The West, Russia and European security: Still the long peace?
| DOI | 10.1177/13691481211036381 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211036381
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(2) 207 –223
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/13691481211036381
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
The West, Russia and
European security:
Still the long peace?
Andrew Cottey
Abstract
Against the background of increased tensions between the West and Russia, this article assesses
the prospects for continued peace in Europe. The end of the East-West conflict upended the
Cold War rules of the game in Europe’s east, creating an enduring source of conflict. Balanced
against this, however, are a range of factors which act as powerful bulwarks against war: a
European balance of power best characterised as modified bipolarity, the continued pacifying
effect of nuclear weapons, energy interdependence between Russia and Europe, the deterrent
effect of the likely consequences of any extended conventional war, and the continuing impact
of the post-1945 satellite reconnaissance revolution. Post-Cold War Western and Russian
crisis behaviour also suggests important elements of restraint and mutual communication.
Despite the downturn in Russo-Western relations, one can be cautiously optimistic that the
long peace in Europe will continue.
Keywords
European security, European Union, long peace, NATO, Russia, Russia-West
Introduction
The downturn in relations between the West and Russia in recent years, which some
describe as a new Cold War (Legvold, 2016), has led to renewed concern about the pos-
sibility of major war in Europe. Since the conflict over Ukraine in 2014, most of the
institutional ties between the West and Russia that were put in place in the 1990s and
2000s have been frozen or abandoned, the United States and the European Union (EU)
have imposed financial and other sanctions on Russia, and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Russia have intensified military deployments and planning
for a possible war with one another. Russian and Western military activities have
resulted in a significant increase in close military encounters in the air and at sea, which
analysts fear could trigger an unintended conflict (Frear et al., 2014; Raynova and
Kulesa, 2018). Some observers have warned of scenarios involving war between Russia
and NATO which could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2016; Shirreff, 2016).
Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
Corresponding author:
Andrew Cottey, Department of Government and Politics, University College Cork, Cork, T12 K8AF, Ireland.
Email: a.cottey@ucc.ie
1036381BPI0010.1177/13691481211036381The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsCottey
research-article2021
Original Article
208 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 24(2)
Drawing on the growing literature on the conditions of peace between states, as well
as Gaddis’ Cold War long peace thesis (Gaddis, 1986, 1991), this article assesses the
prospects for war and peace between Russia and the West in Europe in the 2020s and
beyond. The first section of the article reviews the literature on the sources of peace
between states, identifying those factors most relevant to contemporary Western-Russian
relations in Europe. The next section shows how the contested nature of Europe’s post-
Cold War order has created an enduring source of tensions and potential conflict between
the West and Russia. The following sections examine three factors that I argue make war
between the West and Russia in Europe unlikely: the contemporary European balance of
power, which is best characterised as modified bipolarity and has important stabilising
consequences; the continuing pacifying impact of nuclear weapons; and the energy rela-
tionship between Russia and the West, which is best understood as one of interdepend-
ence (rather than simple Western dependence on Russia). Combined with two things that
have not changed – the deterrent impact of the likely consequences of any extended con-
ventional war and the reduced risk of surprise or pre-emptive attack arising from the
development of reconnaissance satellites – these factors are significant forces likely to
impose caution on Russian and Western leaders and thus act as important bulwarks
against the risk of war between Russia and the West.
This article also examines Western and Russian behaviour in crises involving the use
of force since the end of the Cold War, showing that, despite divergent positions and
resulting tensions, there have also been important elements of restraint and mutual com-
munication by both the West and Russia in such crises – suggesting that both sides are
aware of the risks of escalation and have taken steps to avoid war. The possibility of war
between Russia and the West in Europe should not be entirely discounted and govern-
ments should work to maintain channels of communication and establish confidence-
building measures (European Leadership Network, 2020). Nonetheless, despite the
serious downturn in Russo-Western relations in recent years, one can be cautiously opti-
mistic that the long peace between Russia and the West in Europe will continue.
The conditions of peace: The Cold War and beyond
Recent decades have produced a large body of literature on the conditions of peace
between states. Steven Pinker’s book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence
Has Declined, in particular, gave new prominence to the argument that war was declin-
ing as a phenomenon in world politics (Pinker, 2011). Other authors have advanced
broadly similar arguments, in particular that inter-state war is declining and especially
that great power war has become increasingly unlikely (Goldstein, 2011; Jervis, 2001;
Mandelbaum, 2019; Mousseau, 2019; Mueller, 1990). The range of factors viewed as
causes of peace include the balance of power, nuclear weapons, the increasing destruc-
tiveness of conventional warfare among industrialised states, democracy, international
institutions, and economic interdependence. This section reviews this literature (as
well as Gaddis’ long peace argument), highlighting those factors most relevant to
Europe during the Cold War and to the post-Cold War relationship between the West
and Russia.
The Cold War was distinguished from previous periods by bipolarity and nuclear
weapons and these factors became a particular focus of explanations for the US–Soviet
long peace. The emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world’s two
superpowers after 1945 and the division of much of the world into East and West prompted
To continue reading
Request your trial