The Right to Education of Persons with Disabilities: Disabled in Interpretation and Application

AuthorClaire Breen
Published date01 March 2003
Date01 March 2003
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/016934410302100102
Subject MatterPart A: Article
*Lecturer, School of Law, University of Waikato, New Zealand.
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/1, 7-37, 2003.
© Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM). Printed in the Netherlands. 7
PART A: ARTICLES
THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: DISABLED IN INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION
CLAIRE BREEN*
Abstract
In July 2001, the Irish Supreme Court decided that the right to a free primary education
as contained in the Irish Constitution could not be extended to a 23-year-old autistic
man, Jamie Sinnott. Much of the Supreme Court judgment is an exercise in statutory
interpretation. The Court considered the meaning of both ‘primary’ and ‘education’ in
the context in which it appeared in the Constitution – that of the rights of parents
regarding the education of their children. Whilst it was happy to find that the type of
on-going care and support required by Jamie Sinnott could be classified as education,
nevertheless, the majority of the Irish Supreme Court limited the meaning of ‘primary’
education to that required by children and thereby excluding the care and support, which
it recognised as ‘education’, required by profoundly handicapped adults. The impact
of the Court’s exercise in statutory interpretation is that, in Ireland, the right to free
primary education is to be defined with regard to age and not needs.
This paper examines the decision of the Irish Supreme Court against the background
of the general right to education as provided for in international human rights law in
an effort to ascertain the extent to which the Supreme Court decision, as it reflects Irish
domestic law regarding the provision of free primary education, correlates with Ireland’s
international human rights obligations. In so doing, it will reveal the limited extent to
which the rights of disabled person have been ‘integrated’ into the general right to
education. To that end, Part 1 of this article will focus upon the Sinnott Case as it
provides an effective summary of domestic law regarding primary education as contained
in the Constitution, statute and case law as well as being the benchmark for the rights
of disabled persons to education in Ireland. Part 2 will consider the provisions of
international human rights law regarding that pertain to the rights of disabled persons.
Part 3 will consider the right to education as provided for in international human rights
treaties by comparing the provisions regarding the general right to education, provisions
regarding primary education, and provisions regarding persons with disabilities. Part
4 concludes this article by drawing together the right to education and the rights of
disabled individuals in an analysis of language and interpretation in an effort to
Claire Breen
1Sinnott vs Minister for Education [2001] IESC 39 (SC), Keane, C.J., Denham, J., Murphy, J., Murray,
J., Hardiman, J., Geoghegan, J., Fennelly, J., http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2001/ 39.html.
2See judgment of Murphy, ibidem, at para. 204.
3See Keane, ibidem, paras 1-17; Sinnott vs Minister for Education [2000] IEHC 148 (HC) Barr, paras
1-31.
4Barr, ibidem, paras 25-31.
8
determine the extent to which the rights of individuals, such as Jamie Sinnott are
protected by both national and international law.
1. THE SINNOTT JUDGMENT: THE RIGHT TO FREE PRIMARY
EDUCATION AS AGED BASED OR NEEDS BASED
The Supreme Court judgment in the Sinnott Case is significant because it was
the first time that the full complement of seven Supreme Court judges sat to
hear a case.1 The plaintiff, Jamie Sinnott, is a 23-year-old man who suffers from
autism. The extent of Mr Sinnott’s disability or the consequences of it were
summarised by his Counsel in this Court in the following terms:
‘[T]he plaintiff is not capable of learning much more than toilet training,
preserving his mobility and responding to simple instructions, and perhaps
a few words.’2
The Chief Justice adopted a summary of the facts as stated by the High Court
judge, Barr. In essence, this summary catalogues the grossly inadequate
treatment of and care extended by the State to the plaintiff from his initial
diagnosis with autism up until the time of the initial High Court hearing.3 The
trial judge summed up the plaintiff’s experience as follows:
‘[N]o programme was devised for Jamie’s education and training until
halfway through the trial when a grossly defective one was gathered
together in haste which was roundly condemned by the experts – even
those called on behalf of the defence (...) Jamie had less than three years
of meaningful education and training so far in 23 years of existence (...)
that loss can never be fully restored because (...) education now is arriving
too late in his life to achieve optimum results (...) At best he has suffered
through lack of educational training a diminution in the quality of his life
which has been substantial up to now but which should also continue
significantly into the future (...) It is probable that he will have a lifelong
need for ongoing basic education and training consistent with his require-
ments as they emerge in the future.’4

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