The Winkfield

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtCourt of Appeal
Judgment Date16 December 1901
Date16 December 1901
[COURT OF APPEAL] THE WINKFIELD.

1901 Nov. 26; Dec. 16, 19.

COLLINS M.R., STIRLING and MATHEW L.JJ.

Admiralty - Collision - Limitation of Liability - Bailment - Loss of Chattel by Negligence of Wrongdoer - Claim by Bailee against Fund in Court - Possessory Title as against Wrongdoer - Measure of Damage.

In an action against a stranger for loss of goods caused by his negligence, the bailee in possession can recover the value of the goods, although he would have had a good answer to an action by the bailor for damages for the loss of the thing bailed.

Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co., [1892] 1 Q. B. 422, overruled.

APPEAL by the Postmaster-General against a decision of Sir F. H. Jeune P. confirming a report of the registrar disallowing a portion of a claim in respect of the contents of certain mail-bags lost in a collision.

The case raised the question as to the rights of the Postmaster-General as bailee of letters and parcels in transit by post.

The facts were shortly as follows:—

On April 5, 1900, a collision occurred in a fog off Table Bay, on the coast of Cape Colony, South Africa, between the Government transport Winkfield, belonging to the Seafield Shipping Company, Limited, outward bound to the Cape with troops for service in South Africa, and the Union mail steam vessel Mexican from Cape Town, homeward bound to Southampton with mails, passengers, and cargo. The Winkfield was damaged and the Mexican sank, but not until all the passengers, crew, and some of the mails and luggage of the Mexican had been got on board the other vessel.

The owners, master, and crew of the Mexican and the owners of the Winkfield commenced cross-actions, which resulted in the owners of the Winkfield admitting liability for a moiety of the damage sustained by the Mexican, and, the owners of the Winkfield having commenced proceedings against the owners of the Mexican and all other persons having claims arising out of the collision, they, on July 24, obtained the usual decree, under s. 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, limiting their liability in respect of loss of, or damage to, vessels, goods, merchandise, or other things to 8l. per ton, and paid into court (inclusive of interest) the sum of 32,514l. 17s. 10d.

Against this fund claims by the owners of the Mexican, by her master and crew, by passengers, and by cargo owners, were filed in the Admiralty Registry amounting to 90,085l. 7s. 2d. These were allowed at 75,810l., including a claim for 5147l. 8s. 5d. (allowed at 5145l.), filed by the Postmaster-General, on behalf of himself and the Postmasters-General of Cape Colony and Natal, and made up of the two following items, namely:—

(1.) 105l. 10s. 11d., the value of 282 cases of postal parcels and 678 mail-bags lost on board the Mexican. This claim, made on behalf of the Crown in respect of its own property, was admitted by the registrar on the authority of The Zoe.F1

(2.) 5041l. 17s. 6d., the value of the contents of 334 parcels, and 1155 registered letters, in respect of which the parties interested had made claims upon the Postmaster-General, and given him written authority to represent them in these proceedings. This claim was admitted by the registrar on the ground of the saving of expense by allowing the Postmaster-General to make a claim instead of separate claims by the parties concerned; but the apportionment of the fund in court amongst the several claimants was postponed pending a motion on behalf of the Postmaster-General in objection to so much of the report of the registrar, dated March 29, 1901, as disallowed —

(3.) A claim of 1706l. 19s. 4d., the estimated value of the contents of letters and parcels in respect of which no claim had been made by, or instructions received from, the senders or addressees, but which the Postmaster-General undertook to distribute amongst them, and, in order to comply with the terms of a decision in an action in rem in the case of The MinnaF2, further undertook to indemnify the fund in court against any claims put forward by the actual owners.

On June 10, 1901, the President (Sir F. H. Jeune) overruled the objection, and upheld the decision of the registrar, on the same ground, namely, that the Postmaster-General, as representing the Crown, was not under any liability to the parties interested in the lost letters and parcels included under the third head, and, therefore, was precluded, by the case of Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co.F3, from claiming for their value. Costs reserved.

On appeal:—

1901. Nov. 26. The Attorney-General (Sir Robert Finlay, K.C.), and Acland, for the Postmaster-General. In Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co.F3 the plaintiff, an auctioneer to whom a horse had been delivered by the owner for sale with liberty to use until sold, brought an action in a county court against the defendants, a tramcar company, for the diminution in value of the horse injured by the negligence of the defendants. The judge directed the jury that the plaintiff as bailee was under no liability to his bailor for the injury to the horse, and therefore could not recover. A Divisional Court, consisting of Hawkins and Wills JJ., affirmed the decision; but in Meux v. Great Eastern Ry. Co.F4 the late Master of the Rolls (Sir A. L. Smith) said that Claridge's CaseF5 “may possibly require at some future time further consideration,” and it is now submitted that it was wrongly decided.

