"The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes"
| Author | Y. Tandon |
| Published date | 01 April 1964 |
| Date | 01 April 1964 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711786400200901 |
555
"THE
PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT
OF
INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES"*
Y.TANDON
Attempts
to
settle
international
disputes
can
take
many
forms.
I
shall,
in
this
paper,
study
only
the
institutional
method
of
resolving
them,
that
is,
by
the
use
of
diplomatic
machinery
which
is
formalised
and
more
or
less
permanent,
as
against
the
method
of
&dquo;contingent
diplomacy&dquo;,
under
which
statesmen
meet
ad
hoc
to
attempt
to
settle
a
particular
dispute
and
that
dispute
alone.
This
latter
method,
more
a
feature
of
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
century
diplomacy,
is
still
relevant
today,
particularly
in
settling
cold
war
disputes
as
over
Berlin.
I
am
obviously
not
concerned
with
organisations
like
the
Common
Market,
or
the
United
Nations
Relief
and
Works
Agency,
or
the
Economic
Commission
for
Africa,
although
it
could
be
argued
that
they
contribute,
directly
or
indirectly,
to
the
main-
tenance
of
international
peace
and
security,
for
example,
by
alleviating
misery
and
therefore
a
probable
source
of
friction
between
States.
Nor
shall
I
be
dealing
with
organisations
such
as
NATO,
the
Warsaw
Pact
and
SEATO,
although
there
is
nothing
to
prevent
their
use
for
settling
disputes
arising
between
their
members
(e.g.
NATO
in
Cyprus).
These,
however,
are
primarily
collective
security
arrangements,
based
on
a
defensive
strategy
(c.f.
Article
5
of
the
NATO
Pact),
and
not
the
established
machinery
for
the
settling
of
international
disputes.
The
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
is
therefore
left
as
the
main
instrument
for
the
institutional
resolving
of
international
disputes.
This,
taken
broadly,
embraces
the
United
Nations
itself
the
International
Court
of
Justice
and
the
various
regional
organisations
permitted
under
Chapter
VIII
of
the
Charter-for
example,
the
Organisation
of
American
States,
the
Arab
League,
and
the
Organisation
of
African
Unity.
Of
these
the
UN
is
by
far
the
most
important,
and
the
other
two-the
International
Court
of
Justice
and
the
regional
organisations-will
therefore
be
discussed
within
the
broader
framework
of
the
United
Nations.
In
advocating
a
greater
use
of
the
United
Nations,
and
in
proposing
changes
in
its
procedural
or
substantive
aspects,’
reformers
and
critics
have
always
made
or
implied
some
general
assumptions
on
the
character
of
the
United
Nations
and
the
manner
in
which
it
functions.
The
first
section
of
this
paper
will
deal
with
two
of
these
assumptions
and
examine
how
they
stand
in
the
light
of
the
experiences
of
the
United
Nations.
The
first
is
that
the
chances
of
settling
international
disputes
increase
with
a
greater
use
of
the
United
Nations.
What
grounds
are
there
for
1
The
problem
of
improving
the
structure
and
procedures
of
the
United
Nations
to
encourage
greater
use
of
it
is
not
a
new
one.
In
1955,
Francis
O.
Wilcox
and
Carl
M.
Marcy
considered
the
problem
in
their
book:
Proposals
for
changes
in
the
United
Nations,
(The
Brookings
Institution,
Washington
D.C.,
1955),
p.
477.
*Winning
Essay,
Cecil
Peace
Prize
1963.
556
supposing
that
this
is
so?
What
is,
in
other
words,
the
relation
between
the
use
of
the
UN
and
the
settling
of
international
disputes?
The
second
is
that
there
are
certain
procedural
arrange-
ments
that
inhibit
the
use
of
the
UN,
and
others
that
promote
it.
How
far
does
the
experience
of
the
UN
bear
out
the
truth
behind
the
proposition
that
a
greater
use
of
the
UN
can
be
fostered
by
setting
up
the
right
sort
of
procedural
devices
for
its
functioning?
What
is,
in
other
words,
the
relation
between
the
procedural
arrangements
of
the
United
Nations,
and
its
use.
The
second
section,
will
be
devoted
to
some
specific
problems.
Firstly,
what
are
the
types
of
international
disputes
in
the
settle-
ment
of
which
the
United
Nations
is
likely
to
be
of
assistance?
Secondly,
what
sort
of
demands
are
likely
to
be
made
on
the
resources
of
the
United
Nations
for
the
settlement
of
these
disputes?
And
thirdly,
in
what
ways
might
the
weaknesses
in
the
existing
organisation
and
procedures
of
the
UN
be
remedied
so
that
its
potentialities
can
be
fully
exploited
in
meeting
these
demands?
I
Role
of
the
United
Nations
in
the
settlement
of
disputes
If
it
could
be
proved
that
the
greater
the
use
made
of
the
United
Nations,
the
more
chance
there
is
for
settling
international
disputes,
it
would
be
folly
not
to
foster
its
greater
use.
But
the
point
is
not,
’
to
say
the
very
least,
self-evident.
There
are
a
number
of
other
factors
besides
the
United
Nations
that
go
towards
either
resolving
or
obstructing
the
settlement
of
international
disputes.
One
of
these
factors
is
the
willingness
of
the
parties
to
a
dispute
to
compromise
over
matters
of
substance.
