The ‘Open Method of Co-Ordination’ as an Instrument for Implementing the Principle of Subsidiarity?
| DOI | 10.1177/138826270400600404 |
| Author | Jürgen Kohl,Tobias Vahlpahl |
| Date | 01 December 2004 |
| Published date | 01 December 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF CO-ORDINATION’ AS
AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY?
Ju
¨rgen Kohl and Tobias Vahlpahl*
Abstract
In recent years, the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ has gained prominence in European
discourse on the sharing of competences among different levels in the multi-level
political system of the European Union. This article addresses the question whether
the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)’ is a suitable instrument for
implementing the principle of subsidiarity and, at the same time, for promoting
policy convergence in the European Union. In the first part of the article, the general
concept of subsidiarity is reviewed in light of its role in the European context. In the
next part, the evolution of the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’, its general
characteristics and its application to various policy fields are examined. Based on
this analysis, a critical evaluation is undertaken in the final part of the article
concerning the potential policy outcomes of the OMC from a longer term perspective.
This analysis is carried out from an institutionalist perspective, focussing on the
consequences that the OMC is likely to have on the mindsets and behaviour of
political actors. This before leads to the conclusion that the OMC can help to create
a normative commitment to coordinating national policies with respect to commonly
agreed goals while leaving the competences of policy-making mainly with the
Member States. In this way, the OMC respects subsidiarity and national diversity,
but at the same time contributes to achieving greater convergence of economic and
social policies.
1. FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE EUROPEAN
CONTEXT
Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), later incorporated in the Treaty of
Amsterdam (1997), the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ has become a prominent
part of the constitutional order of the European Union. Since 1992, the
European Journal of Social Security, Volume 6 (2004), No. 4 363
*Ju
¨rgen Kohl is a Professor and Tobias Vahlpahl a Research Assistant at the Institute of
Sociology, University of Heidelberg, Sandgasse 9, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany. E-mail:
juergen.kohl@urz.uni-heidelberg.de and tobias.vahlpahl@urz.uni-heidelberg.de.
364 Intersentia
Commission has published a report each year on the application of the
principle of subsidiarity. Also, in the recent debates about the Constitutional
Treaty, reference has often been made to this principle in relation to
arguments about how relations between the Union and the Member States
should be regulated. Indeed, in a multi-level political system like the
European Union, the issue of how competences are divided and shared
between the different levels of government (European, national, regional,
local) is of crucial importance.
For those (like the authors of this article) who come from a federal state like
the Federal Republic of Germany, it is somewhat surprising that the notion
of ‘federalism’ is not mentioned in this context, and is almost banned from
the official vocabulary of the EU. The problem of an adequate division of
responsibilities and powers between the different levels of government is
posed in every federal political system (Scharpf 1985, 1994; Giubboni 2004).
It is also somewhat surprising that the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ has been
adopted instead, because this concept – as used in the Papal Encyclical
‘Quadragesimo anno’ of Pope Pius XI (1931) – originally referred to the
relationship between the individual and the various social communities to
which individuals belong (family, church, other associations). So it can be
said to refer primarily to the relationships between the individual, civil
society and the state, rather than to the relationships between different
levels of government.
1
In essence, the principle of subsidiarity stipulates a social order where any
activities which can be satisfactorily performed by the individuals themselves
or by the smaller (primary) communities should not be transferred to larger
and more comprehensive communities. The state is conceived as the most
comprehensive community; thus the principle of subsidiarity defines the
role of individual self-responsibility versus the collective responsibilities of
smaller or larger communities.
The regulative idea of subsidiarity, however, can be interpreted in a
restrictive or a more comprehensive manner. On the one hand, it aims to
protect the individual and smaller communities against unwarranted
encroachment by larger (political) communities. On the other hand, it
constitutes an obligation on the part of larger communities to assist and
support the individual and smaller communities if, and to the extent that,
they cannot help themselves.
2
Striking a balance between these two
Ju
¨rgen Kohl and Tobias Vahlpahl
1
In recent debates, the original meaning has been termed ‘horizontal subsidiarity’, whereas
the term ‘vertical subsidiarity’ is used for the latter (Zukowski 2004).
2
The first meaning can be called a ‘negative’ definition of subsidiarity, the second one a
‘positive’ definition (Zukowski 2004).
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