The Theological Landscape of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: the Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches and the Bomb
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12334 |
The Theological Landscape of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty: the Catholic Church,
the World Council of Churches and the Bomb
Emily Welty
Pace University
Abstract
Can religion bring something distinct, critical and useful to global politics? Or do the voices of religious actors mimic those of
secular NGOs when given opportunities to speak truth to power in international diplomacy? This article examines these ques-
tions through the lens of nuclear disarmament, considering the role of the Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches
at the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York City. While
faith communities have had a potent role in pushing for nuclear disarmament, the article argues that much more can be done
by religious actors to argue that nuclear weapons are a stain on the moral conscience of people of faith.
Introduction
Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (1994) famously
described religion as ‘the missing dimension of statecraft’
and in the twenty years since the publication of their
book it is difficult to discern whether much has changed
in the international arena. Can religion bring something
distinct, critical and useful to global politics? Or do the
voices of religious actors mimic those of secular NGOs
when given opportunities to speak truth to power in
international diplomacy? This article examines these ques-
tions through the lens of nuclear disarmament, consider-
ing the role of religion at the 2015 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon)
at the United Nations headquarters in New York City.
Those who create and deploy nuclear weapons have peri-
odically used religious language and imagery. Sometimes
equating nuclear weapons with divinity is subtle, such as
when language associated with the creation of the world
(‘flashes of light’,‘deafening roar’) is used to described
nuclear detonations. Other times it is overt, as when the
United States uses the names of gods for nuclear technol-
ogy (Jupiter, Thor, Poseidon) (Gusterson, 1999, p. 126). J.
Robert Oppenheimer seemed acutely aware of the appro-
priation of religious imagery when codenaming the first
test detonation ‘Trinity’. Turning to Hinduism to explain
his reaction to the first detonation, Oppenheimer said, ‘I
remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bha-
gavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that
he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his
multi-armed form and says, ‘Now, I am become Death,
the destroyer of worlds’.’After the deployment of his cre-
ation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Oppenheimer observed,
now ‘the physicists have known sin’(Oppenheimer, 2015).
Journalist William Laurence (1959, p. 118) watched the
first nuclear detonation and wrote, ‘If the first man could
have been present at the moment of Creation when God
said, ‘Let there be light’, he might have seen something very
similar to what we have seen’. This dual understanding of
nuclear weapons –their association with the creation of the
world and the reality that they represent the apocalypse
pervades nuclear discourse. The sanctification of nuclear
weapons makes it even more difficult to give them up as
they become sacred symbols of security. Ira Chernus (1986,
p. 135) writes, ‘Every society is loath to give up its God, its
sacred symbols, its myths, its rituals. We are no different. For
in every respect, the symbolism of nuclear-weapons-as-God
makes those weapons more appealing, more compelling,
more desirable, more necessary to our lives’.
Religious language had particular salience during the early
1980s when Thomas Sebeok suggested establishing an
‘atomic priesthood’, based on the model of the Catholic
Church, to develop a semiotic language –via myths, rituals
and symbols –that could communicate the danger of
nuclear weapons 10,000 years into the future. To very differ-
ent ends, the term ‘nuclear priesthood’has been used to
describe the scientists, diplomats, policy makers and aca-
demics advocating the security advantages of nuclear weap-
ons. Jonathan Schell (1998) wrote, ‘A nuclear priesthood
taught that to threaten genocide, even to carry it out was
not only justifiable but inescapable duty’. This esoteric
group was entrusted with the creating and safeguarding
their nation’s‘nuclear doctrine’, military policy on the opera-
tional and strategic use of nuclear weapons.
Many religious groups have shifted their positions on
nuclear weapons over time, moving from support for
nuclear deterrence to declaring nuclear weapons to be
morally wrong. This article identifies two themes guiding
©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2016) 7:3 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12334
Global Policy Volume 7 . Issue 3 . September 2016
396
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