The Sanctions Malaise
| Published date | 01 June 2003 |
| Author | Omar Sanchez |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200305800206 |
| Date | 01 June 2003 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
OMAR
SANCHEZ
The
sanctions
malaise
The
case
of
Cuba
'WIHEN
A
COUNTRY
DOES
SOMETHING
WE
DO NOT
LIKE
we express
our
disaffection.
Rhetoric
is
not
enough
and
we
don't
want
to
send
the
marines. Sanctions
are still
popular
but
their
effectiveness
is
dubious.
Politically
there
is
a
reason
to
do
it.
It
allows
politicians
to
say
"I
am
tough
on
Iran
because
I
voted
for
sanctions; the
president
is
the
one
who's
soft.""
These
words
from
Lee
Hamilton,
who
until
recently
chaired
the
International
Relations
Committee
of
the
United
States
House
of
Representatives
and
is
widely
respected
for
his
expertise
in
foreign
affairs,
point
to
the
inherent
flaw
in economic sanctions
as
a
tool
of
foreign
policy. Sanctions
are
a
compromise
between
two
unde-
sirable
options
-
inaction
or
full-scale
military
action
-
and
a
decision
to
impose
them
may,
therefore
'be
taken
less
on
its
intrinsic
merits
than
because
of
its
attractions
in
relation to the
alternatives.'2
And,
unlike
potential
military
intervention,
which
is
usually
given careful analysis,
sanctions
are
often imposed
hastily.
More alarming
is
the
fact
that
they
have
proliferated at
a
dangerous
pace.
The
numbers
are
staggering:
in
1993-6,
61
US
laws
and
executive
actions
authorized
unilateral
eco-
nomic
sanctions
against
35
countries comprising
42
per
cent
of
the
world's
population.
3
These
figures
give a
strong
hint
that
Washington
PhD
candidate
in
political
science,
University
of
Oxftrr"
lecturer
in
Political
Science,
University
of
Wisconsin
-Green Bay
(as
ofAugust
2003)
1
Interview
with
Hamilton,
15
November
1998.
2
Robin
Renwick, Economic
Sanctions
(Cambridge
MA:
Harvard
University/Center
for
International
Affairs
1981),
1.
3
Donald
L.
Losman,
'Economic
sanctions:
an
emerging business
menace,'
Business
Economics
(April
1998),
37.
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Spring
2003
Omar
Sanchez
has
used
this
(questionable) tool
of
foreign policy in
a
knee-jerk,
indis-
criminate,
and
therefore
uncritical
fashion.
This
article
explores
the
use
of
us
sanctions
against
Cuba
to
illus-
trate
what
is
dangerous
about their
haphazard
use:
their
goal
of
encour-
aging
democracy
is
far
too
ambitious; they
cause
tension
between
the
United
States
and
its
closest
allies
because
they
violate
international
law;
they
are
dictated
by an
interest group
that
by
definition
cannot
be
said
to
have
global
us
interests
in
mind;
and
not
only
are
they unsuc-
cessful
in changing
Fidel
Castro's policy
behaviour
but
they
also
pro-
vide
nationalist
fuel
to
legitimate
Castro's rule.
Furthermore,
the
most
recent sanctions
variant,
the
Cuban
Liberty
and
Democratic
Solidarity
Act
(LIBERTAD,
better
known
as
Helms-Burton),
strips
from
the
presi-
dent
the
power to lift
sanctions
and
gives
it
to Congress,
where
the
influence
of
interest
groups
is
strong.
Nor
has
there been
any
study
that
compares
actual
to
intended
effects
and
no
independent
government
review
of
us-Cuban
relations
since
1960.
Indeed,
nothing
approxi-
mating
a
reasonable
cost-benefit
analysis
-
to
the
extent
that
one
is
fea-
sible
-
informs
Washington's
policy
towards
Cuba.
A
complex
amal-
gam
of
factors,
including
policy
inertia,
has
kept
this
anachronistic
cold
war
policy
frozen
in
time.
THE
LOGIC
OF
SANCTIONS
Policy
goals
of
such
scope
as
altering
a
state's
military
behaviour
or
changing
its
regime
or
internal
political
structure
are
delicate
matters.
Prior
to
1914,
war
was
viewed
as
the
only
means
of
bringing
about
such
change;
in
the
aftermath
of
the
First
World
War,
economic
sanc-
tions
came
to the
fore
as
a
more
humane
liberal
alternative
to
war.
David
Baldwin
argued
that:
'Reasonable
people
may
differ
with
respect
to
the
utility
of
war
as
an
instrument
of
policy,
but
there
is
little
to
be
said
in
defense
of
unnecessary
wars
...
It
would
be a
pity
-
perhaps
a
global
disaster
-
if
a
contemporary
American
president
were
to
resort
to
war
solely
because
the
nature,
implications
and
consequences
of
eco-
nomic
statecraft
had
been
misrepresented
to
him
by
his advisors.'
4
Indeed,
compared
to
the
human
cost
of
war,
this
policy
tool
cannot
help
but
be
seductive.
The
landmark
scholarly
work
in
support
of
4
David
Baldwin,
EconomicStatescraft
(Princeton
NI:
Princeton
University
Press
1985),
373.
348
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