The politics of climate change in a neo-developmental state: The case of South Korea
| Published date | 01 January 2021 |
| Author | Thomas Kalinowski |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512120924741 |
| Date | 01 January 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
Special Issue Article
The politics of climate change
in a neo-developmental state:
The case of South Korea
Thomas Kalinowski
Ewha Womans University, South Korea
Abstract
South Korea is the seventh largest emitter of CO
2
and its climate-change mitigation policies are
clearly insufficient. At the same time, the country has been very ambitious in implementing
industrial policies promoting green technologies and international initiatives to support green-
house gas mitigation in developing countries. What explains this discrepancy between weak
emission goals and strong investments in green technology as well as ambitions to become a
green ‘global leader’? This article argues that the specific character of Korean climate policies can
be understood in the context of Korea’s legacy as a developmental state characterized by strong
corporatist links between state and business as well as a weak civil society.
Keywords
Political economy, climate policies, East Asian developmental state, green industrial policies,
South Korea
Introduction
South Korea is the seventh largest emitter of CO
2
and its climate mitigation policies so far
have clearly been an ‘under-reaction’ (Peters et al., 2017). At the same time, South Korea
has been very ambitious in implementing industrial policies promoting green technologies.
Some of these ‘green growth’ policies have proven to be overambitious and failed, but others
could serve as an inspiration, particularly for emerging and developing countries. Indeed,
the challenge of ecologically sustainable development might require a reevaluation of
Corresponding author:
Dr Thomas Kalinowski, Ewha Womans University, 52 Ewhayeodae-gil, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, 03760, South Korea.
Email: kalinowski.thomas@gmail.com
International Political Science Review
2021, Vol. 42(1) 48–63
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512120924741
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industrial policies beyond the narrow focus of economic effectiveness that tends to dominate
the thinking of economists (Hallegatte et al., 2013; Rodrik, 2014). Furthermore, South
Korea has been very active in international initiatives to support greenhouse gas mitigation
in developing countries.
What can explain the discrepancy between weak emission goals and strong investments in
green technology as well as the ambitions to become a green ‘global leader’? This article
argues that the specific character of South Korean climate policies can be understood in the
context of the legacy of South Korea’s developmental state, which is transforming into a
neo-developmental state. The character of the neo-developmental state will become clearer
throughout the paper, although its essence can be described as follows. Neo-developmental
states follow the path dependency of the developmental states that are seen as the key
element of successful East Asian
1
industrialization. Developmental states are characterized
by strong corporatist links between state and business in combination with a weak civil
society (among the vast literature on the developmental state see, for example: Evans, 1995;
Johnson, 1982; Weiss, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Unlike the old-style developmental state, neo-developmental states are no longer able to
dominate the corporatist links with business and thus have lost the ability for comprehensive
macro-economic planning. There are, however, policy niches where the neo-developmental
state remains strong because business is weak or because international agreements give the
government leverage over domestic interest groups. In this sense, my interpretation of the
transformation of the state in South Korea differs from that of others who assume much
stronger path dependency and highlight the continuity of the ‘developmental mindset’ of
elites (Thurbon, 2016) or the ‘hybridization’ of state and business (Kim, 2019). While it is
true that both business and the state are getting stronger in absolute terms, relatively, state
autonomy from business interests has been declining. Increased state interventions and
spending are not in contradiction to the increasing power of business. On the contrary,
they go hand in hand. Moreover, industrial policies have lost the ability to direct the course
of the economy. The ability of the state to incite private investment against short-term
business interests is lost outside certain policy niches. Green industrial policies are such a
niche because business needs government support to catch up to global leaders in the field,
and international pressure to act is strong. This configuration helps to explain the ambitious
Korean goals of green industrial policies. In a case of institutional conversion (Thelen,
2004), path dependency remains intact in these niches but also receives a twist as the gov-
ernment nudges the path in a slightly different and, in this case, ‘greener’ direction.
The weakness in emissions reduction can be explained by the dominance of business
interests in energy-intensive and export industries as well as a politically weak environmen-
tal movement. Climate mitigation and greenhouse gas emission reductions are more difficult
than green industrial policies because they would require a much deeper change in produc-
tion and consumption patterns, which would mean much more than a turn in path depen-
dency and would require a more radical departure from the established growth model. Such
a critical juncture where a strong civil society could take advantage of international agree-
ments and open a political space for the government to act is currently only in its infancy.
This paper is organized as follows: first, I introduce the puzzle of under-reaction in climate
mitigation policies and (over-) ambition in ‘green’ industrial policies; second, I explain this
puzzle by investigating the legacy of the developmental state in Korea. Finally, I conclude
by discussing lessons from the Korean case study and possible future research agendas.
Kalinowski 49
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