The peacenik and the spook as the diplomatic avant-garde
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836719827325 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
827325CAC0010.1177/0010836719827325Cooperation and ConflictLehrs
research-article2019
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
2019, Vol. 54(4) 544 –561
The peacenik and the
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spook as the diplomatic
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avant-garde
Lior Lehrs
Abstract
In conflicts between a state and a non-state actor, such as a paramilitary or terrorist organization,
when no official diplomatic relations and recognition exists, there is a need for actors who
can serve as a “diplomatic avant-garde.” This article identifies a diplomatic pattern in which
breakthroughs occur through cooperative work between two types of actors: unofficial citizen
diplomats and key figures in intelligence bodies. Each actor brings specific resources: unofficial
actors have contacts with the non-state actor, while intelligence officers can offer backing from
within the official system of the state. The article analyzes the topic using three case studies:
Brendan Duddy and the MI6 officer Michael Oatley (UK and the Provisional IRA, 1975–1993);
Willie Esterhuyse and the head of the South African National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard
(South African government and the ANC, 1987– 1990); and Gershon Baskin and the Mossad
official David Meidan (Israel and Hamas, 2011). This study examines the unique relations
between these two types of actors and how their collaboration promoted negotiations with
non-state armed actors. It analyzes three stages: establishment of contact between these actors,
persuasion of the relevant parties, and the breakthrough moment when talks shifted to an official
back channel.
Keywords
Conflicts with non-state actors, diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mediation,
Northern Ireland conflict, South Africa
Introduction
Which actors and what methods can play a diplomatic role in conflicts between a state
and a non-state armed actor when no official diplomatic relations or recognition exists
between the belligerent parties? This situation poses major challenges for the official
diplomatic system and at such times there is a need for creative and unorthodox diplo-
macy, what Churchill termed “black market diplomacy.” Diplomacy of this sort and
under these conditions thus deserves special scholarly analysis. Given changes in the
character of the world’s conflicts since the end of the Cold War and recent examples of
Corresponding author:
Lior Lehrs, New York University, 14A Washington Mews, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10003, USA.
Email: lior.lehrs@gmail.com
Lehrs
545
state fragmentation, the need to find ways of establishing informal, behind-the-scenes
dialogue channels with non-state actors has become more urgent.
This article analyzes a diplomatic pattern of a “diplomatic avant-garde” in which, dur-
ing a conflict between a state and a non-state actor, a breakthrough occurs through coop-
erative work between two types of actors: unofficial citizen diplomats and key figures in
intelligence bodies. Each actor brings specific resources, and together they play an
important role. The unofficial actors have contacts among the leadership of the rival side
and knowledge of its thinking and internal dynamics; the intelligence officer can offer
backing from within the official system, official knowledge, and access to decision mak-
ers. Both are local actors from within the conflict with resources and tools that differ
from those of external actors who try to mediate the conflict.
The article examines the unique relations between these two actors, and how their
joint work promoted tactical or strategic negotiations, and even initiated a conflict reso-
lution process with a paramilitary or a terrorist organization. It analyzes three stages in
the process: the establishment of the contact between the two actors, the process of con-
vincing the parties to agree to the diplomatic avant-garde endeavor, and the breakthrough
moment when an official back channel was established behind the scenes. It identifies an
important diplomatic pattern that has played a critical role in various conflict areas but
has not been addressed and analyzed in the field’s literature.
The empirical research is based on three case studies: Brendan Duddy and the MI6
officer Michael Oatley (UK and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1975–1993);
Willie Esterhuyse and the head of the South African National Intelligence Service, Neil
Barnard (South African government and the ANC, 1987–1990); and Gershon Baskin and
the Mossad official David Meidan (Israel and Hamas, 2011). The research is based on
official and private archival resources, memoirs, interviews with key actors from the
three case studies, academic studies, and media reports.1
The article first presents a theoretical background followed by the three empirical
case studies. It then analyzes the three stages in the diplomatic avant-garde process: cre-
ating the link, convincing the parties, and the breakthrough. It ends with discussion and
concluding remarks.
Theoretical background
The diplomatic avant-garde is incorporated in the scholarship related to the process of
diplomacy and communication between enemies in the absence of diplomatic relations,
in cases of non-recognition, or when there is a diplomatic breach. Some of the diplomatic
methods mentioned in this context are intermediaries, diplomatic corps in third states,
and special envoys (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Berridge, 1994; Wriston, 1960). This
scholarship is also related to the framework of pre-negotiation, also called “the diagnos-
tic phase,” (Zartman and Berman, 1982) which deals with the components and the func-
tions at the heart of the process leading to official and direct negotiation between enemies.
This stage demands non-binding exploratory talks, or “talks about talks,” outlining a
possible framework for future negotiation and identifying preconditions for opening offi-
cial negotiations, the participating parties, and the agenda for the talks (Saunders, 1985;
Stein, 1989).
546
Cooperation and Conflict 54(4)
This kind of diplomacy can be classified into different types of conflict situations
such as diplomacy in warfare (McMillan, 1992), bargaining with “rogue states,” (Dueck,
2006) and negotiations with paramilitary groups, terrorist organizations, and “peace
spoilers” (Faure and Zartman, 2010; Pruitt, 2006; Spector, 2003; Stedman, 1997). This
article focuses on the last type.
Various scholars have addressed the question of engagement and negotiations with
non-state actors such as paramilitary and terrorist organizations, exploring the dilemma
underlying this decision and analyzing the arguments on both sides of the debate. On
the one hand, the argument against this policy is that it legitimizes terrorist organiza-
tions and violence and it may incite and encourage terrorism. It is also argued that in
some cases the complex character of these organizations is an obstacle that will not
allow the leadership to deliver on their promises. On the other hand, the argument in
favor of the option of negotiations is that it can lead to an end to the violence and a
transformation in the conflict and can provide these organizations with a nonviolent
alternative option. It is also argued that efforts to exclude and isolate these actors from
the political process can lead to radicalization (Miller, 2011; Powell, 2014; Pruitt, 2006;
Reiss, 2010; Toros, 2008).
Scholarship indicated a significant gap between the rhetoric of government policy
announcing that they “will never talk with terrorists” and the practice in which govern-
ments frequently decide to negotiate with these non-state actors (Neumann, 2007;
Powell, 2014; Toros, 2008).
The literature in the field has identified different types of negotiations. Schmid and
Flemming (2010: 49) distinguish between “tactical-practical negotiations” on a specific
crisis and “strategic-political negotiations” on a long-term agreement.
Discussions also try to outline a distinction between different types of organizations
in order to explore the types that could be a possible partner for negotiations. Zartman
(2003), for example, suggested a distinction between “revolutionary absolute,” terrorists
who cannot be negotiated with; “conditional absolute,” terrorists who may potentially be
negotiated with; and “contingent” (or “instrumental”), terrorists who seek negotiations.
Other variables affecting the possibility of successful political negotiations with these
armed non-state actors are: the level of public support they have among their constitu-
ents, the existence of effective representatives and their political, diplomatic and military
power (Cronin, 2010; Miller, 2011; Neumann, 2007; Pruitt, 2006; Toros, 2008). The
decision on negotiating also includes decisions on specific questions such as with whom
to negotiate in the organization, when is the right time to negotiate, and how. This article
focuses mainly on the question of how. Scholars have mentioned the importance of using
secret back channels and also discussed the option of integrating unofficial diplomacy as
part of these efforts (Jones, 2015; Pruitt, 2006).
This article explores the effective diplomatic platform, actors, and tools that can be
used to check the possibility of this kind of negotiation with non-state actors, and how to
conduct exploratory contact and initiate dialogue with...
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