The Political Constitution*

Date01 January 1979
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1979.tb01506.x
Published date01 January 1979
AuthorJ. A. G. Griffith
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
Volume
42
January
1979
No.
1
THE
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
*
ONE
of the most distinguished men of letters to become a Member
of Parliament for a short time at the beginning of this century was
Hilaire
Belloc. Ilt
.is
said
Ithat many years later when he was over
80
years
of
age
la
young polimtician dlropped
in
to
see
him at the
Reform
Club.
‘‘
I
have just come from the House,” said the young
man, perhaps
a
shade self-importantly. “God!
said
Belloc.
“Is
that bloody nonsense
still
going
on?” Maybe Westminster today
is
tho
‘excited activity
of
a
chicken Ithat has
lost
its
head. Maybe
the constitution is dead.
‘‘
Meredith,” said Oscar Wilde,
‘‘
is a prose Browning.” And added
‘‘
And
so
is Browning.” Sometimes
I
feel similarly that our consti-
tution is the opposite of what it sets out to be. But then
I
reflect
that
so
probably are all constitutions.
Or
if
they begin as honest
and effective they quickly lose their honesty as the price of retaining
their effectiveness.
Should we now try to restore virtue to the debauched constitution
with a new written contract, new marriage lines preceded by a Royal
Commission on the Constitution, a title unfairly pre-empted by Sir
Harold Wilson’s rush
of
blood to the Celtic fringes?
Constitutions whether written or unwritten are often presented as
descriptions of equilibrium. Hence the metaphors
of
checks and
balances, of ships of state on even keels and
so
on. Somehow, it
would appear, with the
T.U.C.
on one side and the
C.B.I.
on the
other; with Thatcher and Joseph in the blue corner, Callaghan and
Healey in the red; with almost anyone to my right and someone
unnameable to my left; with market forces over there and price
control over here; with low productivity in the midlands nicely offset
by high productivity in the North Sea; with this new missile being
developed by us rand ahat by Ithem; with
5
per cent. wage increases
being
about right
in an economy where the inflation rate has
fallen to single figures; somehow, these weights and measures (we
understand) hold even the scales of civilised constitutionalism.
*
The
Seventh
Chorley
Lecture, delivered on June
14,
1978,
at the London
School
of
Economics and Political Science.
The author
thanks
his
colleague Mr. Philip
Windsor
for
commenting on an early draft.
1
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Some features are of course not
so
easily balanced. The high level
of
unemployment seems not to have a cheaper labour market for
justification (if that is the word
I
am after). Such features fall into
a category which, to invent
a
word, may be called the
"
Alas
"
group.
Also in this group are increasing urban decay, lengthening hospital
queues, more homelessness in the cities and ever-lowering standards
of
care
for the
old.
the mentally
ill
and the physically handicapped.
and the shortage of textbooks in schools. These are all deeply
regretted. They are negatives without plusses. The only thing to be
said about them
is
"
alas." Because to do more would upset,
so
it
is
said, another more important part of the economic and political
equilibrium.
There are, of course, other ways of analysing the working
of
the
constitution than describing it as the state of
a
nation in equilibrium.
It is arguable that society is in reality, especially at this time, in
a
highly combustible condition.
I
shall indeed argue that conflict is at
the heart of modern society.
When constitutional lawyers speak of a liberal, pluralist society,
they see its first important manifestations
(I
do not speak
of
its
origins) in the middle
of
the nineteenth century with John Stuart
Mill, Bagehot and Dicey. By some, these manifestations are
intimately connected with the unusual power enjoyed by the House
of Commons over the executive during that period.
I
do not myself
believe that the connection was other than coincidental. And it
is
of more significance that those middle years which cradled the great
liberal debate and enabled Bagehot and Dicey to write their
unhappily misleading books
on
the constitution, were the years when
the foundations of the regulatory state, which became the welfare
state, were laid.
The ambivalence in Benthamism, which was not an ambiguity,
provided the theoretical basis on which the main arguments between
socialists and conservatives in the United Kingdom were to be
mounted from the middle of the nineteenth century-arguments
which have continued with
very
little alteration until the present
and which show every sign of continuing for at least the next decade.
More difficult to assess is the extent to which these arguments reflect
the real conflicts in our society.
And lest anyone should now be alarmed that
I
am about to talk
about the
to
Higher Education, the launching ,we have recently
witnessed of the new counter-reformation instituted by latter-day
saints of impeccable social background but highly dubious sanctity,
may
I
reassure them.
I
have no intention
of
seeking
to
wring your
hearts with stories of embattled defenders standing shoulder to
shoulder across Houghton Street repelling the red hordes of the
Council for Academic Freedom and Democracy. My purpose is
more simple.
Societies are by nature authoritarian. Governments even more so.
Jan. 19791
THE
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3
By saying that societies are naturally authoritarian
I
mean that we
are all placed in that “wearisome condition of humanity” (as
Fulke Greville called it
370
years ago) of being both individual
and social animals and that this sets up conflicts from which we can
never be free. We find this difficult to accept and
so
we continuously
seek the reconciliation
of
opposites and become frustrated and
aggressive when this fails.
In this country we have stayed clear of one bit of nonsense which
is commonly advanced in countries as diverse in their political
structure as the Chinese People’s Republic, the Soviet Union and
the United States of America.
I
mean the view that sovereignty
resides in the people who delegate it to their politicians who hold
it in trust
for
them.
I
suppose John Locke
is
to blame for offering
this particular cover-up for authoritarianism. Once again one finds
this curious and persistent wish to avoid statements about conflict.
When men 100 years ago spoke of a liberal democracy they meant
a
form of government which was parliamentary in structure and
which sought to secure a particular set of political and economic
ends. But very strongly inherent in the concept was a relationship
between government and governed which embraced many forms of
authority including the paternalistic.
In the mid-1880s (the similarities with today will be obvious) the
politicians of all parties
(I
quote):
‘‘
believed politics was ultimately about the organisation and
presentation
of
the parliamentary community, in such a way
that the working class could be contained. They knew
of
four
or
five
ways
of
doing
so,
and did not propose to add to them.
.
. .
Both Whig, Radical and centre factions
[of
the Liberal Party]
accepted Gladstone’s deep conviction that the working class
electorate could best be guided and controlled by constructing
a middle class consensus agreed on a policy of limited conces-
sions to, an emotional solidarity with, the manual working class
. .
,
.
The politicians of 1885-86 were dealing seriously and
adequately
with
the main problem confronting them, namely
that
of
presenting themselves and the world of parliamentary
activity generally in a sufficiently attractive, necessary and
interesting way to maintain
a
general consent to their hegemony,
and
so
maintain the political system they had been used to since
1868.”
The quotation is from
A.
B. Cooke and
J.
R.
Vincent’s
The
Govern-
ing Passion.2
It would
be
idle to
try
to
fix
precisely
a
date
when “liberal
democracy” as a description
of
a
form
of
government ceased
to
be
useful.
I
suppose the First World War would be the commonest
choice. For
my
generation, born during or immediately after
it,
the
significance of that war cannot be overstated. We were brought up
1
Chorus
Sacerdotum
from
Muslapha.
*
PP.
4,
10,
15-16.
4
THE
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in the period of delayed shock which followed. And no doubt also
in the penumbra of the images which began to emerge
as
reflections
of terrible events. These are not the same as myths, except in the
Jungian sense. They are the kind of impressions, of recollections,
caught by those who wrote the later memoirs of the time. They are
the interplay of what Paul Fussell calls persistence and memory.
They became, for us, the most vivid part of modern memory.
As
others have often observed, Ithe break-up of
the
nineteenth-
century world in Britain was manifest
in
the years before
1914
and
indeed it
is
arguable that the war prevented outbreaks and uprisings
led by the Irish, the industrial working class and the suffragettes
which might have changed the course of history in these islands.*
But the war of
1914-18
seriously damaged the concept of legitimate
authority. Orders were being given which resulted in the death of
tens
of
thousands to no purpose. Sometimes the orders came from
on high. Sometimes immediately. Paul Fussell writes
:
"
Another private, Gunner Charles Bricknall, recalling the war
many years later, likewise behaves as
if
his understanding of
the irony attending events is what enables him to recall them.
He was in an artillery battery being relieved by
a
new unit
fresh from England:
'
There was a long road leading to the front line which the
Germans occasionally shelled, and the shells used to drop
plonk in the middle
of
it. This new unit assembled right
by the wood ready to go into action in the night.'
What rises to the surface of Bricknall's memory is the hopes
and illusions of the newcomers:
'
They was all spick and span, buttons polished and all the
rest of it.'
'
We spoke to a few
of
the chaps before going up and told
them about the Germans shelling the road, but of course
they was not in charge,
so
up they went and the result
was they all got blown up.'
Contemplating this ironic issue, Bricknall is moved to an almost
Dickensian reiterative rhetoric:
'
Ho,
what a disaster! We had to go shooting lame horses,
putting the dead to the side of the road, what a disaster,
which could have been avoided
if
only the officers had
gone into action the hard way
[i.e.
overland, avoiding the
road]. That was something
I
shall never forget.'
"
He tries to help:
Listen to Paul Fussell again
ti
:
"
By the end of June,
1916,
Haig's planning was finished and the
See
for
example
George
Dangerfleld,
The
Strange
Death
of
Liberal
England.
4
The
Great War and Modern Memory,
pp.
30-31
(reprinted
by
permission
of
5
Ibid.
p.
12.
Oxford
Univcrsity
Prcss).
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION
5
attack on the Somme was ready. Sensing that this time the
German defensive wire must be cut and the German front-line
positions ablitemted, Haig bombarded ithe enemy trenches for
a
full
week, firing
a
million and
a
half shells from
1,537
guns.
At
7.30
on the morning
of
July
1
the artillery shifted to more
distant targets and the attacking waves of eleven British
divisions climbed out of their trenches on
a
thirteen-mile front
and began walking forward. And by
7.31
the mere six German
divisions facing them had carried their machine guns upstairs
from the deep dugouts where during the bombardment they had
harboured safely-and even comfortably-and were hosing the
attackers walking towards them in orderly rows or puzzling
before the still uncut wire. Out of 110,000 who attacked,
60,000
were killed or wounded
on
this one day, the record
so
far. Over
20,000
lay dead between the lines, and it was days before the
wounded in
No
Man’s Land stopped crying out.”
Faith in authority which,
I
suggest, is essential to the working
of
that form of government known as liberal democracy, was never
recovered. And authority, not for the first time in history, was
replaced by authoritarianism.
In the twenties and thirties we were not easily persuaded by
appeals to patriotism. The word had become dirty. Pacifism gained
many of its recruits not from the Christian apologists but from
those
on
the left wing of politics who were not part of the communist
camp.
The disillusion of the years between the wars made many of the
younger generation impatient with those who used the language of
the old liberal democracies. These were seen at worst as elaborate
fapdes deliberately constructed to fool most
of
the people most
of
the time or at best as out
of
date pieces of stage paraphernalia which
someone had forgotten to clear away with the other impedimenta
of Professor Dicey’s England.
Another belief that was discarded was more complex. It had to do
with that highly respectable notion
of
the state and the philosophy
of the state which had for
so
long enabled the holders of political
and economic power to appear as trustees rather than as manipu-
lators. What we wanted to know in the thirties was where the
reality of political and economic power lay. We were not surprised
to discover that the trappings
of
democracy concealed rather than
adorned the body politic. But who was pulling the levers, where the
levers were being pulled, who were the puppets and who the puppet-
masters, these were questions to which we sought answers. We are
still seeking them.
This new positivism which was also as old as Comte survived the
Second World War. But
so
did the liberal fallacy. It is still quite
common to hear the constitution described-even lovingly described
-as
a
piece of machinery cleverly and subtly constructed to enable
the will
of
the people to be transmitted through its elected represen-
tatives who make laws instructing its principal committee the
6
THE
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[Vol.
42
Cabinet how to administer the affairs
of
the State, with the help of
an impartial
civil
service and under the benevolent wisdom of a
neutral judiciary. Not only is this explanation given to thousands of
schoolchildren but
I
have to tell you that
it
also finds its way-in a
more sophisticated form-into the curricula of some institutions of
further and higher education, all of them of course a million miles
from the London School
of
Economics and Political Science.
