The Unripe Fruits of Rapprochement
| DOI | 10.1177/002070201206700109 |
| Date | 01 March 2012 |
| Author | Ioannis N. Grigoriadis |
| Published date | 01 March 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The unripe fruits of
rapprochement
Greek-Turkishrelationsinthepost-Helsinkiera
3 April 2006 was not an ordinary day in the history of the National Bank
of Greece. Greece’s biggest and oldest bank announced the acquisition of
Turkey’s eighth-largest bank, Finansbank. This was by far the biggest foreign
investment ever realized by a Greek company. It was also the biggest foreign
direct investment deal for that year in Turkey. Nonetheless, not everyone was
happy on either coast of the Aegean. On the Turkish side, many opinion-
makers were weary about the prospects of foreign—let alone Greek—
domination in the country’s financial sector. Greek columnists, in contrast,
raised concerns about the enormous risk entailed in investing billions of
euros in a country that is volatile and inimical to Greece. What made this
previously unthinkable deal possible—and ultimately successful—was what
had transpired in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999.
The December 1999 decision of the European Council in Helsinki is
normally considered to be the beginning of a new era in Greek-Turkish
relations, yet it did not come out of the blue. A slow change in bilateral relations
could be observed since the mid-1990s, despite adversity and setbacks. The
Ioannis Grigoriadis is assistant professor of political science at Bilkent University, Ankara,
Turkey.
| International Journal | Winter 2011-12 | 119 |
| Ioannis N. Grigoriadis |
first signals of a new approach became evident in 1994. Yannos Kranidiotis
was a key figure as the deputy and alternate foreign minister who succeeded
in changing the agenda of Greek-Turkish relations. In March 1995, Greece
lifted its veto against the EU-Turkey customs union and the disbursement
of the fourth additional protocol funds under the condition that accession
negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union begin within six
months from the end of the EU intergovernmental conference—i.e., within
1998. The customs union between Turkey and the European Union came
into force on 1 January 1996. The decision of the Greek government to lift
its veto marked a significant shift in Greek views of EU-Turkey relations.
Nonetheless, in the view of most experts and public opinion, it was still seen
as a sacrifice made to promote a major national goal, namely Cyprus’ EU
membership prospects. Relations remained frosty, and in fact deteriorated
when the Turkish national assembly issued a declaration that an extension
of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles would amount to a casus
belli. The succession of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou by the moderate
Konstantinos Simitis coincided with the Imia-Kardak crisis which brought
Greece and Turkey to the brink of armed conflict over the sovereignty of an
islet in the Aegean.1 Greece’s development of a “joint defence doctrine” with
Cyprus, and its support for Cyprus’ decision to install a unit of S-300 anti-
aircraft ballistic missiles in 1998, only worsened relations. An all-time low
was reached in February 1999 when it was revealed that Abdullah Öcalan,
the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and at the top of Turkey’s most-
wanted list, had found refuge in the Greek embassy in Nairobi before he was
captured by Turkish security forces.
The Öcalan crisis proved an opportunity for the Simitis administration to
reorient its foreign policy towards Turkey and take a more moderate stance.
The agreement to host the controversial S-300 missiles in Crete instead
of Cyprus was a first signal of this change. The appointment of George
Papandreou—a known moderate—as foreign minister in the aftermath
of the Öcalan crisis catalyzed Greek-Turkish relations. Interestingly, the
Greek academic community remained aloof and this shift remained limited
to the political elite.2 Shortly after the Öcalan affair, foreign ministers
1 For more details on the state of Greek-Turkish relations of that era and the role of the
Imia-Kardak crisis, see Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “Blessing in disguise? The Imia crisis
and Turkish-Greek relations,” Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 3 (1997).
2 Panayotis Tsakonas, “Theory and practice in Greek foreign policy,” Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies 5, no. 3 (2005): 431-34.
| 120 | Winter 2011-12 | International Journal |
| The unripe fruits of rapprochement |
George Papandreou and Ismail Cem instituted careful steps towards the
normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. A first opportunity for dialogue
emerged with the outbreak of the Kosovo War, a major regional crisis
involving both countries.3 In May 1999 Papandreou and Cem launched
a dialogue. Avoiding explosive high-politics disputes, both ministers
prioritized collaborating in low-profile bilateral issues, such as trade,
tourism, and environment. This timid attempt at détente was unexpectedly
facilitated by the two earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece in August
and September 1999 respectively. The earthquakes allowed for a stunning
wave of mutual sympathy and compassion. While there was no causal
relationship between the post-earthquake sentiment and the rapprochement
process, the two peoples were clearly more willing to accept a breakthrough
in bilateral relations than had been previously thought.4 It also became clear
that a change of Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations would not encounter
vehement objections in the media or from public opinion.5
The December 1999 Helsinki European Council summit was a
milestone in that change. On the one hand, Greece agreed to the decision
to name Turkey an EU candidate. On the other hand, conditions were set
regarding Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus question. Before the
advent of EU accession negotiations, Turkey was expected to resolve its
bilateral disputes with Greece, or, alternatively, to agree to refer them to the
International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, it was declared that the settlement
of the Cyprus question, while desirable, did not constitute a precondition
for Cyprus’ EU membership. In effect, Greece was attempting to move the
Cyprus issue and its bilateral disputes with Turkey to the European level,
hoping that this would catalyze their resolution.6
The Helsinki decision hence attempted to consolidate détente and
navigate a reconciliation process through the resolution of the two disputes
3 Alexis Heraclides, “Greek-Turkish relations from discord to détente: A preliminary
evaluation,” The Review of International Affairs 1, no. 3 (2002): 21-22.
4 Ahmet O. Evin, “Changing Greek perspectives on Turkey: An assessment of the post-
earthquake rapprochement,” Turkish Studies 5, no. 1 (2004): 8.
5 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Greek and Greek Cypriot views of Turkey’s accession to the
European Union: On the endurance of a spectacular paradigmatic shift,” in Meltem
Müftüler-Bac and Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds., Turkey and the European Union: Dilemmas,
Constraints and Opportunities (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 155.
6 On the EU role in Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, see Ziya Öniş and
Şuhnaz Yılmaz, «Greek-Turkish rapprochement: Rhetoric or reality?» Political Science
Quarterly 123, no. 1 (2008): 135-40.
| International Journal | Winter 2011-12 | 121 |
| Ioannis N. Grigoriadis |
that had shadowed bilateral relations for decades, the Cyprus and the Aegean
questions. Both countries declared their commitment to a rapprochement
process that aimed to reframe bilateral relations, open new avenues of
cooperation, and contribute to innovative thinking and compromise
solutions for the long-standing bilateral disputes. This was by no means
an easy process, yet it was possible to discern a paradigmatic shift at the
elite level in both countries from a zero-sum game and relative-gains-driven
approach of bilateral relations to a positive-sum game and absolute-gains-
driven approach. Both sides came to the conclusion that they would be better
off if their neighbour...
To continue reading
Request your trial