THE WORKS CONSTITUTION ACTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WEST GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

Published date01 November 1973
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1973.tb00874.x
AuthorIVOR L. ROBERTS
Date01 November 1973
THE WORKS CONSTITUTION ACTS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN WEST GERMANY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM
IVOR
L.
ROBERTS*
ANY
discussion of plant and company industrial relations must recognize
that there are both conflicts and similarities of interest between employer
and employed.
It
is unrealistic to believe that conflicts will not arise from
time to time in labour-management relations which themselves will be
affected by the dynamism of shifts in important industrial relations para-
meters. For example, the socio-cultural norms of thc wider society and
changes in them are important to such plant and company industrial
relationships
as
attitudes to work and authority, and will demand adjust-
ments in internal industrial relations arrangements. Different industrial
relations systems provide rather different mechanisms through which thc
avoidance and resolution of conflict can be effected, and through which
labour and capital may work more closely in promoting those of their
interests which are similar.
In comparing industrial relations arrangements in West Germany and
Britain, due regard must be paid to the different socio-political traditions,
different administrative, legal and societal parameters, and the manner in
which industrial relations arrangements have been established, operate
and change. In Germany these arrangements are both formalized and
legalized in comparison to Britain where there is little indication that
workplace industrial relations systems are moving any nearer the ‘greater
formalization’ advocated by the Donovan Commission in 1968. Conse-
quently the reform of workplace relations remains one of most pressing
problems of British industrial life. Although the wholesale transfer of
industrial relations arrangements between countries is dangerous, and
changes in direction must be viewed cautiously, German practices tempt
comparison with British problems and their possible resolution,
This paper has
a
number of important objectives in the field of plant
and company industrial relations, its primary focus being an examination
of the German labour-management relationship as regulated by the 1952
and the recent 1972 Works Constitution Acts.l These Acts provide for the
establishment and operation of
a
system of Works and Company Councils,
and although the 1972 Act has IargeIy replaced its predecessor, the provi-
sions
of
the 1952 Act regulating the Supervisory Board system outside the
coal, and the iron and steel industries still remain. This system
of
Super-
*
Lecturer
in
Industrial Relations, Institute
of
Extension
Studies,
University
of
Liverpool
338
Das
Betriebsverfassungsgeretz,
1972
WORKS CONSTITUTION ACTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
W.
GERMANY
339
visory Boards and the Works and Company Councils represent the most
important cornerstones of worker participation in German industry. The
possible extension of the Supervisory Board and European Works Council
system across the European Economic Community could raise weighty
political and industrial relations issues for Britain.
This paper considers the legislative provisions regarding the rights and
powers of Works and Company Councils, including the co-decision-
making rights in manpower and personnel policy, rights to effective con-
sultation over production changes, the economic viability of the firm,
intended changes in the organization, type, and location
of
the firm’s
productive activity, and labour’s rights to involvement in the efficient
running of the plant. The paper also considers the Economic Committee
at company level, the role
of
the trade union in plant industrial relations
affairs, an analysis
of
how the provisions of the
1952
Act have operated in
practice and the likely effects of the 1972 Act on labour and management.
An attempt will be made to draw relevant implications for the British
industrial relations system with particular emphasis on the role of the shop
steward: the purpose of such a comparison is to evaluate the possible
benefits the British system
of
labour-management relations could derive
from
a
formalization along German lines.
Although the public debate in West Germany over the introduction
of
the
1972
Act has subsided, it has bcen replaced by mounting discussion
on
the revision
of
the legislative arrangements relating to Supervisory Boards,
a
revision promised by the Socialist-Liberal coalition government in
1972.
It must be stressed, however, that the Supervisory Board is only one-
albeit one important-element in employee participation, and must be
considered in conjunction with the Works and Company Council system.
The transference
of
German provisions-in the whole or in part-for
employee involvement in plant and company affairs would represent
serious inroads into traditional areas
of
managerial prerogative in Britain,
while provisions for the powers of workplace representatives would like-
wise make inroads into union administration prerogative. The paper
attempts to show that the prevention of unnecessary conflict in labour-
management relatioils in Britain could be made more effective, and that
concentration on the similarities rather than the conflicts of interest in
British industry could bring benefits for labour and management alike.
THE
ESTABLISHMENT,
ORGANIZATION
AND
MANNING
OF
WORKS
COUNCILS
German Works Councils, unlike some of their Continental counter-
parts, are exclusively employee bodies elected by all plant employees
regardZess
of
union
membership.
In plants
of
five employees or more, those
eighteen years
of
age and over with
a
minimum
of
six
months service are
eligible to vote and to be elected. Earlier restrictions on the participating
rights
of
foreign workers-contested by both labour and management

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