The ‘Uncle Tom’ dilemma: Minorities in power-sharing arrangements
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512119873103 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Author | Jon Fraenkel |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119873103
International Political Science Review
2020, Vol. 41(1) 124 –137
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119873103
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The ‘Uncle Tom’ dilemma:
Minorities in power-sharing
arrangements
Jon Fraenkel
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
Mandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian
democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-
making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing
executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms
or to advance minority objectives and become seen as ‘Uncle Tom’ type figures who no longer represent
their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.
Keywords
Power-sharing, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Fiji, New Caledonia
Introduction
The defeat of Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe
after its South African-brokered 2008 deal with Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) offers a cautionary tale about the potential dangers of par-
ticipating in power-sharing arrangements. In 2008, the opposition MDC was robbed of a victory
in the first round of a presidential election, but eventually pressed by South African international
mediators to enter a power-sharing deal with ZANU–PF. Mugabe retained the presidency.
Tsvangirai became prime minister. A 31-member Council of Ministers was divided 16/15
between MDC and ZANU–PF. Subsequently, MDC proved unable to control or reshape state
policy and its reform agenda was effectively blocked. As Cheeseman and Tendi write, ‘power-
sharing is a generous title for a process which has condemned opposition parties to accept infe-
rior positions within the government, despite their success at the ballot box’ (Cheeseman and
Corresponding author:
Jon Fraenkel, Department of Political Science & International Relations, School of History, Philosophy, Politics &
International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 6140, New Zealand.
Email: jon.fraenkel@vuw.ac.nz
873103IPS0010.1177/0192512119873103International Political Science ReviewFraenkel
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