The
larger
the stakes
at
issue
the
less
willing
are
States
likely
to
be
to
compromise.
Thus,
where
the
very
physical
or
political
existence
of
a
State
is
at
stake,
as
in
the
case
of
Israel
or
South
Africa,
no
amount
of
persuasion
by
the
United
Nations
can
induce
it
to
offer
a
major
concession
which
would
jeopardise
its
very
being,
even
if
refusal
meant
war.
Contrariwise
if
the
stakes
involved
are
not
so
great,
it
is
easier
to
bring
about
a
settlement.
For
example,
the
United
Nations
has
found
it
relatively
easier
to
achieve
a
cease-fire
or
a
truce
than
a
final
political
settlement
of
disputes
such
as
those
over
Palestine
and
Kashmir.
A
cease-fire,
at
least
at
the
time
when
it
is
being
negotiated,
has
always
been
considered
as
a
transitional
measure,
pending
further
political
negotiations.
It
is
easier
to
give
and
take
concessions
over
interim
measures
than
over
the
final
controversial
issues
where
the
stakes
are
much
larger.
In the
event
of
a
failure
to
persuade
the
parties
to
a
dispute
to
make
concessions
by
the
milder
methods
of
conciliation
and
negotiation,
the
only
other
alternative
is
to
apply
pressure-
diplomatic,
political,
financial,
or
military.
A
second
factor
there-
fore
influencing
the
settlement
of
disputes
is
the
strength
of
such
external
pressures
on
one
or
both
parties
on
the
one
hand,
and
on
the
other
hand,
the
strength
and
susceptibilities
of
the
State
or
States
parties
to
the
dispute.
557
To
illustrate:
the
final
settlement
of
the
Indonesian-Netherlands
controversy
came
about,
paradoxically,
after
the
Second
Dutch
&dquo;police
action&dquo;
in
December
1948,
at
a
time
when
the
Dutch
were
in
an
overwhelmingly
superior
military
position;
they
had,
in
fact,
overrun
the
whole
of
Indonesia
including
Jogjakarta,
and
had
interned
the
Republican
leaders.
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Netherlands
agreed
to
climb
down
only
as
a
result
of
the
strong
pressure
exerted
by
the
United
States,
and
the
corresponding
fact
that
the
Dutch
were
highly
susceptible
to
such
pressure.
The
American
threat
to
terminate
Marshall
Aid
to
the
Netherlands
unless the
latter
ceased
hostilities,
withdrew
its
troops,
released
the
Republican
leaders,
and
entered
into
&dquo;bona
fide&dquo;
negotiations
with
the
Republic,
had
an
enormous
impact
on
subsequent
Dutch
policy
towards
Indonesia,
amounting
to
an
almost
complete
volte
, face.2
2
Until
the
United
States
took
this
firm
line
against
the
Dutch,
there
seemed
to
be
no
solution
in
sight.
The
resolutions
passed
in
the
General
Assembly
calling
upon
the
parties
to
negotiate
a
settlement
were
unheeded
by
the
Netherlands.
The
UN
Good
Offices
Committee,
sent
to
Indonesia
to
help
the
parties
to
negotiate,
remained
virtually
inactive
for
almost
a
year.
The
mere
fact
that
the
United
Nations
was
being
&dquo;used&dquo;
all
this
time
in
the
settlement
of
the
dispute
did
not
bring
a
solution
any
nearer.
On
the
contrary,
two
years
after
its
intervention the
prospect
of
a
solution
was
farther
away
than
before.
The
use
of
the
United
Nations
was
effective
only
after
a
change
in
the
diplomatic
situation,
principally
in
the
attitude
taken
by
the
United
States.
How
far
was
the
UN
itself
responsible
for
this
change
in
the
diplomatic
situation?
The
repeated
flouting
of
the
UN
resolutions
by
the
Netherlands
might
have
had
some
effect
in
hardening
American
opinion,
but
then
UN
resolutions
have
been
disregarded
by
many
other
countries
on
other
occasions,
for
instance,
by
India
on
the
Kashmir
issue.
The
presence
of
an
American
representative
on
the
Good
Offices
Committee
must
have
carried
some
weight
with
the
State
Department.
But
the
biggest
influence
on
the
US
attitude
was
not
that
of
the
UN
as
such,
but
of
the
possible
effects
that
the
Dutch
military
action
might
have
on
American
efforts
to
contain
Communism
in
the
Far
East,
parti-
cularly
at
a
time
when
the
communists
had
recently
won
power
in
China.
The
point
here,
of
course,
is
not
to
belittle
the
role
played
by
the
United
Nations
but
to
recognise
the
fact
that
not
until
a
diplomatic
consensus
of
opinion
crystallised
in
the
UN,
partly
perhaps
as
a
result
of
what
happened
within
the
organisation
but
more
because
of
the
changing
diplomatic
situation
in
the
world
at
large,
and
its
re-
percussions
in
the
foreign
offices
of
the
countries
that
mattered,
could
anything
be
done
about
the
resolution
of
the
dispute.
Another
example
illustrating
the
point
is
the
Balkans
dispute
2
S.
I.
P.
Van
Campen:
The
Quest
for
Security,
Some
Aspects
of
Netherlands
Foreign
Policy,
1945-1950,
(The
Hague,
1958),
ch.
10.
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