The myth of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a decentred state
| Published date | 01 January 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076720905016 |
| Author | Paul Cairney |
| Date | 01 January 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
2022, Vol. 37(1) 46 –66
Special Issue: Decentred State
The myth of
‘evidence-based
policymaking’ in
a decentred state
Paul Cairney
Division of History and Politics, University of Stirling, UK
Abstract
I describe a policy theory story in which a decentred state results from choice and
necessity. Governments often choose not to centralise policymaking but they would
not succeed if they tried. Many policy scholars take this story for granted, but it is often
ignored in other academic disciplines and wider political debate. Instead, commentators
call for more centralisation to deliver more accountable, ‘rational,’ and ‘evidence-based’
policymaking. Such contradictory arguments, about the feasibility and value of
government centralisation, raise an ever-present dilemma for governments to accept
or challenge decentring. They also accentuate a modern dilemma about how to seek
‘evidence-based policymaking’ in a decentred state. I identify three ideal-ty pe ways in
which governments can address both dilemmas consistently. I then identify their ad hoc
use by UK and Scottish governments. Although each government has a reputation for
more or less centralist approaches, both face similar dilemmas and address them in
similar ways. Their choices reflect their need to appear to be in control while dealing
with the fact that they are not.
Keywords
Decentred state, evidence-based policymaking, policy implementation, policy process,
theories of the policy process
Corresponding author:
Paul Cairney, Division of History and Politics, University of Stirling, UK.
Email: p.a.cairney@stir.ac.uk
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DOI: 10.1177/0952076720905016
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Cairney 47
Introduction: Policy theory and the decentred state
I use policy theory to tell a story about the decentred state. Decentred policy-
making may result from choice, when a political system contains a division of
powers or a central government chooses to engage in cooperation with many
other bodies rather than assert central control. However, it is largely borne of
necessity: governments would fail if they tried to centralise policymaking. I base
this argument on two abstract propositions: all policymakers face ‘bounded ratio-
nality’ and engage in a policymaking environment over which they have limited
knowledge and minimal control. The former suggests that they must ignore most
information most of the time, since they can only pay attention to a tiny propor-
tion of their responsibilities at any time (Baumgartner, 2017). The latter suggests
that there are many policymakers and influencers spread across many types of
government, producing a myriad of rules, networks, locally dominant beliefs,
and ways to respond to socioeconomic conditions and events outside of the control
of any single ‘centre’ (Cairney and Weible, 2017; Heikkila and Cairney, 2018).
Some policymakers are more powerful than other actors, but not to the extent
that we should conclude that there is singular central control. Rather, policymak-
ing is multi-centric (Cairney et al., 2019).
Variants of this story represent the conventional wisdom in key branches of US
and European policy studies (Cairney, 2019; Weible and Sabatier, 2018). Its main
messages are present in UK-focused comparisons between the simplified Westminster
model story of central government power versus more realistic accounts of gover-
nance (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Kerr and Kettell, 2006; Rhodes, 1997). However, it
does not have the same impact in wider political debate (Jordan and Cairney, 2013b:
235) or other academic disciplines (Oliver et al., 2014a, 2014b). Its lack of impact in
political debate often prompts central governments to try, in vain, to project an image
of governing competence by regaining central control of policymaking (Bevir and
Rhodes, 2003). Its lack of wider academic impact allows governments to tell stories of
‘evidence-based policymaking’ (EBPM) (Sullivan, 2011), and commentators to make
misguided calls for more centralisation to deliver more ‘rational’ policymaking
(Cairney, 2016).
Indeed, the idea of EBPM sums up a large collection of longstanding myths,
hopes and political slogans about the use of information in central government
(Cairney, 2016). For some governments, like New Labour (from 1997) in the UK,
EBPM phraseology accompanied reforms to ‘modernise’ and take control of pol-
icymaking (Richards and Smith, 2004). Further, ‘what counts is what works’
symbolised the – sometimes sincere, sometimes strategic – assertion that evidence
should trump ideology when addressing policy problems (Davies et al., 1999).
EBPM became a ‘useful myth’ to depoliticise issues (Boswell, 2018). For many
critics of government, EBPM is an ideal to compare with actual practices, to
identify ‘policy-based evidence,’ in which politicians make a choice then cherry-
pick evidence to support it (Cairney, 2019b). More generally, scientists bemoan
the gap between the supply and use of evidence, often blaming it on ill-defined
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