The Weiss judgment: The Court’s further clarification of the ECB’s legal framework: Case C-493/17 Weiss and others, EU:C:2018:1000
| DOI | 10.1177/1023263X19837208 |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Author | Annelieke AM Mooij |
| Subject Matter | Case notes |
Case note
The Weiss judgment:
The Court’s further
clarification of the ECB’s
legal framework
Annelieke AM Mooij*
Abstract
In December 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice delivered its judgment in
the Weiss case. This case is the most recent development in the Euro crisis case law. The financial
crisis has shown the difficulty in determining the precise limits to the mandate of the European
Central Bank. The Gauweiler case provided a legal framework but also left unanswered questions.
This contribution will first providethe background to theEuro crisis and the context of thecase then
continue by giving a short summary and analyses of the Opinion of the Advocate General and the
judgment of theCourt. Finally, a reflection willbe given on what lessons can be takenfrom the Weiss
case. As the Weisscase appears to be last in Euro crisis case law, thisreflection will include an overall
analysis of the currentinterpretation of the mandate of the European Central Bankpost-Euro crisis.
Keywords
ECB, monetary policy, economic policy, Euro crisis, Weiss case, judicial review
Introduction
On 11 December 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (CJEU, the Court)
delivered its judgment in the Weiss and others case (Weiss case).
1
This case is the most recent
* Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
Corresponding author:
Annelieke AM Mooij, Dublin City University, School of Law and Government, Dublin 9, Ireland.
E-mail: anne.mooij2@mail.dcu.ie
1. Case C-439/17 Weiss and others v. Bundesregierung, EU:C:2018:114.
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2019, Vol. 26(3) 449–465
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1023263X19837208
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development in the body of Euro crisis case law. Its predecessors were th e Pringle
2
and the
Gauweiler cases.
3
The financial crisis has shown the difficulty in determining the precise limits
to the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Central banks are generally independent
institutions due to their expertise in monetary policy. The role of the ECB is narrowly defined in
the Treaties but the exact interpretation remained unclear. The Gauweiler case provided a frame-
work but also left some questions unanswered.
This contribution will first provide the background of the case and of the Euro crisis, then
continue by giving a short summary and analyses of the Opinion of the Advocate General and the
judgment of the Court. Finally, a reflection will be given on the Weiss case. As the Weiss case
appears to be the last in Euro crisis case law, this reflection will include an overall analysis of the
current interpretation of the mandate of the ECB post Euro crisis.
1. Background
The Euro crisis started in January 2010 with the revision of the Greek public deficit from 3.7%to
12.7%.
4
In May that year, the first bailout package was agreed upon between the Eurogroup, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Greece.
5
During the years that followed, multiple Member
States received financial aid.
6
The number of Member States receiving aid shifted the scope of the
crisis from the national level to the European one. In 2012, the Member States responded by
signing the European Stability Mechanism Treaty.
7
This treaty was set up to take over the func-
tions of the temporary European Financial Stability Facility. This European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) aims to aid Euro area Member States through a financial crisis. This aim is closely
connected with Article 125 TFEU, where the assumption of a Member State’s debt by the Union
or a Member State is prohibited. In addition, the aim of providing financial aid closely connects to
the monetary goal of price stability. The latter is a competence attributed to the ECB. Both the
issue of competence and the no bailout clause were raised in the Pringle case. As expected, the
Court concluded the ESM programme to be lawful, but it is interesting to see how they reached this
verdict. As Craig notes in his contribution on the Pringle case, the Court combined text, back-
ground, purpose and teleology.
8
Rather than strict adherence to the letter of the law, the Court
4. Report on Greek government deficits and debt statistics, COM(2010) 1 final.
5. European Commission, ‘Financial Assistance to Greece’, European Commission, ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/
financial-assistance-greece_en#first-programme-for-greece.
6. European Commission, ‘Which EU Countries have received assistance?’, European Commission, ec.europa.eu/info/
business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-
received-assistance_en.
7. Treaty Establishing The European Stability Mechanism Between The Kingdom Of Belgium, The Federal Republic Of
Germany, The Republic Of Estonia, Ireland, The Hellenic Republic, The Kingdom Of Spain, The French Republic, The
Italian Republic, The Republic Of Cyprus, The Republic Of Latvia, The Republic Of Lithuania, The Grand Duchy Of
Luxembourg, Malta, The Kingdom Of The Netherlands, The Republic Of Austria, The Portuguese Republic, The
Republic Of Slovenia, The Slovak Republic And The Republic Of Finland (henceforth the ESM Treaty).
8. P. Craig, ‘Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology’, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law (2013), p. 3-11.
450 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 26(3)
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