The Views of Members towards Workplace Union Organization in Banking between 1999 and 2008
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| Author | Jeremy Waddington |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00896.x |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
The Views of Members towards
Workplace Union Organization in
Banking between 1999 and 2008bjir_896333..354
Jeremy Waddington
Abstract
In tracing the changing perceptions of members in banking of trade union
workplace organization between 1999 and 2008, this article illustrates a pattern
of decline in terms of the coverage and performance of workplace organization.
Contrary to the claims made by proponents of partnership arrangements,
merger involvement and organizing, these strategies were not sufficient to arrest
the decline in workplace organization. In consequence, members remained
reliant on trade union full-time officers for support.
1. Introduction
Analyses of workplace union organization in Britain have classically
focussed on the activities of shop stewards (Batstone 1984, 1988; Beynon
1973). Working within unions, but with some degree of autonomy, shop
stewards establish dense interactions with members, which constitute the
bedrock of union democracy (Fairbrother 1984; Hyman 1975: 64–93) and
result in substantive and procedural benefits for members, characterized as
comprising the joint regulation of a range of terms and conditions of employ-
ment and greater procedural equity and transparency in terms of discipline
and grievance (Brown 1981: 26–50). For many, the strength of British trade
unionism rested on these features of workplace union organization (Coates
and Topham 1974; Terry 1986), which also separated British trade unionism
from that found in much of continental Europe (Terry 1994).
It is now generally agreed that even at the peak of trade union density
during the late 1970s, the coverage of this classic form of workplace union
organization was concentrated in large sites in segments of manufacturing
and the public sector (Brown 1981). More recently, a vast array of evidence
demonstrates the contraction of the classic form of workplace union
Jeremy Waddington is at the University of Manchester and European Trade Union Institute.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00896.x
51:2 June 2013 0007–1080 pp. 333–354
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
organization, particularly in the private sector. Large-scale survey evidence
from 1980 indicated that 70 per cent of manual workers and 63 per cent of
non-manual workers employed at workplaces where unions were recognized
had access to one or more shop stewards at their own workplace (Millward
and Stevens 1986: 79), whereas by 2004, only 45 per cent of union members
had access to a lay representative at their workplace (Kersley et al. 2006:
124). Associated with the decline in the coverage of workplace union orga-
nization are a rise in non-union voice mechanisms, particularly at new estab-
lishments (Terry 2010; Willman et al. 2007), and a contraction in the range of
issues discussed by unionized workplace representatives (Kersley et al. 2006:
123–77). Extant research also focuses on the explanations of the numerical
decline in coverage of workplace union organization. Among the interrelated
factors identified as promoting the decline in coverage are the actions of
employers (Darlington 1994; Marchington and Parker 1990); the legislative
regime introduced by the Conservative governments 1979–1993 (Smith and
Morton 2001; Willman et al. 2006); and the failure of unions to invest in
organization at the workplace and to adjust to changes in the labour market
(Freeman and Rogers 1999).
Rather than focus on the extent and explanation of decline in the coverage
of workplace organization, this article addresses the performance of work-
place union organization from the perspective of union members in banking
over the period 1999–2008. Workplace organization in banking constitutes a
key case on four counts. First, union organization in the banking industry
was competitive, with staff associations1competing with the Trades Union
Congress (TUC)-affiliated Bank Officers’ Guild (BOG)/National Union of
Bank Employees (NUBE)/Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU).2
Differences in approach towards workplace organization constituted a key
element of this competition. Second, attempts to develop workplace union
organization in banking along the lines of the classic model had been
underway since the 1970s. Third, partnership agreements, with inter alia the
purpose of developing workplace organization, were concluded from the
mid-1990s. Fourth, union organization was reformed through the merger
process with the stated purpose of achieving economies of scale to release
resources for the extension of workplace organization. Associated with the
merger process was a policy shift towards organizing as a means to increase
membership and to further develop workplace union organization.
The long-standing political and constitutional objective of BIFU and its
predecessors was the establishment of industrial unionism and collective
bargaining for banking (Allen and Williams 1960; Blackburn 1967: 81–87).
Among the strategies to resist BIFU, banking employers prompted the for-
mation of staff associations and subsequently supported them in the form of
recognition, initially for representation and, from the late 1960s, for bargain-
ing; finance and material resources; and the release of employees to under-
take representative duties (Robinson 1969). Two features differentiated the
staff associations from BIFU. First, the staff associations were founded
on ‘internalism’ in that they represented employees of only one employer,
334 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.
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