Chapter 2: The UK corporate law and governance framework as a mechanism to facilitate risk-taking by corporate managers and shareholders

LibraryCorporate Law and Financial Instability
Pages40-69
AuthorAndreas Kokkinis

Having examined conceptual arguments and empirical evidence demonstrating that the interests of equity investors in financial institutions and of the public are diverging with regard to risk-taking, this chapter seeks to identify the corporate law doctrines that make this possible. In particular, it is shown that modern corporate law and governance seek to align the risk appetite of risk-averse senior managers with that of risk-neutral shareholders by setting strong incentives for executive directors and managers to maximise the market price of a company’s (and thus a bank’s or other financial institution’s) shares in the short term in order to maximise their remuneration and secure their positions. At the same time, UK company and insolvency laws shield financial institution directors and senior managers from the negative consequences of risky decisions insofar as they acted in good faith and followed a reasonable decision-making process, as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section I reviews the broadly accepted conceptual framework of agency theory as it applies to corporate law, emphasising the issue of aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Section II explains how limited liability banking arose and argues that limited liability is a necessary precondition for the separation of ownership from control and portfolio diversification. Sections III and IV then analyse the legal and soft-law mechanisms which seek to align the risk appetite of corporate managers with that of diversified shareholders. Turning to the issue of shielding managers from the risks of failure, section V explains how the legal formulation of the duty of care owed by directors to companies insulates the directors of financial institutions from liability in case of failure due to excessive risk-taking. Section VI proceeds to explain how the modern corporate governance framework has attempted to mitigate the problem of excessive risk-taking and discusses the limitations of such attempts. Section VII concludes with an overall assessment of the legal framework.

I: Agency costs and the role of corporate law

The need for corporate law and corporate governance 1 to devise mechanisms to protect and empower the shareholders vis-à-vis the directors and managers is grounded on agency theory. A principal-agent relationship is a concept frequently used in economics and political science to describe a situation in which one person appoints another to act on his behalf and in his best interests, occasionally in exchange for remuneration. 2 In this sense, the relationship between voters and members of Parliament, patients and doctors, and shareholders and managers in a company are all examples of a principal-agent relationship. It is worth noting that this concept of agency is broader than the legal notion of agency 3 and includes all fiduciary relationships and other relationships. An agency relationship gives rise to a principal-agent problem when the agent does not have the same interests as the principal, and there is information asymmetry between the two. In other words, this occurs when the agent is in possession of relevant information which is not available to – or cannot be properly understood by – the principal. In such cases, the principal cannot prima facie ensure that the agent will use his powers in the principal’s best interests. Assuming that the agent is a rational actor who seeks to maximise his own utility, it can be expected that the agent will shirk his duties and may even transfer wealth from the principal to himself when a conflict exists between the interests of the principal on the one hand, and those of the agent on the other.

In companies, it is the separation of ownership and control – first empirically observed by Berle and Means 4 – which gives rise to an agency relationship between the shareholders, who are the principals, and the directors and senior managers, 5 who are their agents. The separation of ownership and control occurs when the ownership of shares is so dispersed that no shareholder – or small group of shareholders – holds a majority of shares, or even a stake that would guarantee effective control of the company. This means that no individual shareholder (or small group) acting alone can usually determine the outcome of a shareholder vote. 6 On these conditions, the costs faced by shareholders who wish to influence corporate decision-making are significant. First, they have to invest time and resources in analysing relevant information to form an opinion. Second, they have to try to put together and maintain a coalition of shareholders. Third, they need to communicate with the board, and possibly pay legal and other professional fees. At the same time, the potential benefit from activism is relatively small, as it is by no means certain that the coalition will be successful in winning the vote against the board. Moreover, even if the activist shareholders are successful, any benefits will be equally spread among all shareholders. As a result, each shareholder is tempted to remain passive and wait for someone else to engage, a phenomenon described as the rational apathy of the shareholders. 7 The outcome of this is that the recommendations of the board are nearly invariably approved by the shareholders, as the latter either do not use their voting rights at all, or tend to vote in favour of the board. This includes the election of directors itself, and thus the board becomes a self-perpetuating organ, except for the most exceptional occasions of poor performance. 8

The separation of ownership from control, which since the late 1960s is prevalent in the UK nearly as much as in the US, is argued to give rise to agency costs, which are imposed by senior managers on shareholders. These costs are of two types: (a) lack of optimal effort and diligence by senior managers in discharging their duties; and (b) the risk that senior managers may pursue objectives other than the maximisation of shareholder wealth, such as the advancement of their own financial interests. This can be achieved (inter alia) by self-dealing, exploiting corporate opportunities, misappropriating corporate assets and receiving excessive remuneration. 9 Additionally, or alternatively, managers may pursue non-value-maximising objectives to serve their non-financial interests. An example of that is corporate ‘empire-building’, i.e. the creation of inefficiently large corporate groups with a view to enhance senior managers’ personal power, prestige and security of office. 10

In order to reduce primary agency costs, shareholders have to engage in monitoring managers by keeping informed on the performance of companies and getting involved when necessary. In parallel, senior managers also wish to signal to potential investors that agency costs will be held in tight control in order to encourage investment in the company’s shares. To do so, senior managers put in place majority independent boards which have the power to monitor their performance and replace them. Of course, monitoring by shareholders and using bonding devices by managers are costly activities in their own right, so they can be seen as types of agency costs themselves. This explains why Jensen and Meckling classify agency costs into three categories, namely monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual agency costs. 11

Monitoring by the shareholders and the emergence of independent boards are processes that evolved in the UK through market practice and are now positively encouraged by soft-law codes. 12 Still, high transaction costs have made it necessary for company law to devise further default rules that seek to minimise agency costs which are argued to be similar to what the relevant parties (i.e. shareholders and senior managers) would have agreed to. In this sense, contractarian theory analyses and rationalises most company law doctrines as an attempt to minimise the agency costs borne by the shareholders. 13 There are various ways to achieve this objective. The authors of the influential comparative law monograph, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 14 identify five alternative strategies, namely: decision-making, appointment, trusteeship, reward, and affiliation. I will briefly outline the usage of these strategies by UK company law in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of the agency costs analysis in this context.

The decision-making strategy empowers directly the principal so that he can monitor the agent. In the UK, it is manifested inter alia by shareholder approval of amendments to the company’s articles of association 15 and major transactions, 16 as well as by the power of the shareholders to initiate constitutional amendments 17 and call General Meetings. 18

The second strategy enables the principal to appoint and remove freely the agent. Section 168 (1) of the Companies Act 2006, for instance, enables shareholders to remove any director at any time without contractual cause by passing an ordinary resolution. 19 In addition, the default rule for UK public companies is that directors are elected or re-elected by an ordinary resolution of the company in a General Meeting. 20

The trusteeship strategy aims at extinguishing the ‘selfishness’ of the agent. One example of its use in the UK is the fiduciary duties of directors, who are expected to put the interests of the company ahead of their personal interests. Directors who thus owe a duty of loyalty to the company, 21 must exercise their powers for the purposes they were conferred, 22 and may not put themselves in a position where their personal interests conflict with those of the company. 23 The other main manifestation of the trusteeship strategy is the appointment of independent non-executive directors on boards. Since 2003 in the UK, listed company boards have been...

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