We sought therefore to free ourselves from the tentacles of the
natural lawyers, the metaphysicians and the illusionists who gave
the impression that the working of constitutions was something all
done
by
mirrors, by sleight
of
hand, and by sthe use
of
nineteenth-
century language based on eighteenth-century concepts.
Our line was based on Comte and led to Durkheim and,
for
me,
to L6on Duguit. M. Duguit being a Frenchman and a constitutional
lawyer seemed to me to present the nearest thing to a solid,
positivist. unmetaphysical, non-natural foundation for analytical
jurisprudence.
I
read him avidly.
I
wrote
a
long essay about him
for
my tutor Ivor Jennings who never returned it or, for all
I
know,
read it.
The division
of
labour
being
to
Duguit
the
preeminent fmt
of
social cohesion, social solidarity being a fact of social life, we were
able
to
ignore
(as
Wolfgang Friedmmn put it
e,
the ageold
canhre
versies about ideals
of
justice.
This
way law got
its
fset
omto
the
ground and interdependence
tbbeocwne
#the frock. From there Duguit
moved on to advocate strong legal checks on the
power
af
those
politicians who happened to Ibe in
office.
This would
require
a
highly
developed system
of
administrative law, more decenftrdisartion and
devolution leading *to
la
hm
of
synddism
with
again
a
strong
juristic structure
far
,the individual groups. It should be noticed Ithat
all
this
is
opposed bath
to
the revoluhionlary syndicalism
of
Sore1
and to the Marxist conception
of
class conflict.
This in total becomes almost a statement
of
the ideal. It suggests
a
community dedicated to the concept
of
social interdependence
and solidarity, working in groups the size of which is determined by
the nature
of
the task or of the environment, the power of central
and local politicians being constrained by a legal, juristic and
juridical structure. When attempts are made to break away from the
authoritarian structures of western capitalism or eastern communism,
something like this is aimed at, most obviously in Tito’s Yugoslavia,
but also perhaps in what Dubcek’s Czechoslovakia might have
become.
It will not have escaped you that Duguit’s attempts
to
analyse and
to
prescribe ended in his falling face forward into the surrounding
sea of natural law. Some regard that sea as “the moving waters
at their priestlike task of pure ablution round earth’s human shores.”
So
long as we stick to analysis we can hope to hold back the tides
of
6
Lead
Theory,
p.
158.
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
7
natural law, But
if
we only and merely begin to make deductions
frm our analysis,
values
begin to re-enter and
u$h
owe
are
very careful the waters of natural law close over our heads:
.
In the last
30
years, theories of natural law have a&in
risen
tp
the
surface. They now pose as antitheses to democratic socialism
#@ate
advanced by both Conservatives and Liberals. Lord
Hailsham
in
hid
recent book
The
Dilemma
of
Democracy, diagnosis and
presqdption
puts the conflict sharply,
as
he sees it.
He begins by positing two theories of democracy which he says
are wholly inconsistent, the one with the other. The first he calls
the theory of centralised democracy
or
elective dictatorship; the
second, the theory of limited government or freedom under law.
The
first,
says
Lard
Hailsham:
. .
.
will assert the right of
a
bare majority in
a
single
chamber assembly, possibly elected on
a
first past the post
basis, to assert its will over a whole people whatever that will
may be. It will end in
a
rigid economic plan, and,
I
believe, in
a siege economy,
a
curbed and subservient judiciary, and
a
regulated press. It will impose uniformity
on
the whole nation
in the interest of what it claims to be social justice. It will insist
on
equality. It will distrust all forms of eccentricity and dis-
tinction. It will crush local autonomy. It will dictate the
structure, form, and content of education. It may tolerate, but
will certainly do its best either
to
corrupt or destroy religion.
It will depend greatly on caucuses or cadres to exert its will.
Some will (be directly
appointed
by patronage
as
in the increasing
number
of
Quangos.’ Others
will
be eleoted by
a
tiny minority
of
dedicated activists
and
apparatchiks relying on the aparthy
of the rest as
a
passport to offlce. This is already happening
in some unions and local authorities. It will worship material
values, but not succeed in producing material plenty. When its
policies fail, it will rely strongly
on
class divisiveness or scape-
goats
to
distract attention
fmm
its
failures.”
The theory, he says, is the offspring of two related humanist
philosophies:
Utilitarianism
and
legal positivism.”
You
will have gathered that Lord Hailsham does not think much
of this first theory. His alternative is that those in positions of
political authority should not rule absolutely and should not make
laws
‘‘
which affront the instructed conscience
of
the commonalty.”
On
the other hand, the #theory
af
Emited
government, he
says,
. . .
offers precisely what the dominant theory denies. In
place
of
uniformity it offers diversity. In place of equality it
offers justice. In place of the common good, it protects the
rights
of
minorities and the individual.
As
an alternative to
regulation it propounds the rule of law. It does not seek to
overthrow governments or institutions, or abolish universal
franchise or popular rule. But it prescribes limits beyond which
66
8
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MODERN
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[Vol.
42
governments and Parliaments must not go, and it suggests means
by which they can be compelled to observe those limits. In
place of concentrating, it diffuses power. It confers rights
of
self-government on previously ignored communities. It offers
protection against the oppressiveness of unions and corpora-
tions.
Above all it corresponds with the general conscience of man-
kind.”
7a
It
is
common to speak
of
the
revival
of natural law theories
but the word is misleading. In one sense, natural law and its
opponents are permanently in conflict and the struggle between them
is what gives tension to arguments about justice, human rights,
political power, and social obligation. In another sense, natural law
theories have
a
way of insinuating themselves into the entrails of
their opponents, causing a considerable amount of personal distress
and indigestion.
Revival
does not seem
to
be quite the word for
this continuing phenomenon.
It is clear that Lord Hailsham
is
particularly concerned about the
legislative powers of governments, particularly minority govern-
ments.
Fundamental and irreversible changes,” he says,
ought
only to be imposed, if at all, in the light
of
an unmistakable national
consensus.
.
. .
My thesis is that our institutions must be
so
structurally altered that,
so
far as regards permanent legislation,
the will of the majority will always prevail against that of the party
composing the executive for the time being, and that, whoever may
form the government
of
the day will be compelled to follow pro-
cedures and policies compatible with the nature of parliamentary
democracy and the rule
of
freedom under law.”
