The origins and effects of public servant confidence in whistleblowing protection regimes
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Author | Carey Doberstein,Étienne Charbonneau |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12644 |
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The origins and effects of public servant
confidence in whistleblowing protection regimes
Carey Doberstein
1
|Étienne Charbonneau
2
1
Department of Political Science, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada
2
CERGO, Ecole nationale d'administration
publique a Montreal, Montreal, Quebec,
Canada
Correspondence
Carey Doberstein, Department of Political
Science, University of British Columbia, 1147
Research Rd, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada V6T 1Z4.
Email: carey.doberstein@ubc.ca
Abstract
We examine the various whistleblowing regimes in Canada
which, across 13 provinces and territories and a single federal
government, exhibits theoretically interesting variation on
procedures, incentives and protections that are well posi-
tioned for comparative analysis. Drawing on a panel of Cana-
dian public servants, we conducted a survey with both
descriptive and experimental dimensions to identify and mea-
sure knowledge and confidence in the context of diverse
whistleblowing regimes, and how that relates to perceptions
of the legitimacy of unauthorized public disclosures. We find
that confidence is high among public servants despite varia-
tion in the structure of whistleblowing regimes, is enhanced
when respondents know the number of reported wrongdo-
ings and their results, and that greater knowledge of
whistleblowing protections delegitimizes unauthorized public
disclosures (e.g., leakingto the media) of alleged wrongdoing.
1|INTRODUCTION
Public sector whistleblowing legislation has proliferated around the world in recent years, ostensibly in response to
high-profile scandals and disclosures that left both the state and the disclosers—not to mention, citizens—frustrated
in their aftermath. Whistleblowing is ‘an activity of disclosure by organizational members for illegal, immoral, or ille-
gitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations who may be able to effect action’
(Near and Miceli 1985, p. 4). In the absence of a statutory framework that articulates rules and expectations with
respect to confidential disclosures of alleged wrongdoing, the state will fear more ‘unauthorized external disclosures’
(e.g., anonymous leaks to media), potential disclosers will fear retaliation or other negative consequences if they
report up the ladder internally, and citizens will remain suspicious of unchecked government corruption and
mismanagement.
Even in the US, which historically has had robust protections—or compensation in the event of reprisals—for
whistleblowers (Thomas 2005), the massive unauthorized disclosure by Chelsea Manning in 2010 of the Afghan and
Received: 5 September 2019Revised: 14 November 2019Accepted: 7 December 2019
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12644
Public Administration. 2020;98:643–658.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd643
Iraq War logs to Wikileaks and international media left the state and diplomatic corps reeling, Manning in jail from
2010 to 2017, and ‘created such mayhem’in capitals around the world (Brooke 2011, p. 223). Edward Snowden's
years-long collection and unauthorized disclosure of confidential National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence docu-
ments on US government surveillance programmes to international media, notwithstanding its positive impacts on
changing laws governing domestic surveillance, ‘set US counterterrorism efforts back by years, and endangered
American intelligence agents and their sources all over the world’(Lepore 2019).
All of this is indicative of the risks for all when witnesses to alleged wrongdoing, for whatever reason, do not feel
protected when dealing with matters internally in a structured manner as specified by law. Even in jurisdictions that
have robust protections for whistleblowers—and even compensation for any reprisals that may confront them—there
are additional mechanisms that can be employed, such as risk assessments or injunctions to stop victimization
(Brown and Wheeler 2008). There are competing depictions about the ‘whistleblower’, in the abstract, and as a result
different beliefs about the appropriateness of legislative responses to facilitate or at least structure it.
For many, the potential whistleblower is a witness to wrongdoing whose strong public interest ethos compels
them to sacrifice their own personal relationships and likely their career progression to rectify a wrong (Brewer and
Selden 1998). These are high-integrity individuals in organizations who, if granted robust protections in law, can pro-
vide a great service to the public in terms of reducing and preventing corruption (Cho and Song 2015), which among
other benefits can reduce costs and improve services in the public sector (Miceli and Near 2013). The noble
whistleblower narrative is found in the cases of Roger Boisjoly, the NASA scientist whose internal warnings of the
1986 Challenger space shuttle's risks went unheeded, bureaucrat Allan Cutler in Canada in the late 1990s who iden-
tified corruption in the Government of Canada's (GoC) programme to combat Quebec separatism, and Anna Kamm,
who in 2008 leaked confidential documents of the Israeli Defense Forces' extrajudicial killings in the West Bank to a
major newspaper. And, of course, most recently, the yet-unnamed White House whistleblower on Ukraine affairs
whose disclosures have prompted impeachment proceedings against President Trump, and has reportedly been
offered personal protective services due to threats in part encouraged by the President and his allies (Cohen and
Raju 2019). These individuals bore immense personal cost to bring attention to what they perceived as unconsciona-
ble wrongs at the hands of their governments.
There are observers, however, like Canadian scholar Paul Thomas (2005), who argue that not all potential whis-
tleblowers are ‘driven by purely altruistic motives’(p. 151)—with others even claiming a certain narcissism associated
with it (Jos et al. 1989)—and that it is a morally questionable breach of the duty of loyalty to the government of the
day in public sector work environments. Further, they would argue, we need to be careful about facilitating or even
encouraging whistleblowing because sometimes whistleblowers are wrong themselves and can do great damage to
individuals and organizations. For example, in the British Columbia government, a whistleblower, though sincere,
erroneously accused Ministry of Health employees of wrongdoing, caused them to be inappropriately vilified and
fired, and resulted in the suicide of one of them (BC Office of the Ombudsperson 2017). Yet even those sceptical of
whistleblowing as an act are typically focused on the risks of unauthorized external disclosure of confidential infor-
mation (i.e., going public), and tend to favour robust internal procedures that facilitate reporting to a supervisor or
independent officer, with public disclosure being the final option after all other avenues have been exhausted
(Thomas 2005).
There is considerable research into the personal and contextual determinants of whistleblowing behaviour
(Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005; Park and Keil 2009; Keil et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 2010; Dalton and Radtke
2013; Cho and Song 2015) as well as comparative research on whistleblowing regimes around the world (Thüsing
and Forst 2016), which will be briefly reviewed in the paragraphs below. An area of whistleblowing research that has
received less attention, however, is how variations in whistleblowing regimes influence public servants' confidence
in their protections and their views of the legitimacy of unauthorized external disclosures. That is, do some
whistleblowing regimes, more than others, generate confidence among those they are ostensibly targeting, and
importantly from the state's perspective, do they effectively delegitimize the unauthorized external disclosure of
confidential information?
644 DOBERSTEIN AND CHARBONNEAU
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