Has the Rainy Sky Dried Up? Arnold v Britton and Commercial Interpretation

DOI10.3366/elr.2016.0323
Published date01 January 2016
Pages71-76
Date01 January 2016
Author

For some time now a quiet war has been going on. On one side of the argument stand commercial contract draftsmen, doing their best to incorporate parties' agreements in their documents while accepting that client-driven amendments may arise at any time for tactical, commercial, or other reasons. They are committed to, and advise on, the proposition that, once complete, the document says what it says. If one party has not thought of something which may, as things turn out, give the other an advantage, so be it. Barring extreme circumstances (for instance, those in which the officious bystander can say “yes, of course” to an implied term) the words are inviolate.

On the other side of the battlefield stands a smaller (but more powerful) group. These are courts which feel able to rule on what parties “must have” or “must be taken to have” intended many years ago, whatever they wrote. If contract wording appears to provide a shield, they are equipped with a sword more than capable of penetrating that defence in the form of “business common sense”.

Those favouring the business common sense weaponry have been in the ascendency. The most quoted case was Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank,1

[2011] UKSC 50, [2011] I WLR 2900.

which majored on that topic. However, decisions remain contentious. In both Rainy Sky and the Scottish case of Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd,2

[2011] UKSC 56, 2012 SC (UKSC) 240.

the judges asked what credible reason the party would have had for agreeing the interpretation.3

See Rainy Sky at para 31; Stewart Milne at para 32.

Absence of an answer led, it seemed, to the automatic rejection of that interpretation

If venturing into the hypothetical, should the question not have been: what would parties have agreed had they thought of the point? Assuming that the Supreme Court is not infallible, merely final,4

Comment from the Bench during the hearing of Stewart Milne.

in Rainy Sky the result may offend long-established banking practice in which banks granting guarantees tie themselves to the precise words in the guarantees, no more and no less. In Stewart Milne what parties would have agreed may have led to a different result.5

The alternative argument belatedly presented by Stewart Milne (at para 23) had been supported at a very early stage by the other party.

Is the recent Supreme Court decision in Arnold v Britton 6

[2015] UKSC 36, [2015] 2 WLR 1593.

a biblical shaft of light breaking through the clouds (and dispersing the Rainy Sky) or, perhaps like the Scottish weather, do other factors suggest it is only a brief sunny interval before the skies darken again THE FACTS

At first blush the circumstances provide fertile ground for the application of a broad “business common sense” approach that departs from literal words. A chalet park operated ninety-nine year leases to individual chalet occupiers. Common services were provided for general maintenance and upkeep of the park as a whole, chalet occupiers being required to pay for that upkeep. Some complications arose from the fact that, as it eventually emerged, not all occupiers had precisely the same common charges provisions. For present purposes, attention will focus on those occupiers whose lease terms were the focus of the appeal.

Each chalet owner was to pay a “proportionate part” of the cost of maintaining the park as a whole.7

Arnold at paras 6–7.

So far, so good. However, that proportionate part was fixed at £90 per annum, increasing by 10% on a compound basis each year. As is obvious, the contribution increased exponentially year upon year regardless of the actual cost of maintenance or what might be regarded as a “proportionate part”. The individual contributions would in due course greatly exceed the cost of maintaining the entire park. What credible reason would anyone have had to agree to such a term? The Supreme Court, by a majority of four to
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT