Thorner v Curtis and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 26 October 2007 |
| Neutral Citation | [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch) |
| Docket Number | Claim No: 6BS30254 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Date | 26 October 2007 |
[2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch)
Mr John Randall QC Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
Claim No: 6BS30254
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
BRISTOL DISTRICT REGISTRY
The Guildhall
Small Street, Bristol BS1 1DA
Mr Michael Jefferis instructed by Stephen Gisby & Co, Solicitors of Bristol, appeared for the Claimant
Miss Penelope Reed instructed by Messrs Gould & Swayne, Solicitors of Glastonbury, appeared for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 19 th– 20 th September 2007, at The Guildhall, Bristol
In accordance with paragraph 9.3 of the Chancery Guide (October 2005), this is the official judgment of the Court, and I direct that this written judgment may be used for all purposes as the text of the judgment, and that no further transcript of the judgment need be made.
John Randall QC, Deputy Judge
The Deputy Judge, John Randall QC:
INTRODUCTION
(1) The Thorners are a farming family in Somerset. For convenience, and with no disrespect whatever, I shall refer to all members of this family by their first names. Jimmy and Peter were cousins, their fathers being brothers. Jimmy had 4 children (all sons), of whom the claimant, David, is one. Peter, who had 6 siblings (3 brothers and 3 sisters), had no children. In 1997 Peter made a will by which, after a number of pecuniary legacies, he left the residue of his estate, including in particular his farm (Steart Farm, Cheddar) to David. However he subsequently decided to destroy that will, which was returned to him for that purpose by the solicitors who had been holding it. After Peter's death in November 2005 neither it nor any other will was found. Thus by law Peter's estate devolves to his blood relatives in accordance with the Intestacy Rules, subject only to David's claim in these proceedings. The defendants are the three administratrices of Peter's estate, namely his sisters Winifred and Ena, and his niece Lesley.
(2) David claims to have the benefit of a proprietary estoppel against Peter and his estate, in essence on the basis that over 15 years or more he acted to his considerable detriment in reliance on an expectation repeatedly encouraged by Peter that he (David) would inherit Peter's estate, or at least Steart Farm, such that it has become unconscionable for the same to be disposed of elsewhere.
(3) All the elements of such a proprietary estoppel are disputed by the defendants. The defendants further contend that even if the claimant establishes such an 'equity', it would be disproportionate for it to be satisfied by the fulfilment of his expectation, and that he should be awarded a much lesser sum by way of satisfaction.
THE LAW
(4) As to the legal principles applicable to such proprietary estoppel claims, there is a large measure of agreement between the parties. They have cited to me an extract from Snell's Equity (31 st ed.), and a number of cases, including in particular three relatively recent decisions of the Court of Appeal, Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210, Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P&CR 8, and Uglow v Uglow [2004] WTLR 1183. There is however one particular legal point in dispute, namely whether, at least in a case where an estoppel is raised so as to restrict testamentary freedom of action, it is necessary for the claimant to establish an express promise made in terms as such.
(i) The applicable legal principles
(5) Snell op cit summarises the current rule thus, at para. 10–16:
“In Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co Ltd Oliver J provided the following statement of the elements of the doctrine: 'If A, under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a certain interest in land thereafter, on the faith of such expectation and with the knowledge of B and without objection from him, acts to his detriment in connection with such land, a Court of Equity will compel B to give effect to such expectation.' This remains the most important and authoritative modern statement of the doctrine although it must now be qualified by the proposition that the relief granted by the court must be proportionate to the detriment suffered and that the court is not always required to satisfy his or her expectation by awarding the promised or expected interest in land.”
(6) In Uglow, Mummery LJ identified at para. [9] of his judgment the following 6 general principles as having been expounded in the 2 earlier cases I have mentioned, and as relevant to the Uglow case; they are relevant here too:
“(1) The overriding concern of equity to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the different elements of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel: assurance, reliance, detriment and satisfaction are all intertwined.
(2) The broad inquiry in a case such as this is whether, in all the circumstances, it is unconscionable for a testator to make a will giving specific property to one person, if by his conduct he has previously created the expectation in a different person that he will inherit it.
(3) The expectation may be created by (a) an assurance to the other person by the testator and intended by him to be relied upon that he will leave specific property to him; (b) consequent reliance on the assurance; and (c) real detriment (not necessarily financial) consequent on the reliance.
(4) The nature and quality of the assurance must be established in order to see what expectation it creates and whether it is unconscionable for the testator to repudiate his assurance by leaving the property to someone else.
(5) It is necessary to stand back and look at the claim in the round in order to decide whether the conduct of the testator had given rise to an estoppel and, if so, what is the minimum equity necessary to do justice to the claimant and to avoid an unconscionable or disproportionate result.
(6) The testator's assurance that he will leave specific property to a person by will may thus become irrevocable as a result of the other's detrimental reliance on the assurance, even though the testator's power of testamentary disposition to which the assurance is linked is inherently revocable.”
(7) In Gillett Robert Walker LJ observed (at 225C-E) that although his judgment was:
“for convenience, divided into several sections with headings which give a rough indication of the subject matter, it is important to note at the outset that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight compartments. Both sides are agreed on that, and in the course of the oral argument in this court it repeatedly became apparent that the quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and that whether there is a distinct need for a 'mutual understanding' may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood. Moreover the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round.”
(8) Later, when dealing with the extent of the relief in the event that the claimant established an equity, Robert Walker LJ observed (at 237A-B) that:
“The court's aim is, having identified the maximum [extent of the equity], to form a view as to what is the minimum required to satisfy it and do justice between the parties.”
In the later case of Jennings, he explained (at para 48) that :
“… reference to the minimum [in such a context] does not require the court to be constitutionally parsimonious, but it does implicitly recognise that the court must also do justice to the defendant.”
(9) Later in his judgment in Jennings, he went on helpfully to recapitulate what he held the law's approach to be to the question of how such an equity ought to be satisfied:
“50 …. there is a category of case in which the benefactor and the claimant have reached a mutual understanding which is in reasonably clear terms but does not amount to a contract. I have already referred to the typical case of a carer who has the expectation of coming into the benefactor's house, either outright or for life. In such a case the court's natural response is to fulfil the claimant's expectations. But if the claimant's expectations are uncertain, or extravagant, or out of all proportion to the detriment which the claimant has suffered, the court can and should recognise that the claimant's equity should be satisfied in another (and generally more limited) way.
51 But that does not mean that the court should in such a case abandon expectations completely, and look to the detriment suffered by the claimant as defining the appropriate measure of relief. Indeed in many cases the detriment may be even more difficult to quantify, in financial terms, than the claimant's expectations. Detriment can be quantified with reasonable precision if it consists solely of expenditure on improvements to another person's house, and in some cases of that sort an equitable charge for the expenditure may be sufficient to satisfy the equity (see Snell's Equity, 30th ed., para.39–21 and the authorities mentioned in that paragraph). But the detriment of an ever-increasing burden of care for an elderly person, and of having to be subservient to his or her moods and wishes, is very difficult to quantify in money terms. Moreover the claimant may not be motivated solely by reliance on the benefactor's assurances, and may receive some countervailing benefits (such as free bed and board). In such circumstances the court has to exercise a wide judgmental discretion.”
(10) In the same case Aldous LJ, giving the leading judgment, had importantly observed (at para 36)...
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