The Ratio Decidendi Of A Case

Date01 September 1959
Published date01 September 1959
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1959.tb00552.x
AuthorA. W. B. Simpson
THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
Volume
22
September
1959
~
No.
5
THE
RATIO
DECIDENDI
OF
A
CASE
DR.
GOODEART
objects to the main thread of my argument because
there may be
a
divergence between the rule of law enunciated by
a
judge
as
governing his decision, and
8
rule which is constructed by
ascertaining the facts which the judge considered to be material
and the conclusion based upon them.l He gives
an
example of this
taken from the speech
of
Lord Atkin in
Donoghue
v.
Stevenson,'
where that learned Lord of Appeal, besides enunciating
a
wide
principle (the
"
neighbour principle
"
),
also
enunciated
8
narrower
principle about the relationship between
8
manufacturer and
a
consumer of products. Clearly these two rules or principles are not
the same
;
the neighbour principle includes the manufacturer
principle, but the contrary is not true.
Dr.
Goodhart claims that
this example helps to confirm his opinion, and his argument takes
the ingenious form of
saying
that Lord Atkin's broad statement-
"
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions
which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour
"
-is the rule of law enunciated by the judge, upon which the
classical theory concentrates, whilst the narrow statement-
". .
.
a
manufacturer of products, which he sells
in
such
8
form
as
to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer etc."
-is the statement of the material facts and conclusion
upon
which
his theory would concentrate. Clearly the
two
rationes decidendi
are not the same.
With this argument
I
should respectfully disagree. Both the
broad and the narrow propositions which Lord Atkin made can be
described
as
"
statements
of
material facts plus conclusions
"
or
8s
"rules of law enunciated by the judge," for the descriptions are
purely alternative; the question is begged by characterising the
wide one
as
"
the rule enunciated
.
.
.
"
and the narrow one
as
''
the
'
A.
L.
Goodhart,
"
The
Ratio
Decidendi
of
a
Cane
"
(1959) 22
M.L.R.
117, at
120 and 122.
In
this reply
I
have
limited the diecussion
to
points
of
mbsbnce.
a
[l932]
A.C.
662. Lord Atkin's
speech
begins at
p.
678;
Ire
st.ter
the
broad
principle
at
p.
680
and the
narrow
one
at p. 578.
458
VOL.
22
29

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