*
Within the limits of the theme
of
his book he indicates three
types of safeguards. The first is legal and is the setting
of
limits
“beyond which politicians may not be allowed
to
go without
a
special mandate protected by proportional voting and referenda.”
The second type would
so
rearrange ithe ‘balance
of
forces within
the sepamte organs
of
the:
constitution
as
to
make dominance by any
one
of
them impossible.” The third type of safeguard
involves an
examination of existing voting processes and the value, if any,
of
referenda on particular issues.”
Lwd Hailsham’s constitubimd package includes
a
Bill
of
Rights,
a
proportionately elected second chamber,
a
liimit by law on the
right
of
Parliament to legisl$ate without restriotion, land devduth to
Scatland,
Wales,
Nonthern Ireland and Ithe English regions in
a
federal structure. The object
of
this new constitution would be
to
institutionalise the theory of limited government.”
lo
Lord Hailsham
refers with alarm to the position
when
a
government elected by
a
small minority of voters, and with
a
slight majority in the House,
8
pp.
21,
22.
78
p.
13.
9
p.
68.
10
p.
226.
Jan.
19793
THE
POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION
9
regards itself as entitled, and, according to its more extreme sup-
porters, bound to carry out every proposal in its election manifesto.
This has happened,” he says, LLmore than once in the past few
years and it seems to me that
at
almost
any
cost
we must ensure
that
it
cannot happen again
l1
(my emphasis).
Lord Scarman’s prescription
is
close to Lord Hailsham’s. Lord
Scarman wants a new constitutional settlement the basis of which
would be entrenched provisions (including
a
Bill of Rights) and re-
straints upon administrative and legislative power, protecting it from
attack by
a
bare majority in Parliament;
a
supreme court charged
with the duty of protecting the constitution; an immediate study to be
begun of the problems of codification, drafting and interpretation in
the new context
of
entrenched provisions and codified law; and the
establishment
of
machinery for handling the problem
of
the law’s
development and reform, especially of administrative law.la
Discussion
of
the feasibility of Lord Hailsham’s remedies is made
somewhat speculative by his reluctance to clothe his new body
politic with more than the minimum required for decency.
So
we do
not know what goes into his Bill of Rights, nor how the legal
limits on the power of minority governments to legislate would
opexak.
Presumably we annot have
.a
referendum on every
BU.
Is
it for the second chamber to decide when and on which measures?
How will it be known that
a
Bill was “not acceptable to majority
opinion
or when legislation
had no real basis of popular
approval
or when legislation
contained excessive or unreasonable
procedures”? All this can mean, it seems to me, is that Lord
Hailsham’s second chamber, elected on the basis of proportional
representation based
on
large geographical areas, would have the
power to veto Bills passed by the Commons. That might indeed
reduce the amount of legislation passed-another of Lord Hail-
sham’s hopes-but whether it would conduce to better government
must be speculative. At times Lord Hailsham comes very close to
saying that less legislation,
whatever its content,
would be beneficial.
That sounds well and would raise a cheer but argument about
policies resulting in legislation would be more pertinent.
The philosophical basis of Lord Hailsham’s position, as we have
seen, rests on the dangers (as he sees them) of the present way of
carrying on. For this he blames the sexual coupling of utilitarianism
and legal positivism which produced elective dictatorship.
By legal positivism he means the definition of law as nothing but
the command of the ruler. At one and the same time he accepts
the positivist analysis and yet disapproves of it.
The enforcement of law,” says Lord Hailsham:
.
.
.
rests, of course, upon those possessing political power,
and since the possession of political power cannot self-evidently
LL
11
p.
129.
12
English Low-The
Nmu
Dimension,
pp.
81-82.
10
THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
[Vol.
42
be said to be based
on
moral right, this has given rise through-
out the ages to legal positivism in one of its many forms, the
simplest expressed of which is that of Austin, that law
is
nothing
else but
the
command of the ruler. In a sense all lawyers must
be legal positivists. They could not advise their clients
if
they
did not take political authority as a given fact and argue their
cases before the established courts without questioning the
basis upon which they were established. Political authority in
the modern world
is
almost always based historically upon some
forcible acquisition of power, and since it is in the nature of
sovereignty to demand a monopoly of force, even the most
primitive of sovereigns is faced with the necessity of settling
disputes, enforcing the settlements, and imposing penalties
on
those who take the law into their own hands.”
The central question, says Lord Hailsham, both for jurisprudence
and for political theory
is
that law and government are about com-
pulsion. And
so
justification is needed and this
is
to be found not
in utilitarianism but in notions like
justice and morality, right
and wrong, responsibilities, duties and moral rights.”
Let me, for the moment, leave Lord Hailsham there,
on
his
stilts, and compare what he is saying with Ronald Dworkin’s theory
of law advanced in his recent book
Taking
Rights
Seriously
because
I
find there also this-I will not say confusion for fear of being
struck down for the sin
of
presumption but-confluence of analysis
and prescription. John Mackie usefully places Dworkin’s theory
as in some ways intermediate between legal positivism and natural
law.I6 Dworkin sets up principles above rules
of
law and
a
principle
is
a standmard that
is
to be obsenned, not because it will advance
or
secure
an
economic, politioal,
or
social
situation deemed desirable,
but (because
it
is
a
requirement
of
justice or fairness
or
some ot,her
dimension
sf
morality.”
Ie
In
this view, where judges do not easily And the appropriate rule
of law in a particular case, they look for the principle which seems
to inform other rules
in
comparable cases and apply that.
So
judges
need never act as legislators.
If
they were legislators it would be
proper for them to have regard to policy, not principle, to the
general welfare, to majority opinion. But instead they have regard
to principle, which is always discoverable. And they are not
legislating.
In
his search for the principle, Dworkin’s judge has regard to
notions
of
politics or morality. The judge at
no
point chooses
between his own political convictions and those he takes to be the
political convictions of the community at large.
On
the contrary
‘‘
his theory identifies
a
panticular conception
of
community
13
Op.
cir.
p.
88.
14
p.
91.
1s
The Third Theory
of
Law,”
in
Philosophy
and
Public
Aflairs
(1977),
p.
3;
18
R.
Dworkin,
op.
clr.
p.
22.
also
J.
Raz
in
26
Political
Studies
(1978)
123.
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION
11
morality as decisive
of
legal issues; that conception holds that
community mor&ty is the plitid marality presupposed by the
laws
and institutions
of
the cmunilty.”
lT
Here we see anoteher
attempt to hide in a mist of words the conflict which is the
characteristic of our society.
‘‘
Community morality
is nonsense
at the very top of a very high ladder.
This
is
s
summa~ised account
of
a smld pant
of
a
ccrmplex
argument but
I
lam
dso
concerned with the Jighit it obliquely
throws on the positivist-natural law argument.
For
Dworkin
does
argue that this theory
is
ddmble
as
well
as
analytiod. And
as John Mackie observes it is
a plea for
a
more speculative and
enterprising handling by judges
of
their traditional materials and
data.”
l8
And it does
partake
more
of
natural law than
of
positivism.
Modern positivists are said to be troubled by two kinds of
question. The Arst concerns the authority
of
institutions which
Austinle found to rest on their power or their monopoly of power;
and which, more recently, Herbert Hart found to rest in his rule
of recognition and his rules of change by and within the community.
The second concerns the guidance which should be given to a judge
when he deals with a case that is not clearly covered by an
existing rule. Dworkin says )the judge must search for the principle.
Others recommend the search should
be
for
justice or mortality
or
fairness
as
reflmted in the general consciousness
af
the people
or
in
Lord Hailsham’s
majority opinion
or
popular approval.”
The idea
of
Austinian positivism as a form of monarchical
or
parliamentary absolutism is perhaps traceable
to
Sir
Henry
Maine
who described Austin’s position thus:
‘‘
There is, in every independent political community-that is,
in every political community not in the habit of obedience to
a
superior above itself-some single person
or
some combination
of
persons which has the power
of
compelling the other
members
of
the community
to
do
exactly
us
it
pleuses
2o
(my
emphasis).
We should remember that Maitland, writing privately
to
Sir
“I
always talk
of
him with reluctance, for on the few
occasions on which
I
sought to verify his statements of fact
I
came
to
the conclusion that he trusted much
to
a memory
that played him tricks and rarely looked back at a book that
he had once read.”
21
Legal positivists are not absolutists. Certainly not the analytical
positivists associated with Austin. They say that a society contains
Frcderic Pollock, said of Maine:
1‘
Ibid.
p.
126.
18
Op.
cit.
p.
16.
19
The Province
of
Jurisprudence Determined
(1832).
20
Early History
of
Institutions,
p.
349.
21
Quoted
by
C.
A.
W.
Manning
in
Modern Theories
of
Law
(4.
W.
I.
Jcnnhgs),
p.
183.
12
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
42
certain people with the political authority to make laws and with the
coercive power to see that those laws are enforced. Those people
may be all-powerful dictators or weak representative assemblies
(or
weak dictators or all-powerful assemblies). Or any other
form
of
government. They may be benevolent autocrats or malevolent
Members
of
Parliament. They 'may
make
laws inspired by the
ideals of justice, right, fairness and morality. Or they may spend
their time feathering their own nests, striking down the firstborn
throughout the land, and joining the Common Market.
For myself,
I
am very doubtful about the value of the exercise
of telling judges or other legislators that they should look towards
the ideals of justice, truth and beauty in their search for the right
solution to difficult cases or problems. And
I
am even more sceptical
when they are urged to
look
to the moral standard of the community
--or the general welfare-because
I
do not believe these things exist.
All
I
can see in the community in which
I
live is a considerable
disagreement about the controversial issues of the day and this is
not surprising as those issues would not be controversial if there
were agreement.
I
know what my own view
is
about racial
minorities, immigration, the power
of
trade unions, official secrets,
abortion and
so
on and
so
on. And
I
know that many people
disagree with my views.
I
will justify my views by reference to
human behaviour, political expediency or the placating of my non-
conformist conscience.
I
will do more and seek to persuade those in
authority
to
act as
I
feel they should. But
I
expect legislators to
come to their own conclusions of what is best on their own
criteria. Most importantly they represent and promote particular
interests within our conflictual society. Presumably no one nowadays
doubts that the Conservative party exists primarily to promote
the interests of private capital and the Labour party the interests
of
organised trade unionism.
We have therefore a considerable number of proposals for
radical constitutional change being advanced by a number of rather
improbable people.
I
do not mean that
as
people they are
improbable. But as radicals. And we have
a
re-statement of the
notions
of
rights and of justice from Ronald Dworkin and others
like John Rawls.
What then are the objections to these proposals which seem to
be designed to protect us from anticipated tyranny?
I
think they
are of two kinds: the political and the philosophical.
The first political objection is that the rights which are sought
to be protected by the many and varied protagonists of the Bill of
Rights are themselves also many and varied. Civil libertarians wor-
ried about exercise of police powers, about security tests, about
phone-tapping, about interrogation methods in Northern Ireland
unite with those concerned about the curtailment
of
freedom'of
speech by the Race Relations Acts, the educational policies of the
Labour Government, Mr. Foot's trade union legislation and the
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION
13
effect of taxation policies
on
small businesses.22 The mere statement
of these rival claims is
a
statement about conflict.
But the operation of the European Convention
on
Human Rights
provides
a
more practical test. One example will suffice.
I
refer to the case of the
Sunday
Times
and the thalidomide chil-
dren. You will remember that in
1972
the Attorney-Gcneral, having
received representations from Distillers Ltd. (the makers and sellers
of the drug), applied to the High Court for an injunction to prevent
the
Sunday
Times
from publishing its second article on this affair.
In July
1973
the House of Lords unanimously approved the granting
of the injunction.
The
Sunday
Times
applied
in
January
1974
to
the European
Commission
on
Human Rights
on
the ground that there had been
a
violation
d
Article
10
af
,the Convention. Tohe Commission by a
majority of eight to five agreed that there had been such
a
violation.
The matter was referred to the European Court in July
1977.
Oral
hearings have naw ended and
a
decision is expected shortly.
Obviously this conflict
is
md
enough.
Panties
to
powible liti-
gation may be adversely affected by pre4rid publicity.
But,
in this
case, litigation between the parties-the parents and the children
on
the one side and Distillers Ltd. on the other as to the amount of
compensation-was neither imminent nor even likely.
The law
on
this subject, said Lord Reid,
is and must be founded
entirely on public policy.” Nevertheless he went
on
to say that what
was regarded as “most objectionable” was that
a
newspaper or
television programme should seek to persuade the public
that one
side
is
right and the other wrong.”
Lord Diplock went further and said that contempt of court
extended to conduct calculated to inhibit suitors generally from
availing themselves of their constitutional right to have their legal
rights and obligations ascertained and enforced in courts of law, by
holding
up
any suitor to public obloquy for doing
so
or by exposing
him to public and prejudicial discussion of the merits or the facts
of his case.
So
folfowed the challenge brought before the Commission and the
Court
of
Human Rights in Strasbourg. This turned
as
I
have said
on
Article
10
of the European Convention
on
Human Rights. That
Article follows the pattern of many of the other Articles. It begins
with general statements of principle and then adds
a
series
of
excep-
tions. Article
10
reads:
1.
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2.
The exercise
of
these freedoms,
since
it carries with it
See
M.
Zander,
A
Bill
oj
Righrs?
14
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
42
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection
of
the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure
of
information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of
the judiciary.
That sounds like the statement of a political conflict pretending
to be a resolution
of
it.
The argument before the United Kingdom courts turned
on
the
judicial interpretation of a highly uncertain area of the law but
came essentially to a policy decision of how widely the protection
given by the law of contempt should be extended. And, by the Law
Lords, it was extended very widely indeed to protect Distillers Ltd.
from public criticism.
The argument before 'the European
Commission
land
Couct was
even more legalistic in form and perhaps in substance. It turned
on
the question of whether the restriction imposed by the Law Lords
was
"
necessary
"
within the meaning of Article
10.
To my mind the whole story shows why we should not try to
solve our problems by the application
of
such a Bill of Rights.
If
we
incorporate the European Convention into our domestic law, ques-
tions like those in the thalidomide case will be left for determination
by the legal profession as they embark
on
the happy and fruitful
exercise of interpreting woolly principles and even woollier excep-
tions. Clearly the House of Lords will take some persuading that
restrictions
on
freedom of expression are not
"
necessary
"
when
they conflict with some more positive rule
of
law.
The solution to such problems should not lie with the imprecisions
of Bills of Rights or the illiberal instincts of judges. The law of
contempt of court is highly unsatisfactory. It has been recently
examined by a committee whose report
28
has been commented
on
in a White Paper.24 Arguments continue about that report and that
Paper. And they may result in some hard, blackletter reform of the
common law which can be put in a statute in words which will be
relatively precise.
If
we had a Bill of Rights, such attempts at reform would be
fobbed
off.
And political questions
of
much day-to-day signdficance
would, even more than
at
paexnt, be left
to
deoision by the
judiciary.
But the objection
is
more broadly based.
As part of the recent movement to re-introduce natural law
concepts into the theory and practice of politics,28
"
the law
"
has
~
29
Cmnd. 5794 (1974).
24
Cmnd. 7145 (1978).
2s
Amongst writings which have helped me to clarify my own thoughts
on
these
matters,
I
am indebted
to
Shirley Robin Letwin's
articles
in
Encounter,
November
Jan.
19791
THE
POLlTICAL CONSTITUTION
15
been raised from its proper and useful function as
a
means towards
ends (about which it is possible to have differing opinions) to the
level of
a
general concept. On this view, individual rules of law
may be good or bad but
''
the law
"
is undeniably good and must
be upheld or chaos will come again. There is more than a suspicion
of sleight of hand here. For nobody, except committed anarchists,
suggests that
"
the law
"
should be dispensed with.
The ground is then shifted slightly and what becomes sacred and
untouchable is something called the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law
is an invaluable concept for those who wish not to change the
present set-up. A person may be said not to be in favour of the
Rule
of
Law
if
he is critical of the Queen, the Commissioner of
Metropolitan Police, the Speaker of the House of Commons, or Lord
Denning. Statutes may be contrary to the Rule of Law (like some,
but not all, Indemnity Acts) but the common law, it seems, can
never be. Objection to the rules of international law in their appli-
cation
to
,the United Kingdom
is
wholly excusable on proper
occasions. Defiance of regulations and directives emanating from
Brussels may often be accounted
a
positive virtue.
If
the Rule of Law means that there should be proper and
adequate machinery for dealing with criminal offences and for
ensuring that public authorities do not exceed their legal powers,
and for insisting that official penalties may not be inflicted save on
those who have broken the law, then only an outlaw could dispute
its
desirability. And Bracton
is
a
thirteenth-century authority
in
its
support. But when it
is
extended to mean more than that, it is a
fantasy invented by Liberals
of
the old school in the late nineteenth
century and patented by the Tories to throw
a
protective sanctity
around certain legal and political institutions and principles which
they wish to preserve at any cost. Then it is become
a
new meta-
physic, seeming to resolve the doubts of the faithful with an old
dogma.
The political objection
to
these proposals for limited government
is
as fundamental as are the proposed changes. The proposals are
fundamental because they would change the constitution at its very
heart. This heart is that Governments of the United Kingdom may
take any action necessary for the proper government of the United
Kingdom, as they see it, subject to two limitations. The first limita-
tion is that they may not infringe the legal rights
of
others unless
expressly authorised to do
so
under statute or the prerogative. The
second limitation
is
that if they wish to change the law, whether by
adding to their existing legal powers or otherwise, they must obtain
the assent of Parliament. To these two limitations, some would add
a third: that the Government is bound by the regulations and
directives which emanate from the Commission and the Council of
Ministers under the Treaty of Rome.
1974 and
October
1977; and
to
K.
Mlnogue's
review
of
Dworkln in
The
Times
Educalional
Supplement
of
June
3,
1977.
16
THE MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
42
The proposals for
a
written constitution, for
a
Bill of Rights, for
a
House of Lords with greater powers to restrain governmental legis-
lation, for regional assemblies, for
a
supreme court to monitor all
these proposals, are attempts to write laws
so
as to prevent Her
Majesty’s Government from exercising powers which hitherto that
Government has exercised.
