The positive obligations doctrine: A means of effective fundamental rights protection in EU Member States?
| Published date | 01 April 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X241268874 |
| Author | Anna V. Backé |
| Date | 01 April 2024 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The positive obligations
doctrine: A means of effective
fundamental rights protection in
EU Member States?
Anna V. Backé*
Abstract
Over the last years, the idea of positive obligations under Charter rights was brought up as an
argument in some cases before the European Court of Justice in order to claim action from
Member States or the European Union. However, a general doctrine of positive obligations
does not seem to be able to assert itself in EU law. The article starts with identifying challenges
for a concept of positive obligations under EU law. Further, different levels of manifestations of
positive obligations are determined in the case-law of the ECJ in relation to the Member
States. Through revisiting the case-law in light of the challenges identified, the article points out
possibilities and limits for endorsing positive obligations in EU law, particularly in relation to
the Member States. Lastly, the article looks into potentials of further developing a concept of posi-
tive obligations under the Charter.
Keywords
Positive obligations, Charter, effective fundamental rights protection
1. Introduction
The concept of positive obligations is rooted in the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR).
1
In its 1979 Marckx v. Belgium judgment, the ECtHR held regarding the right
*Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Wien, Austria
Corresponding author:
Anna V. Backé, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 1, Wien, 1020, Austria
Email: anna.valeria.backe@s.wu.ac.at
1. Initially in the case ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Application No. 6833/74. Previously, the
German Constitutional Court recognized in 1979 the State’s obligation to protect (’Schutzpflicht des Staates’) to safeguard
the right to life in the context of abortion; see case BVerfGE 39, 1.
Article
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2024, Vol. 31(2) 147–170
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1023263X241268874
maastrichtjournal.sagepub.com
to respect for private and family life pursuant to Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an
effective “respect”for family life.’
2
Since then, the ECtHR has developed a doctrine of positive
obligations in its case-law, involving different types thereof, particularly substantive and procedural
positive obligations.
3
The concept is generally considered as a means of ensuring effective funda-
mental rights protection.
4
Over the last years, the idea of positive obligations under Charter rights was brought up as an
argument in some cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in order to claim action
from Member States
5
or the European Union (EU).
6
However, a general doctrine of positive obli-
gations does not seem to be able to assert itself in EU law. But why is that? What are the challenges
for a concept of positive obligations under the Charter and what are potentials thereof? What are the
possibilities and limits for endorsing positive obligations in EU law, especially in relation to the
Member States?
7
In order to answer these questions, the first section of the article will identify the challenges for a
potential positive obligation doctrine in the EU’s system of fundamental rights. The second section
will discuss to what extent EU law actually already entails manifestations of positive obligations for
Member States. In particular, until a few years ago the notion of ‘positive obligations’was absent in
the ECJ’s case-law. Therefore, the evolution of the concept of positive obligations under the Charter
will be examined based on the degree of reference (implicit, ‘quasi-explicit’and explicit) to the
notion of ‘positive obligations’. Especially, in which ways has the explicit use of positive obliga-
tions in more recent ECJ judgments specified that concept under EU law? The third section revisits
the case-law in light of the challenges identified, in order to understand how the challenges limit an
EU law-specific concept of positive obligations. It also aims to outline under which circumstances
there actually is room for development of such obligations in EU law. Finally, the article discusses
potentials of endorsing positive obligations under the Charter.
2. Challenges for a concept of positive obligations in the EU’s
fundamental rights system
When speaking of a potential doctrine of positive obligations under EU law, such a doctrine would
naturally have to comply with EU law. Therefore, the ECtHR’s doctrine of positive obligations
2. ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Application No. 6833/74, para. 31.
3. See L. Lavrysen, Human Rights in a Positive State (Intersentia, 2016), p. 47–78. In German academic literature, further
and more specific categories are defined; see for example C. Grabenwarter and K. Pabel, Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention (7th edition, C.H. Beck, 2021), ‘§ 19. Gewährleistungspflichten (“positive obligations”)’,
margin notes 3–15; C. Dröge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention
(Springer, 2003), p. 6–7; M. Holoubek, Grundrechtliche Gewährleistungspflichten (Springer, 1997), p. 54–65.
4. See in more detail subsection 4.B.
5. Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v. État belge, EU:C:2017:173, para. 23; Case C-69/21 Staatssecretaris van Justitie en
Veiligheid (Éloignement –Cannabis thérapeutique), EU:C:2022:913, para. 33–34; Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18
and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net, EU:C:2020:791, para. 85.
6. Case T-283/17 SH/Commission, EU:T:2018:917, para. 76; Action brought on 21 May 2021, Case T-282/21 SS and ST
v. Frontex; implicitly Action brought on 20 September 2021, Case T-600/21 WS and Others v. Frontex.
7. This paper focusses on positive obligations for the Member States and does not touch upon specific issues regarding posi-
tive obligations for EU bodies.
148 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 31(2)
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting