Unilateralism and Alliance Cohesion: The United States, Western Europe, and the Regulation of Energy-related Trade with the Soviet Union
| Author | Jan Braathu |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678301800103 |
| Published date | 01 March 1983 |
| Date | 01 March 1983 |
Unilateralism
and
Alliance
Cohesion:
The
United
States,
Western
Europe,
and
the
Regulation
of
Energy-related
Trade
with
the
Soviet
Union
JAN
BRAATHU
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo
Braathu,
J.
Unilateralism
and
Alliance
Cohesion:
The
United
States,
Western
Europe,
and
the
Regulation
of
Energy-related
Trade
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XVIII
,
1983,
21-41.
The
point
of
departure
for
this
paper
is
the
nature
of
Alliance
cohesion
and
the
means
of
achieving
this
over
an
extended
period
of
time.
A
historical
overview
of
East-West
energy
transactions
involving
both
the
Western
export
of
oil
and
natural
gas
equipment
and
technologies
as
well
as
the
import
of
oil
and
gas
seeks
to
trace
the
evolution
of
American
trade
control
policies
and
their effect
upon
the
West
European
energy
relationship
with
the
Soviet
Union.
But
the
effects
of
these
trends of
policy
are
also
sought
related
to
the
evolution
of
intra-Alliance
relationships
in
general.
The
major
underlying
force
is
the
strain
between
the
unilateralism
of
sanctions-policy
concep-
tualization
and
the
prerequisite
of
multilateral
implementation.
Thus,
the
result
of
our
unilateralism
...
is
to
alienate
our
friends
without
taming
our
adversaries.
The
result?
Increasing
signs
of
disintegration
in
the
delicate
fabric
of
Western
unity ...
George
W.
Ball,
Diplomacy
for
a
Crowded
World,
1976,
p.
304.
INTRODUCTION
It
is
in
the
very
nature
of
alliances
to
seek
consensus
and
to
maintain
a
common
and
united
front
in
relation
to whatever
exter-
nal
threats
that
may
have
provided
the
rationale
for
their
coming
together
in
the
first
place.
Nonetheless,
it
is
relevant
to
question
the
degree
to
which
consensus
and
unity
must
be
achieved
in
order
for
the
alliance
to
maintain
its
meaning
and
its
ability
to
achieve
long-term
objectives.
Objectives,
as
well
as
the
ways
and
means
of
attaining
them
are
not,
however,
above
the
changes
dictated
by
developing
environmental
settings
or
altered
domes-
tic
circumstances.
Therefore
the
original
basis
for
alliance
cooperation
may
event-
ually
be
surpassed
by
the
passage
of
time
and
the
general
evolution
of
events.
In
order
to
avoid
obsolescence,
alliances
must
consequently
adapt
their
common
objectives
as
well
as
the
instrumentalities
for
the
realization
of
these
in
step
with
the
evolving
perceptions
and
inclinations
of
the
alliance
members.
This
may,
how-
ever,
prove
difficult,
for
it
is
by
no
means
given
that
interests
and
the
methods
of
dealing
with
them
will
develop
in
a
con-
sistent
and
coherent
fashion
among
alli-
ance
members.
To
the
extent
that
con-
gruence
of
interests
and
instrumentalities
ceases
to
obtain
within
the
alliance,
there
no
longer
exists
any
firm
foundation
for
the
continuation
of
that
particular
form
of
cooperative
venture.
The
recently
ended
trans-Atlantic
dis-
pute
regarding
the,
issue
of
West
Euro-
pean
natural
gas
imports
from
the
Soviet
22
Union
is
one
area
in
which
the
questions
raised
above
have
shown
their
pertinence.
While
the
dispute
originally
took
the
form
of
a
debate
over
the
wisdom
of
entering
into
what
the
United
States
described
as
a
relationship
of
energy
dependence
to
the
Soviet
Union,
the
issues
which
crys-
tallized
in
the
course
of
the
well
18-
month-long
controversy
proved
to
be
of
a
much
more
fundamental
character.