The fundamental political objection is this: that law is not and
cannot be a substitute for politics. This is
a
hard truth, perhaps an
unpleasant truth. For centuries political philosophers have sought
that society in which government is by laws and not by men. It is
an unattainable ideal. Written constitutions do not achieve it. Nor do
Bills of Rights or any other devices. They merely pass political deci-
sions out of the hands of politicians and into the hands
of
judges
or other persons.
To
require
a
supreme court to make certain kinds
of
political decisions does not make those decisions any less political.
I
believe firmly that political decisions should be taken by politi-
cians. In
a
society like ours this means by people who are remov-
able. It is an obvious corollary of this that the responsibility and
accountability of our rulers should be real and not fictitious. And of
coune
our existing institutions, espeuidly the House
of
Commons,
need strengthening. And we need to force governments out
of
secrecy and into the open.
So
also the freedom
of
the
Ress should
be enlarged by the amendment of laws which restrict discussion.
Governments are too easily able
to
act in an authoritarian manner.
But the remedies are political. It is not by attempting to restrict the
legal powers of government that we shall defeat authoritarianism.
It is by insisting
on
open government.
That is why these present proposals by Lord Hailsham, Lord
Scarman and others are not only mistaken but positively dangerous.
They seem to indicate
a
way by which potential tyranny can be
defeated by the intervention of the law and the invention of institu-
tional devices. There is
no
such way. Only political control, politically
exercised, can supply the remedy.
The philosophical objection to the new proposals stems from an
unease about
a
formulation based exclusively on rights.
I
suspect
I
shall be misunderstood
on
this.
So
I
had better begin by saying
that my distrust of governments and of the claims made by those
in authority is as profound as any man’s and more profound than
most.
I
begin by rejecting the existence of that abstraction called the
State. With Carlyle
I
accept the universe.
I
also accept the country,
and the nations that inhabit it. But the State
is
yet another meta-
physic invented to conceal the reality
of
political power. Secondly,
then,
I
reject the notion that those who hold political power have
any moral right or moral authority to do
so,
however they came to
their positions. They are there and they have power.
No
more.
Thirdly, following from what
I
have said, the power they exercise
is not special. It is
no
different in kind from the power exercised by
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
17
other groups in the community like the owners or controllers of
large accumulations of capital or the leaders
of
large trade unions.
Fourthly, it is misleading to speak of certain rights of the individual,
as being fundamental in character and inherent in the person of the
individual.
As
an individual
I
make claims on the authorities who
control the society in which
I
live.
If
I
am strong enough-and
I
shall have to join with others to be so-my claim may be recognised
within certain limits. It may even be given legal status. There is
a
continuous struggle between the rulers and the ruled about the
size
and shape
of
these claims and that is what is meant by Curran’s
statement that the condition upon which God hath given liberty to
man is eternal vigilance although, as you will have gathered,
I
am
not persuaded that we have
a
divine donor in this respect. (Or in the
words of the old story when the vicar congratulated his parishioner
saying what
a
splendid job God and you have made of this garden.
Yes, said the old man, but you ought to have seen what it was like
when God had it to Himself. To continue the parenthesis, Lord
Hailsham tells
of
the remark attributed to but denied by William
Temple:
‘‘
I
believe in one holy Catholic and apostolic Church, and
I
very much regret that it does not exist.”)
I
referred earlier to the wearisome condition of humanity which
results from the intolerable dilemma-which has nevertheless to be
tolerated-of our being at the same time individual and social ani-
mals.
As
an individual
I
may say that
I
have certain rights-the
right to life being the most fundamental. But those who manage the
society in which
I
live will reply
‘‘
Put up your claim and we will look
at it. Don’t ring us, we’ll ring
In this political, social sense there are no over-riding human rights.
No
right to freedom,
to
trial before conviction, to representation
before taxation.
No
right not to be tortured, not
to
be summarily
executed. Instead there are political claims by individuals and by
groups.
One danger of arguing from rights is that the real issues can be
evaded. What are truly questions of politics and economics are
presented as questions of law.
But paradoxically, arguments advanced avowedly for the pro-
tection of human rights are often concealed political propaganda.
Those for
a
written constitution,
a
Bill of Rights,
a
supreme court,
and the rest are attempts to resolve political conflicts in our society
in a particular way, to minimise change, to maintain
(so
far as
possible) the existing distribution of political and economic power.
So
also the appeals to
national consensus,’’
to
community
morality,” to fundamental legal principles, to theories of justice,
likewise enable the political and economic conflicts to be, if not
ignored, at least relegated to the kind of lower class arguments that
take place below stairs.
It seems to me that to call political claims
inherent rights
is
to
mythologise and confuse the matter. The struggle is political through-
18
THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
LVol.
42
out and moral only in the purely subjective sense that
I
may think
I
ought to be granted what
I
claim. Those in authority may think
I
ought not to be granted my claim. And there is no logic which
says that their view is more based
on
their self-advancement (rather
than, say, the public good) than mine
is.
Lord Denning was correct
when he said the other day, as reported, that English law knows
no
right to strike.
Similarly with lawmakers, like Ministers and judges. They have
regard to the political ends they subserve. Party politicians being
rather less homogeneous a group than judges are likely to make
decisions more distinguishable than the decisions judges make. And
the political ends which Ministers subserve are not identical with
those which judges subserve. But it seems to me that to suggest
Ministers or judges are seeking abstractions like justice or the
conscience
of
the community or whatever is
"
nonsense
on
stilts."
They are political animals pursuing political ends which are far
narrower, more limited and more short term, than those abstractions.
I
am therefore much more concerned to create situations in which
groups of individuals may make their political claims and seek to
persuade governments to accept them.
I
therefore want greater
opportunities for discussion, more open government, less restriction
on
debate, weaker Official Secrets Acts, more access to information,
stronger pressure from backbenchers, changes in the law of con-
tempt of court.