Chief Justice Holmes, in his lectures on the Common LawF6, traces the origin of the rule as to the right of the bailee to sue to the time when, in the primitive condition of society in England, the arm of the law had to be called in to check the practice of cattle stealing, and it is shewn that the person in actual possession of the cattle at the time they were stolen was of necessity the proper person to follow the trail and institute proceedings for their recovery. The procedure provided by the law turned on the single question whether the plaintiff had lost possession against his will, and was modelled on the self-redress “natural to the case which gave rise to it, (and) was the only remedy. (It) was confined to the man in possession, and was not open to the owner unless he was that man”; in other words, “if chattels were intrusted by their owner to another person, the bailee, and not the bailor, was the proper party to sue for their wrongful appropriation by a third”; and if the bailee “sold or gave the goods in his charge to another, the owner could only look to the bailee and could not sue the stranger …. because there was no form of action known which was open to him.” BractonF7 says that one may sue for his chattel as stolen, by the testimony of good men, and that it does not matter whether the thing thus taken was his own property or another's, provided it was in his custody. Holmes C.J. adds: “as the remedies were all in the bailee's hands, it also followed that he was bound to hold his bailor harmless. If the goods were lost, it was no excuse that they were stolen without his fault. He alone could recover the lost property, and therefore he was bound to do so …. At first the bailee was answerable to the owner, because he was the only person who could sue; but though this strict liability remained, cause and effect were inverted, and it was said that the bailee could sue because he was answerable to the owner.” This liability to the bailor being, however, founded on the remedy the bailee had over against the wrongdoer, it ceased where the remedy ceased, so that in 1455 in an action of debt against the marshal of the MarshalseaF8 for an escape of a prisoner, and the defence was that enemies of the King broke into the prison and carried off the prisoner against the will of the defendant, the Court said that, if alien enemies of the King — for instance, the French — released the prisoner, or perhaps if the burning of the prison gave him a chance to escape, the excuse would be good, “because then (the defendant) has remedy against no one”; but if subjects of the King broke the prison the defendant would be liable, because it is implied that the defendant would have a right of action against them, and therefore would himself be answerable. For a similar reason there was some hesitation as to robbery where the robber was unknown, and so the bailee had no remedy over, and even as to robbery generally, on the ground that by reason of the felony the bailee could not go against either the robber's body or his estate; for the one was hanged and the other forfeitedF9; but the bailee was not excused by an ordinary wrongful taking. “If the goods are taken by a trespasser of whom the bailee has conusance, he shall be chargeable to his bailor, and shall have his action over against his trespasser.”F10 The principle to be deduced from this reasoning is that, if the bailee parted with the property to another, the owner could not recover it, but must get his indemnity from the bailee — that is to say, the bailee was absolutely responsible for loss, even when happening without his fault, but where he had no remedy he was not answerable.

It may, therefore, be asserted that from time immemorial bailees have been regarded in English law as possessors and entitled to possessory remedies — that is to say, the right of the bailee to bring his action rests, not on his being chargeable over, but as against a wrongdoer, on his possessory title, and he recovers on the strength of his possession just as in the case of a finder: Armory v. Delamirie.F11 This view that the infringement of the possessory right is the true cause of action is established by a long line of authorities.

In Sutton v. BuckF12, in trover for portions of a wrecked ship, it was held that possession under a general bailment is sufficient title for the plaintiff who was in possession of the ship, but without title as the transfer was void: see also the American case of Lyle v. Barker.F13 That the infringement of the possessory...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
83 cases
  • Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK Plc [QBD (Comm)]
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Court)
    • 20 March 2009
    ...title asserted was a right to possession. If established, would this be sufficient to afford title to sue? 492 The issue first emerged in The Winkfield [1902] P 42. The claim was by the Postmaster-General in regard to mail bags that had been lost in a collision. The claim was against the no......
  • Jet Holding Ltd and Others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Another
    • Singapore
    • High Court (Singapore)
    • 22 August 2005
    ...Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601; [1973] 2 All ER 260 (folld) Voaden v Champion [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 623 (refd) Winkfield, The [1902] P 42 (folld) Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) ss 32, 67 (consd);ss 12, 35 (1), 35 (6), 35 (10) (b), 64, 66 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev E......
  • Chua Wah Keow v Ng Ho Huat and Another
    • Singapore
    • Court of Appeal (Singapore)
    • Invalid date
  • Worthington v Tipperary County Council
    • Ireland
    • Court of Appeal (Ireland)
    • 27 February 1920
    ... ... All the cases on this point were considered in the elaborate judgment of Collins M.R., concurred in by Stirling and Matthews L.JJ., in the case of The Winkfield (4) ... That was a claim by the Postmaster-General as bailee of letters and parcels which were lost in transit by post by reason of the "Winkfield"being run down by another ship. Collins M.R. sums up the effect of the authorities as follows:—"I think I have now shown by authority that the root ... ...
  • Get Started for Free
10 books & journal articles
  • The types of damage or loss compensated
    • United Kingdom
    • Oxford University Press Books and Journals Product Liability (Third Edition) Part IV. Liability in tort
    • Invalid date
    ...at paras 16.50–16.52. 135 See s 5(2), discussed at paras 16.59–16.62. 136 As to the sufficiency of a possessory title, see The Winkfield [1902] P 42; also Losinjska Plovidba v Transco Overseas Ltd (The ‘Orjula’) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 395, 400 per Mance J. But a contractual right is not suffi......
  • Chapter 12. Security for performance
    • United Kingdom
    • Construction Law. Volume II - Fourth Edition
    • Invalid date
    ...the owner has deliberately conducted itself in a manner inconsistent with the contractor’s right so as to deprive it of possession: The Winkfield [1902] P 42; Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97 at 98–99, per Young 573 See, by way of illustration, Ball Engineering Co. v JG White......
  • Security for performance
    • United Kingdom
    • Construction Law. Volume II - Third Edition
    • 13 April 2020
    ...has deliberately conducted itself in a manner inconsistent with the contractor’s right so as to deprive it of possession: he Winkield [1902] p 42; Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] Vr 97 at 98–99, per Young CJ. 529 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Developments Ltd [1......
  • Chapter 12. Security for performnce
    • United Kingdom
    • Taylor and Francis Construction Law, Volume II. Second Edition
    • Invalid date
    ...the owner has deliberately conducted itself in a manner inconsistent with the contractor’s right so as to deprive it of possession: The Winkfield [1902] P 42; Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97 at 98–99, per Young 497 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Development......
  • Get Started for Free