A THEORY OF DISRIMINATORY CLUBS */sp>
| Author | Allan C. De Serpa |
| Date | 01 February 1977 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1977.tb00405.x |
| Published date | 01 February 1977 |
Scottish Journal
of
Political
Economy,
Vol.
24,
No.1, February
1911.
A
THEORY
OF
DISCRIMINATORY
CLUBS*
ALLAN
C.
DE
SERPA
I
INTRODUCTION
The economics of clubs is the economics of sharing. Where sharing is possible,
it
is
only
in
rare instances that unlimited sharing would be economical or
desirable. Congestion, spatial separation of individuals, societal norms, as
well as individual tastes and income all might constitute reasons for exclusion.
Treating these factors as given, it is possible conceptually
to
identify the
optimal size of the (public) good to be shared and the optimal number of
sharers. The nature
of
sharing arrangements
is
subject to considerable
variation, ranging from the purely impersonal (typically, the mere sharing
of expenses
on
such things as traffic signals, fire hydrants, etc.) to the very
intimate
(e.g.,
clothing, bathtubs, perhaps swimming
pools).
Only in rare
circumstances would all individuals be indifferent as to the identity and
attributes
of
the others with whom they share the good. Accordingly, it is
the purpose
of
this
paper to consider formally the manner
in
which differences
among individuals influence the nature and extent of sharing arrangements.'
The problem
is
an important one with far-reaching social significance.
Private clubs, in the traditional sense, are almost universally discriminatory.
Discrimination may involve arbitrary exclusion of some individuals or simply
the categorization of others as close friends, acquaintances, etc. Some
individuals may join a club but avoid using their membership when certain
other members are present. Others may eschew membership because certain
others are members. In the context of the broader economic definition of
clubs, public schools, parks, neighbourhoods, and many other quasi-public
facilities have been the focus of racial discrimination and violence. Thus
problems of group interaction, ranging from the very trivial to the very signifi-
cant and complex, underlie virtually all types of sharing arrangements and
*
The author
is
grateful to Todd Sandier of the University of Wyoming, Chuck Knoeber
of
North Carolina State University, Bill Eadington
of
the University
of
Nevada, Reno, and
to Ryan Amacher and Steve Happel of Arizona State University
for
the helpful suggestions
and comments.
I
bear full responsibility for any errors which remain.
This paper is a logical extension
of
earlier studies by Buchanan
(1965)
and Tollison
(1972).
The general clubs framework was developed by Buchanan, who, in the interest of
simplicity, ignored all of the social aspects of group interaction, at least in his formal
analysis. He implicitly addressed the problem
of
sharing
by
individuals with identical
preferences and with no tastes for the characteristics or identities of co-sharers. The work of
Tollison
(1972),
somewhat amended by Ng and Tollison
(1974),
represents the only formal
attempt in the public goods literature
to
address the problem of discrimination. Tollison
discusses
a
number
of
interesting policy issues and indicates how the discrimination factor
would alter the Buchanan conclusions. However,
he
freely admits
(p.
277)
that his formal
model is sketchy and invites different formulations
to
improve the specification
of
the
problem.
3
33
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