The Rights and Wrongs of No‐Platforming
| Published date | 01 July 2022 |
| Author | Victor Tadros |
| Date | 01 July 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12729 |
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Modern Law Review
DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.12729
The Rights and Wrongs of No-Platforming
Victor Tadros∗
This article oers an account of no-platforming, an investigation of the dierent considerations
that determine why no-platforming is wrong when it is, and howit might be justied. It suggests
that no-platforming can be wrong because it violates a person’s right to a platform, or because
it involves unjustied public denunciation. It then explores when no-platforming is justied
by exploring when a person might lose a right to a platform, and when public denunciation is
justied.It concludes with a cr itical assessment of both no-platforming culture and the prospects
for legal regulation.
INTRODUCTION
No-platforming is an increasingly prominent response to those who hold
views that are deemed deeply wrongful or oensive. Advocates believe that
no-platforming is an important tool in the ght against ser ious injustice. It is
condemned by critics as an unwarranted interference in public or academic dis-
course,and a violation of r ights of freespeech. The government seeks to regulate
no-platforming in the name of protecting free speech (though it is question-
able whether that is their real motive),and the Higher Education (Freedom of
Speech) Bill that is currently before parliament sets out a proposal for how to
do this.
But despite its prominence, no-platforming has received relatively little
deep examination. The social and political debate around it is supercial and
full of overblown rhetoric. This article attempts to provide more clarity and
structure to our thinking about no-platforming. What is no-platforming?
What are its morally salient features? What makes it wrong when it is wrong?
When is it justied? What kind of culture of no-platforming should we
foster? And how should it be legally regulated? My aim is not to answer all
these questions fully, let alone to provide a complete guide to who should be
∗Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Theor y, School of Law,University of Warwick. I am grateful
to John Adenitire, James Harrison, Kieran Oberman, and Kartik Upadhyaya for helpful discussion
and comments, and to audiences at MANCEPT at the University of Manchester, the Festival of
Freedom at Warwick University, and the Graduate Conference in Politics, Philosophy and Law at
King’s College London,as well as two referees for the Modern Law Review.
© 2022 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2022)85(4) MLR 968–996
Thisis an open access ar ticle under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attr ibution License,which permits use,distr ibution and reproduction
in any medium,provided the original work is properly cited.
Victor Tadros
no-platformed, but rather to provide a clearer understanding of the consider-
ations that determine when and why no-platforming is wrong, and when it is
justied.
The rst section oers an account of no-platforming, distinguishing it from
other kinds of exclusion from academic and public discourse,and distinguishes
dierent kinds of no-platforming. The second and third sections draw on
dierent features of no-platforming to explain what is wrong with it when
it is wrong. The fourth section is concerned with the justication for no-
platforming. It is mainly focused on dierent ways in which people might lose
a right to a platform, but also addresses some of the wider questions about
no-platforming. In the conclusion, I oer br iefer reections on the culture of
no-platforming and its legal regulation.
WH AT IS N O- P LAT FO RM I NG
The term ‘no-platforming’ and the social practice that it describes are relatively
new and in ux. To some extent, an account of no-platforming stipulates rather
than identies the boundaries of that emerging social practice. However, we
can identify the most salient features of central cases of no-platforming and
distinguish it from related phenomena. Doing so xes our subject matter and
focuses our critical attention.
No-platforming involves excluding people from platforms. Such platfor ms
provide opportunities to participate in public or academic discussion and debate.
Examples include public lectures, academic conferences and workshops, public
broadcasts aimed at discussion and debate, columns in newspapers and social
media platforms.
Excluding a person from a platfor m, though, is insucient for no-
platforming. Suppose that X holds an event to discuss some subject. Y believes
they are an expert,and wishes to be included in the discussion, to have a chance
to express their views, challenge others, and to revise their views in the light
being challenged. X does not invite Y, because places are limited, and others
have more to contribute.Y is excluded and may feel aggr ieved.If this decision
was made well, Y is not wronged. If X’s judgement was mistaken, perhaps Y is
wronged,and appropriately feels aggrieved. But Y has not been no-platfor med.
It might be argued that no-platforming involves excluding people based on
the content of their beliefs, rather than based on their expertise.This distinction
is hard to draw.Suppose that at-earther s arenot invited to a geography confer-
ence with limited spaces, which is surely typically justied. If they are excluded
because their beliefs are ridiculous, making them hopeless interlocutors at the
conference, are they excluded for their beliefs, or their expertise? It’s hard to
know. But excluding them on this basis is often permitted. No-platformers are
sometimes criticised for their unwillingness to discuss controversial and unpop-
ular ideas. But not every controversial and unpopular idea is worth discussing –
many are controversial and unpopular because they are ridiculous – and even if
there is sometimes good reason to discuss ideas that we nd ridiculous,because
they might turn out not to be, or because discovering why they are ridiculous
© 2022 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2022) 85(4) MLR 968–996 969
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