While
the
points
of
contention
involved
the
terms
of
credit
provided
by
West
European
governments,
the
employment
effects
of
the
transaction,
the
foreign
exchange
earnings
provided
by
the gas
sales
to
the
Soviet
Union,
as
well
as
the
real
price
of
the
commodity
in
question,
in
addition
to
the
supply
security
aspect,
all
of
these
issues
in
reality
centered
around
the
question
of
East-West
trade
in
its
broadest
sense.
Indeed,
it
was
in
many
ways
reminiscent
of
debates
in
the
eighteenth
century
between
mercantilists,
holding
that
trade
strengthened
the
opponent,
and
the
free-traders,
who
stressed
mutual
benefit.
The
latter
group,
being
believers
in
what
has
by
some
been
termed
the
’Manchester
Creed’,
con-
tended
that
trade
in
itself
served
to
dis-
sipate
the
sources
of
conflict
through
the
increased
contact
between
different
cul-
tures.
Naturally,
this
analogy
should
not
be
pressed
too
far,
but
the
point
never-
theless
remains
that
the
American
pos-
ition
concerning
trade
relations
with
the
Soviet
Union
has
all
the
marks
of
a
zero-sum
conceptualization.
This
stands
in
sharp
contrast
to
the
view
more
com-
mon
in
Western
Europe,
that
trade
with
the
Eastern
European
countries
and
the
Soviet
Union
is
not
only
economically
advantageous,
but
also
politically
desirable.
Unilaterally
conceived
and
imposed
American
sanctions
on
the
sale
of
gas
pipeline
equipment
to
the
Soviet
Union
were
first
implemented
on
29
December
1982,
formally
in
response
to
the
military
crackdown
in
Poland and
the
banning
of
the
’Solidarity’
labor
movement,
which
were
understood
by
the
United
States
to
be
the
result
of
Soviet
pressures
and
threats
of
military
intervention.
At
that
time,
the
Reagan
Administration
pro-
hibited
American
oil
and
gas
equipment
manufacturers
from
exporting
oil
and
gas
transportation
equipment
to
the
Soviet
Union.
On
18
July,
this
ban
was
extended
to
American
subsidiaries
in
Western
Europe
and
measures
were
threatened
against
those
West
European
companies
that
exported
gas
turbines
containing
US
produced
and
export-restricted
rotor-
blades
to
the
Soviet
Union.
This
ban
was
made
retroactive,
thereby
adding
to
the
West
European
exasperation
already
caused
by
the
extra-territoriality
of
the
American
sanctions.
Newspaper
commentaries
have
tended
to
regard
these
sanctions
as
something
peculiar
to
the
Reagan
Administration.
We
intend
to
take
exception
to
such
an
interpretation,
arguing
to
the
contrary
that
the
Reagan
sanctions
fit
nicely
into
a
sequence
of
American
policy
imple-
mentation
with
regard
not
only
to
East-
West
trade
in
general,
but
to
East-West
energy
transactions
in
particular.
We
believe
it
possible
to
argue
that
United
States
policy
objectives
in
this
area
have
retained
a
basic
orientation
toward
the
general
containment
of
Soviet
power,
whether
this
be
expressed
via
military,
political
or
economic
means.
We
further-
more
contend
that
the
ways
and
means
by
which
the
United
States
has
gone
about
achieving
this
have
undergone
only
incre-
mental
modification.
Significantly,
this
modification
of
the
instrumentalities
of
policy
objectives
has
been
motivated
in
part
by
the
need
to
ensure
the
continued
support
of the
West
European
allies,
but
also
out
of the
desire
to
reap
some
of
the
benefits
of
East-West
trade
for
American
business.
A
further
incentive
working
toward
such
adaptation
has
been
the
wish
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