholarship demonstrates that the distinction between the two types of
systems is not clear-cut. A key factor to be considered is the settlement patterns of minorities. That
is, SMD systems can be more beneficial to geographically concentrated minorities than closed-list
PR systems, while geographically dispersed minorities may find it easier to access the parliamen-
tary ranks through closed-list PR systems (Bloemraad, 2013; Bochsler, 2011; Dancygier, 2014;
Ruedin, 2009).
Evidence favouring the moderating effect of minorities’ geographical concentrations is also
provided by studies conducted in mixed-member (MM) systems (Donovan, 2007; Friedman, 2005;
Kostadinova, 2007; Moser, 2008; Schönwälder, 2012; Wüst, 2014; Zollinger and Bochsler, 2012).
Since MM systems create parliaments with a fixed share of seats elected under SMD and remain-
ing seats allocated by PR (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003), this line of research mainly seeks to
make ‘controlled’ comparisons between levels of minority representation in the (closed-list) PR
and in the SMD tier.
However, extant research in MM systems considers the geographical representation of
minorities as a decisive factor in the SMD tier, whereas surprisingly little is known about the
consequences of minorities’ settlement patterns in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems.
Consequently, we ask in this paper whether minorities’ geographical concentration influences
descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems.1 Pursuing this question
provides an interesting research puzzle. From the perspective of formal electoral rules, minori-
ties’ geographical concentration may not be consequential in the PR tier because closed-list PR
electoral rules lack the kind of geographical representation institutionalised in SMD systems
(Latner and McGann, 2005). Conversely, minorities’ geographical concentration could be a
decisive factor for their descriptive representation in the closed-list PR tier of MM systems due
to contamination effects between the two electoral tiers or due to informal recruitment rules
requiring candidates to possess and maintain involvement in local politics. If candidates have
such local attachments when running in the PR tier of MM systems, parties may have incentives
to allocate promising list positions to minority candidates who are based in the geographical
areas where minorities concentrate.
This article, we believe, is the first to pursue this research question. Moreover, by outlining a
novel theoretical understanding of minorities’ geographical representation, we make a theoretical
contribution to the literature. Empirically, we provide a case study of list placements of dual can-
didates of immigrant origin running in the 18th German Bundestag elections held in 2013.
Implemented in 1949, the German MM system has been in place continuously since then and is,
therefore, the oldest existing MM system, which has, as a prototype, inspired other MM system
designs globally in their basic, although not necessarily in all, features (Manow, 2015: 1–8). As
such, the German electoral system may provide insights relevant for minority representation in
other MM and closed-list PR systems, or for constitutional designers who plan to implement a
German-style system.
Empirical results provide evidence that the list positions of dual candidates of immigrant origin
are positively related to geographical concentrations of immigrant-origin residents. This suggests
that, in addition to formal electoral rules, other factors can affect geographical patterns of minority
representation. Thus, our knowledge about the interplay of electoral rules, minorities’ geographical
representation, and their descriptive representation, is far from complete, urging future research to
investigate other determinants of local minority representation than formal electoral rules.
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