The Transfer of Moveables in Scotland and England

Published date01 May 2008
DOI10.3366/E1364980908000309
Pages173-199
AuthorLars van Vliet
Date01 May 2008
<bold>A. INTRODUCTION</bold>

In analysing the rules for the transfer of property, many continental legal systems make use of terms such as “consensual transfer system”, “traditio(n) system”, “causal” and “abstract” transfer systems.1

L P W van Vliet, Transfer of Movables in German, French, English and Dutch Law (2000); C von Bar and U Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe (2004); D L Carey Miller, “Passing of property: finding the fundamentals”, in S Espiau Espiau and A Vaquer Aloy (eds), Bases de un Derecho Contractual Europeo (2003) 471.

Such terminology is unknown to English law, and even in Scots law its use is relatively new. This paper analyses the transfer of tangible moveable property on sale in both English and Scots law. Its focus is on doctrine and technique rather than on legal policy

The terminology requires explanation.2

See further Van Vliet, Transfer of Movables 23-25.

A transfer system in which the contract itself passes property, without the need for delivery of possession, actual or constructive, is called a “consensual” transfer system, since consensus between the parties, their will to transfer and accept property, suffices to pass property. On the other hand, if delivery – traditio – is also needed, the system is known as a “tradition” transfer system. “Tradition” systems observe a distinction between the initial legal act which creates an obligation to transfer title (generally a contract) and the subsequent legal act – the “real agreement” as it is sometimes known – which effectuates the transfer

Cutting across this distinction between consensual and tradition systems is a second distinction between systems which are “causal” and those which are “abstract”. In an “abstract” system of transfer, the validity of the act of transfer is unaffected by any infirmity in the contract or other legal act on which it proceeded. The conveyance thus operates “abstractly” from the contract. In a “causal” system, however, the failure of the contract results in the failure of the conveyance, for the two are inextricably linked. A system in which property passes under the contract – a consensual system, in other words – is inevitably also causal in nature, for without a valid contract there can be no transfer of title. But a tradition system of transfer can be either causal or abstract.

In order to ascertain whether a particular transfer system is causal or abstract (or something in between) the treatment of defects of will, such as error and fraud, offers good evidence. The core element of an abstract transfer system is that the effectiveness of the conveyance is judged independently from the effectiveness of the underlying transaction which formed its basis, with the result that a transfer can be valid even though the underlying transaction is defective. It is a commonplace of legal systems that a party who acted under a defect of will has an action to annul the transaction. But in an abstract system, at least in its purest form, such an action has no effect on the passing of property, with the result that a transfer by the buyer to a sub-buyer is valid, even if the sub-buyer knew of the defect of will. The abstract system in this form was developed by the German scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny and his pupils in the nineteenth century. As it is the archetype of an abstract system, it is used in comparative law as the standard example of the abstract model. As we will see later, however, this extreme form of abstraction has been abandoned in Germany and seems never to have been adopted in Scotland.

<bold>B. THE SALE OF GOODS ACT AND ENGLISH LAW</bold> <bold>(1) Conceptual difficulties</bold>

This section asks whether the transfer system for the sale of goods in England is a consensual or traditio system and whether the system is causal or abstract. It analyses the Sale of Goods Act 1979, but also the case law prior to the first Sale of Goods Act of 1893. That case law was not based on a deliberate choice between a causal or an abstract transfer system, if only because such a division was, and remains, unknown to English law. Nor was the Sale of Goods Act drafted on the basis of any particular system of transfer. We should not therefore be surprised to find that neither the Act nor the common law fits neatly into one of the standard types of system. Nevertheless it is possible to say that English law is closer to a causal and consensual transfer system, although certain elements fit better into a tradition system.

<bold>(2) The development of the rules on transfer</bold>

The Sale of Goods Act 1893, so its long title says, was intended to codify the common law relating to the sale of goods, by which is meant the common law of England. Originally the legislation was not intended to apply to Scotland at all, and it was only during the bill's passage through Parliament that the necessary amendment was made for Scotland to be included.3

J P Benjamin, Sale of Goods, 7th edn, by A G Guest et al (2006) para 1-001. The process of drafting the Sale of Goods Act is analysed in detail by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in “The codification of commercial law in Victorian Britain” (1992) 108 LQR 570.

The fact that in many respects the bill did not fit the Scots common law was largely disregarded

When we read that the Sale of Goods Act 1893 purported to codify English common law, we should realise that that law had developed special rules on the passing of property which did not apply outside the area of sale. Originally, a requirement of delivery applied to all transfers of moveables, corresponding to the requirement of “livery of seisin”4

Like the verb “deliver”, the noun “livery” derives from the French livrer and the Latin liberare (to deliver up, to hand over). The word “seisin/seizing” or the alternative “sasine” derives from the old-French seisine or saisine. Cf the English “seize” and the French saisir (to get hold of or take possession of).

(transfer of possession) applicable in land law.5

F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd edn (1898) (reprinted, ed S F C Milsom (1968)) vol 2 180-181, 210; F Pollock “Gifts of chattles without delivery”(1890) 6 LQR 446 at 448. The requirement applied for example to the transfer of a freehold interest (an estate in fee simple or in fee tail).

Centuries before 1893, however, two important exceptions to the delivery rule had developed: delivery was unnecessary where the transfer was either based on sale or took place by deed (a sealed document). These exceptions still exist. English common law thus had three different ways of transferring title in moveable property: the original rule of delivery, and the newer rules on sale and on transfer by deed

Where a specific object was sold and nothing had to be done to bring it into a deliverable state, property passed to the buyer immediately, even if delivery and payment had not yet taken place. The origins of this rule can be traced back to the sixteenth century.6

J H Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England vol VI, 1483-1558 (2003) 740-744. There was, however, a lot of debate as to whether property could pass before payment of the purchase price, and the rule at the time seems to have been that property would pass before payment if the date for payment was settled.

Three cases from the early nineteenth century – Hinde v Whitehouse,7

(1806) 7 East 558.

Phillimore v Barry8

(1808) 1 Camp 513.

and Tarling v Baxter9

(1827) 6 B & C 360.

– show clearly the rule that property passes when the contract is made. The facts of all three cases were similar. Goods were to be delivered to the buyer some time after the contract of sale. Until then they remained in the seller's possession. Before delivery could take place the goods were lost as a result of fire. The question was who bore the risk of the fire. As risk in English law is linked to property, the answer depended on whether property had already passed to the buyer. It was held that property in specific goods passes to the buyer at the moment the contract is made, and that the loss was thus the buyer's. Both the result and the reasoning suggest a consensual system, that is to say, a transfer system in which property passes by contract and without the need for delivery.

This rule was carried forward to the Sale of Goods Act. Section 17(1) – the principal rule on the passing of property – provides that:

Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.

However, in order to categorise the Act's transfer system from a comparative law perspective, it is necessary to focus on the default rule rather than the rule which the Act happens to set up as the primary rule. The default rule – the rule which applies in the absence of the parties' express or implicit intention – is to be found in section 18. Rule 1 of section 18 provides that:

Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.

Rule 5(1) adds:

Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer; and the assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made.

These rules accord with the preceding cases and codify the system of consensual transfer.
<bold>(3) A causal system of transfer?</bold>

The question of whether the transfer system in the Sale of Goods Act is causal, abstract or something different is not debated in English case law and hardly...

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