I
see the dangers in the present situation not in the
powers of minority governments, not in the sovereignty of Parliament
as the legislative institution, but in the prosecution of investigative
journalists, in the suppression of the
Sunday Times
article on
Distillers Ltd.,
in
the exclusion of Rudi Dutschke, and
of
Agee and
Hosenball,
in
$he search
of
the
Railway Gazette
offices, in the
prosecution of Jonathan Aitken and the
Sunday Telegraph,
and of
Paul Foot and
Socialist Worker,
in the Special Branch investigation
of a
WEA
course
on
Marxism, in the attempts to impede the exer-
cise
of
parliamentary privilege, in the recent use
of
the armed
forces
in
aid of the civil power, even, absurd though it may sound,
in the exclusion of the public,
so
reported, from the trial
of
some
unfortunate who threw a battle
at
a
hame-grown
rqd
Ptrince.
Excwive legislation does
nd
seem
to
me to be &where the dangers
lie. The dangers are
in
excessive adjministration designed
'to
limit
cdicism and to protect governments.
I
am extremely doubtful
whether any
of
the proposals
d
Lord Hailsham or
of
Lord Scarman
would affect these questions.
A further advantage
in
treating what others call rights as political
claims is that their acceptance or rejection will be in the hands of
politicians rather than judges and the advantage
of
that
is
not that
politicians are more likely to come up with the right answer but
that,
as
I
have said, they are
so
much more vulnerable than judges
and can be dismissed or at least made to suffer in their reputation.
Not only am
I
very strongly
of
the opinion that, in the United
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION
19
Kingdom, political decisions should be taken by politicians.
I
am
also very strongly against any further judicialisation of the admini-
strative process.
It
is
quite common in some intellectual circles-though not those
to which you will find me invited-to argue that the Benthamite-
positivist position leads to government by pressure groups. Lord Hail-
sham uses this argument. He concludes that
quite irrespective of
merits, the growth of pressure groups reflects
a
loss of confidence
in the parliamentary machine to produce results in consequence
of
national parhnemkry debate without pressure
beyond
that which
is generated
By
the inherent strengtlh and mmnaHeness
of
*the
w.”
And
so,
he
says
power tends to move away (from an ,inarticulate
majority in favour
of
vdms articulate and more
or
less
militant
minonit&.”
2o
The more strident will draw
greater
attention to their
pains
and
plwuses
in
the calculus.
To me the argument is more interesting for the assumptions on
which it rests than for any intrinsic merit. For once again
it
posits
that first, last, and necessary refuge
of
natural lawyers who have
been rash enough to venture into the treacherous country
of
politics.
I
mean their assumption that there is
a
body of opinion,
a
mass of
activity, of a generalised sort which can be appealed to as the in-
articulate majority. Whereas
I
am arguing that this is not
so.
I
do not believe that the concept of law is
a
moral concept. Of
course
I
will, as cheerfully and as seriously as the next person, engage
in discussions about the value of individual laws and pass moral judg-
ments about them. But laws are merely statements
of
a power
relationship and nothing more. A law remains
a
political act about
which it is indeed possible to hold opinions. But it can be called good
only in the limited sense that a number of people hold that opinion
of it.
If
I
had to find a name for this position
I
would call it Mini-
Austinism.
The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, changing from
day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what
happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And
if
nothing
happened that would be constitutional also.
I
am arguing then for
a
highly positivist view
of
the constitution;
of
recognising that Ministers and others in high positions of authority
are men and women who happen to exercise political power but
without any such right to that power which could give them a
superior moral position; that laws made by those in authority derive
validity from no other fact or principle, and
so
impose no moral
obligation of obedience on others; that so-called individual or human
rights are no more and no less than political claims made by
individuals on those in authority; that
a
society is endemically in a
state
of
conflict between warring interest groups, having no con-
sensus or unifying principles sufflciently precise to be the basis of
a
theory
of
legislation.
as
op.
cit.
pp.
60,
61.
20
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
42
I
am arguing further that recognition of these basic facts is
necessary before we can begin to consider in what ways
(if
any) the
working of our constitution can be improved. Over-simple, con-
servative diagnosis of our ills-that minority Governments have too
much power and need to be restrained by written constitutions and
a supreme court, and the rest-take us no step nearer the resolu-
tion
of
conflicts or at least their voluntary containment. (Incidentally
I
am not clear how large a majority has to be to confer legitimacy,
though
I
have the impression that leftwing governments would be
required to have a somewhat larger majority than rightwing govern-
ments.)
Nor
will we find even temporary solutions in appeals
to
reference
points like social solidarity, the conscience of mankind or justice or
fairness
or
fundamental legal principles.
I
do not disbelieve in generalised
Q
priori
principles.
I
have them
filling my pockets and coming out of my ears. But they cannot be
guidelines for legislative or administrative activity, because such
principles, in their application to particular situations, are the very
questions which divide not unify opinion.
We are back in the conflicts where we began. And politics is
what happens in the continuance
or
resolution
of
those conflicts.
And law is one means, one process, by which those conflicts are
continued or may be temporarily resolved.
No
more than that.
This view of the constitution clearly cannot encourage those who
would embark on formal or written statements. Indeed it must go
in the opposite direction. For the best we can do is to enlarge the
areas for argument and discussion, to liberate the processes
of
gov-
ernment, to do nothing
to
restrict them, to seek to deal with the
conflicts which govern our society as they arise. Marx defined life
as
the actions of men in pursuit of their ends,
I
am afraid we shall
have to accept that. But
I
will end with
a
quotation from someone
closer to my heart who was concerned to observe that the best
equipment will not solve situations when the puzzles at
the
centre
of
the situation are the human beings themselves.
All had been ordered weeks before the start
From the best Arms at such work, instruments
To
take the measure of all queer events,
And drugs to move the bowels
or
the heart.
A watch,
of
course, to watch impatience
fly,
Lamps for the dark and shades against the sun;
Foreboding, too, insisted on a gun,
And coloured beads to soothe a savage eye.
In theory they were sound on Expectation,
Had there been situations to be
in;
Unluckily they were their situation:
Jan.
19791
THE
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
21
One should not give a poisoner medicine,
A
conjurer fine apparatus, nor
A
rifle
to
a melancholic bore.27
J.
A.
G.
GRIFFITHt
27
Reprinted by permission
of
Faber and Faber Ltd. from
Collected
Shorter
Poems
t
Professor
of
Public Law in the Univcrsity
of
Lbndon
(London
School
of
1927-1957
by
W.
H.
Audon.
Economics).

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